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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores how cultural knowledge, beliefs, and practices affected the 
humanitarian aid response to disasters in Haiti and Aceh Province, Indonesia. It examines 
the importance of local knowledge in post-disaster response situations and how aid 
workers’ “expertise” interplays with local knowledge, decision-making structures, and 
leadership. I questioned how knowledge of cultural practices could contribute to a more 
effective humanitarian aid approach and identified housing, social institutions and local 
leadership, economic systems, religious belief and practice as primary focuses. Examples 
detail how cultural beliefs and practices—as well as cultural heritage—may be vehicles 
for social stability and advance recovery in the social and economic spheres. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The Haitian earthquake of January 2010 left the cities of Léogane and Port-au-
Prince in ruins and compounded the poverty and instability of the Caribbean nation. 
Beyond the fractured infrastructure, the human toll was staggering: an estimated 200,000 
were dead and millions displaced. The aid response was swift as international agencies—
some of them long-established in Haiti—developed strategies to distribute aid. Monetary 
pledges poured in from around the world as funds were solicited to provide essential 
services and goods and for reconstructing hospitals and schools.  
Four years prior, on December 26, 2004, an earthquake triggered a tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean. A reported 167,000 lives were lost in the Aceh province of Indonesia alone, 
equivalent to 4 percent of the population (Hyndman and Waizenegger 107). The power of 
the wave was evident in the extent of the physical destruction. Water reached far inland, 
destroying man-made structures and erasing natural coastal features. 
Rapid response is necessary following natural disasters like those in Haiti and 
Aceh, meaning cultural complexities are often a secondary concern. Once emergency 
measures have been taken, humanitarian organizations may consider their role in the 
long-term recovery process and consider the consequences of aid projects and 
development programs. Aid may be disruptive and ultimately delay recovery if it is not 
culturally appropriate or rooted in cultural practice, and certain approaches may not be 
suitable based on a population’s cultural values and historical experience.  
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Numerous examples detail how government agencies and foreign NGOs take part 
in post-disaster recovery processes and determine community needs and priorities with 
little or no consultation with the affected population. Despite the efforts of well-meaning 
individuals and aid organizations, a lack of cultural understanding and meaningful 
participation by local stakeholders often leads to misguided programs that are unwelcome 
or unsuccessful in the short- or long-term. Standardized aid approaches can be ineffective 
because local cultural forces, traditions, and beliefs are frequently disregarded. 
It is prudent to define the term “culture” as there are numerous definitions that 
may be applied based on a particular theoretical approach. UNESCO explains culture as a 
“complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, laws, customs, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by [a human] as a member of society” ("Learning 
to Live Together"). It is also described as “a dynamic force for renewal and creativity,” 
hence its use as an asset or tool for post-disaster reconstruction and development (Bokova 
“The Power of Culture for Development” 3). The definition of culture as “sets of learned 
and shared attitudes, beliefs, and value characteristics of a particular society” is also 
applicable because of its emphasis on transmission through and by people (Sidky 421).  
For the purpose of this thesis, I have elected to view culture as the beliefs, values, 
attitudes, and practices that a group of people adheres to, as well as the social institutions 
and relationships in which they participate. Culture is transmitted by people and through 
people. I am interested in how beliefs, attitudes, and practices are negotiated in the 
aftermath of disaster and during response efforts, but also in the impact of disaster and 
humanitarian response on social institutions such as families, religious groups, and 
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economic systems. I believe an understanding of culture that embraces both short- and 
long-term change is especially important because of the rapid changes that may occur 
following a natural disaster.  
In an article written for the Journal of the Prince Claus Fund, anthropologist 
Anthony Oliver-Smith defines cultural heritage as, 
…the historical memory of a community, to that which links people to 
others and to their environment throughout time.  Cultural heritage is 
constituted in objects, resources, and practices that locate a people in the 
universe, giving them a sense of identity through time. (“The Centrality of 
Culture in Post-Disaster Reconstruction” 20) 
Thus, cultural heritage can refer to material culture, communal practices, cultural 
performances, and significant sites. It has been proposed the destruction or loss of any of 
these cultural heritage assets can bring about a loss of collective identity, “erasing 
cultural memory and severing links with the past” (Silverman and Ruggles 5).   
The natural disasters in Haiti and Aceh wreaked havoc on cultural heritage sites, 
devastating museums, places of worship, and other culturally important locations. The 
Haitian National Cathedral and the presidential palace crumbled, and the Nader 
Museum—an important collection of Haitian folk art—was leveled. In Aceh, the tsunami 
waves decimated mosques and meunasah, crucial community and religious structures, in 
coastline villages. Cultural heritage has also been targeted in times of conflict to inflict 
emotional and psychological damage. The inadvertent destruction of culture due to a 
natural disaster can have a similar emotional effect. It has been suggested that the 
protection and preservation of cultural heritage—both tangible and intangible—can help 
a community regain a sense of meaning and control and support the recovery process. 
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This thesis is a comparative study between disaster response efforts in Haiti and 
Aceh. It explores the importance of local knowledge—and the role of anthropologists—in 
post-disaster response situations and in understanding the human, social causes behind a 
disaster. This thesis contributes to the field of anthropology because it details an 
application for the study of cultural systems. It also makes a contribution to cultural 
heritage and museum studies because it explores post-disaster approaches to cultural 
heritage and the ways in which its symbolic importance can support a community in 
recovery. Examples detail how cultural practices—such as religion, economic systems, 
housing, family structure, and community leadership—and cultural heritage sites may be 
vehicles for social stability and cohesion. 
Humanitarian aid efforts typically address visible damage and the need for food, 
water, and shelter, but I questioned how knowledge of cultural practices could contribute 
to a more effective humanitarian aid approach. The two disasters detailed in the following 
chapters shed light on how cultural values and practices may factor in human-centered 
aid and sustainable development programs. I elected to use a case study approach to 
understand the particular cultural features of both Aceh and Haiti and how they were or 
were not leveraged as part of the aid response. I also conducted a comparative study of 
the post-disaster response in both locations to aid in the identification of more general 
guiding principles and recommendations for humanitarian aid organizations.  
To guide the development of the case studies and comparative study, I focused on 
particular aspects of culture and developed a set of research questions, introduced in 
Chapter Two. I identified housing, social institutions and local leadership, economic 
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systems, religious belief and practice, and cultural heritage as the primary focuses and 
developed questions to direct my research. I was interested in how housing and habitation 
patterns were impacted by the disasters and if aid organizations addressed shelter in a 
way that met cultural needs. I sought to understand how aid workers’ “expertise” 
interplays with local knowledge, decision-making structures, and leadership. I developed 
research questions to examine how disaster survivors and aid organizations sustain the 
economic system in a post-disaster period. I questioned how aid organizations supported 
religious practice, even for beliefs that were controversial or different than their own. My 
research questions also inquired into how the protection or restoration of cultural heritage 
may advance social and economic recovery. 
Chapter Two introduces the specific set of research questions and explores the 
methodological basis for the Haitian and Acehnese case studies and the comparative 
study of the humanitarian aid response.  It also introduces theoretical foundations upon 
which this thesis is built and establishes vulnerability as a central concept. The chapter 
highlights the psychosocial challenges that survivors face after a disaster and how culture 
can provide stability and psychological support. The chapter investigates the problems 
that arise when culture is not integrated into disaster response or work is done without 
local consultation. It also explores how emergency humanitarian aid is linked to long-
term development efforts and the importance of culture at all stages of assistance. 
Cultural heritage is defined and several examples put forth as to how it has been 
threatened during times of conflict but also how it has been leveraged for tourism. Finally, 
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the chapter briefly notes how gender is also an important consideration in humanitarian 
aid work.  
Chapter Three explores the historical factors contributing to vulnerability in Haiti 
and Aceh. The concept of vulnerability posits that disasters are the result of human, 
societal factors that impact a population’s ability to cope with earthquakes, tsunamis, and 
other natural forces. With this idea in mind, this chapter delves into the roots of Haiti and 
Aceh’s susceptibility to natural hazards.  
Temporary camps are common in a post-disaster landscape. Chapter Four 
explores the challenges associated with displaced and disrupted communities. The 
chapter examines how local knowledge can be used to construct environmentally 
appropriate housing and to design homes that take into account cultural practices.  
In Chapter Five, I explore the tensions that can arise when humanitarian aid 
workers and survivors meet in a post-disaster context. Conflict can surface because of a 
lack of cultural understanding, feelings of distrust, language barriers, religious 
differences, and aid workers living apart from the everyday realities of survivors. The 
chapter also underscores the benefits of working through local cultural and community 
structures.  
Chapter Six inquires into the need for culturally appropriate and sustainable 
employment. In the chapter, I investigate temporary employment models, like “Cash for 
Work,” and how outside investment does or does not create sustainable economic growth. 
The chapter emphasizes investment in training and leveraging local and informal 
economies to support development.  
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Religious beliefs can both support and complicate the recovery process. Chapter 
Seven delves into faith-based needs post-disaster and how religion can be a lens through 
which a disaster is processed and understood. Survivors’ religious beliefs, however, can 
conflict with the worldview of responding agencies and complicate the work of aid 
workers.  
Chapter Eight focuses on cultural heritage and how heritage loss was addressed in 
Haiti and Aceh following natural disaster. The chapter profiles several organizations with 
different approaches to heritage protection and restoration. The chapter concludes with an 
example of how cultural heritage production is sparked by natural disaster, and how the 
value of cultural heritage is communicated to a museum audience. 
As historian David Lowenthal is quoted, “beleaguered by loss and change, we 
keep our bearings only by clinging to remnants of stability” (6). Lowenthal refers to 
change in the 20th century, but the same sentiment may apply to the changes that take 
place post-disaster. Placing an emphasis on culture and cultural heritage can create more 
sustainable solutions and may help a community regain a sense of meaning and control. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS AND THEORY 
 In this chapter, I introduce my primary research questions and explain the 
methods utilized. The following sections also introduce the foundational concepts I have 
applied to a study of the humanitarian response in Haiti and Aceh. To better understand 
the human role in natural disasters and why disasters impact populations unequally, I first 
introduce the idea of societal vulnerability. Disaster can cause psychological distress and 
delay recovery. I explore how disaster survivors process trauma and establish several 
strategies for post-disaster psychosocial aid.  
The role of culture in humanitarian aid is a central theme in the following chapters. 
I provide several examples of how cultural values and practices have and have not been 
addressed in other post-disaster contexts and how cultural values and practices can 
support long-term development goals. Cultural heritage is a significant focus of this 
thesis. Several sections of this chapter explore the links between cultural heritage and 
identity—both personal and collective—and how it may be leveraged for economic 
growth as well as community healing. The chapter concludes with a section to explain 
how disaster impacts men and women differently and how the recovery process can keep 
women’s needs at the forefront.  
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Research Questions 
The primary questions that guided my research were: How are cultural factors 
considered as part of a humanitarian aid response? Are there benefits to factoring cultural 
values, beliefs, and practices in humanitarian aid decisions? Conversely, are there 
consequences for disregarding cultural values and traditions in the aid response?  
There are many parts to a post-disaster humanitarian response, such as healthcare, 
housing, and food distribution. For the purpose of this thesis, I focused on housing; social 
institutions and local leadership; economic systems; religious belief and practice; and 
cultural heritage as key factors in a humanitarian response. I chose these areas of focus 
because they surfaced in other post-disaster accounts as either important considerations 
for survivors, areas that aid organizations addressed, and needs that went unfulfilled.  
I developed a set of questions to guide further inquiry into specific components of 
post-disaster humanitarian work: 
• How are habitation patterns and social relationships impacted by disaster? 
• What is the role of shelter in the recovery process?  
• Did aid organizations approach rebuilding homes in ways that support local 
cultural needs and environmental constraints?  
• To what extent do cultural differences present a challenge to disaster recovery? 
• How do aid organizations and disaster survivors negotiate cultural differences?  
• How do aid organizations work with community groups and social institutions to 
address needs?  
• In what ways does natural disaster impact livelihoods and the economic system? 
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• Can aid organizations support economic recovery through employment 
opportunities without creating new dependencies? 
•  How did aid organizations support or ignore religious practices, beliefs, and 
institutions and integrate them into their efforts? 
• What is the impact on a community when heritage sites are destroyed, heritage is 
threatened, or heritage practices suspended after a disaster? 
 
Methodology 
 I chose the case study method and the comparative method to address the research 
questions I proposed above. At the time I began my research, it was not feasible for me to 
travel to either location because of safety concerns in a post-disaster environment. 
Therefore, I sought out different resources to help me understand the situation after the 
earthquake. These resources included: accounts written by Haitian and Acehnese 
museum and cultural heritage professionals; post-disaster analyses conducted by 
anthropologists, sociologists, disaster researchers, psychologists, and humanitarian policy 
professionals; articles written by government personnel; surveys and studies conducted 
by NGOs; news articles and journalistic pieces; online posts by community and 
grassroots organizations; and disaster situation updates and briefs. The case study method 
allowed me to compile detailed accounts of the complex pre- and post-disaster situation 
in Haiti and Aceh and independently identify significant concepts. I utilized the 
comparative method to further explore conceptual similarities and relationships. 
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Case Study Method 
Education researcher Helen Simons defines a case study as the documentation of 
“a particular situation or event in detail” and from multiple perspectives (Simons 1). I 
chose to use the case study method because I believed it was essential to study the 
humanitarian aid response in both Aceh and Haiti in depth. As Louis Cohen, Lawrence 
Manion, and Keith Morrison write in Research Methods in Education, one of the benefits 
of a case study is that they “report the complex dynamic and unfolding interactions of 
events, human relationships and other factors in a unique instance” (181). Therefore, the 
case study method can be beneficial to describing and analyzing key events that unfold 
post-disaster, understanding the whole of the situation, and appreciating its complexity.  
 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison explain that case studies are often “concerned with 
a rich and vivid description of events relevant to a case” and “[blend] a description of 
events with the analysis of them” (Cohen et al. 182). By utilizing the case study method, I 
aim to layer the accounts of disaster survivors and aid workers—among others—to create 
a nuanced description of the post-disaster situation and aid response. Case studies provide 
an opportunity to build upon the description of events with analysis. However, the case 
studies I utilize in this thesis were based on written accounts rather than firsthand 
experience, so they may not illustrate the reality of the disaster response in a way that 
provides a richly detailed, “vicarious experience” for the reader (Simons 5). This is not 
necessarily unique. There are case studies for international development programs and 
nation-wide projects that are less experiential and more focused on sharing information 
(Simons 5).  
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The strength and weakness of case studies lies in their particularity. Case studies 
have been criticized because they examine only one instance—albeit with great depth, 
detail, and insight—and findings may not be applicable to other cases (Cohen et al. 184). 
Haiti and Aceh were impacted by different natural events and faced unique circumstances 
and constraints during the reconstruction process. Insights from one case study may not 
be applicable to the other because of their distinct cultural factors. Simons supports the 
idea that generalizations can be made from finding connecting themes between multiple 
case studies—a “cross-case generalization”—as well as from a single case (21). Concept 
generalization, for example, supports creating a theory from the interpretation of a single 
case and identifying concepts that “have equal significance in other cases of a similar 
kind, even if the contexts are different” (Simons 22). A case study of the post-disaster 
response in Aceh may bring to light general concepts or inferences that may be relevant 
to the post-disaster response in Haiti.  
 
Comparative Analysis  
In addition to the case study method, I also elected to conduct a comparative 
study to identify similarities between the humanitarian response in both Haiti and Aceh. 
Comparison can be a valuable tool, especially for anthropologists. As Peter van der Veer 
comments in The Value of Comparison, “social and cultural analysis always takes place 
within a comparative frame” (van der Veer 32). A comparative study approach provides 
an opportunity to compare the qualitative information gathered in the case studies. In the 
article “A Purposeful Approach to the Constant Comparative Method in the Analysis of 
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Qualitative Interviews,” Hennie Boeije notes that comparison features prominently in a 
variety of approaches to qualitative research. Comparing and contrasting allow a 
researcher “to develop a theory…namely categorizing, coding, delineating categories and 
connecting them” (Boeije 393).  
Peter van der Veer provides a critical look at comparative studies in The Value of 
Comparison. Van der Veer suggests, “comparison should be conceived not primarily in 
terms of comparing societies or events…but as a reflection on our conceptual framework” 
(van der Veer 41). Consequently, I must acknowledge that the comparisons that I make—
and the categories that I identify to compare—are based on my own Western assumptions 
and conceptual and linguistic framework (van der Veer 27). Such conceptual categories 
may include the idea of an informal economy, religious institutions, and state structures. 
My particular way of viewing the world, affected the categories that I identified and led 
to my own assumption the two disasters are comparable (van der Veer 150).  
As Uwe Flick explains, “comparisons can be related to cases as a whole or to 
certain dimensions in the case” (40). In this thesis, I chose to compare case studies of the 
humanitarian response to the 2006 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. 
Particular cultural traditions, values, beliefs, and practices were conceived of as the 
“certain dimensions” Flick mentions. Peter van der Veer alludes to a similar idea when he 
comments that comparative studies with an anthropological lens can help us “gain a 
holistic insight into how things (ideas, flows, objects) are configured in historically 
evolving, open configurations” (van der Veer 147). Comparison can help draw attention 
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to the similarities and differences in the processes and relationships present in various 
socio-cultural environments. 
The intended outcome of a comparative study is not a universal recommendation 
or blueprint for how to approach cultural practices or values in a humanitarian emergency. 
Rather, the comparison was intended to highlight how similar challenges were 
approached in both locations. The comparison was also intended to provide some insight 
into “differences among the cases…coming from one or the other cultural background” 
(Flick 41). Flick notes the importance of context when conducting a comparative study in 
order to understand the variables present in each case (41). Additionally, van der Veer 
calls attention to the kind of generalization that can occur when conducting a comparative 
study. He explains that the goal of comparison is not to come “to some general truth but 
to highlight something that is not general, something specific without any pretense of 
general truth, but definitely of broader significance” (26). Thomas Gibson explains in the 
foreword to The Value of Comparison that “van der Veer advocates the intensive study of 
fragments of social life” rather than trying to make general statements on behalf of whole 
societies (van der Veer viii).  
 
Vulnerability and Disaster 
As noted by anthropologist Susanna M. Hoffman, “there is no such thing as a 
‘natural’ disaster. They are all caused by humans at one level or another” (Hoffman 4). In 
this view, disasters are not isolated incidents; they are a product of complex social and 
environmental vulnerabilities that build up in communities over time. Those with the 
fewest resources feel its effects most acutely. 
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In Catastrophe & Culture, anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith suggested 
vulnerability is, 
…generated though a chain of root causes ideological, social, and 
economic systems, the dynamic pressures of a demographic, 
socioeconomic, or ecological nature, and specific sets of unsafe conditions 
that, when combined with a natural hazard, produce a disaster. 
(“Theorizing Disasters: Nature, Power, and Culture” 28) 
Vulnerability can surface in a variety of different forms—economic, political, physical, 
educational, cultural, and ecological among them (Oliver-Smith, “Theorizing Disasters: 
Nature, Power, and Culture” 29). It can manifest as an ineffective political structure, a 
weak economic state, an imbalanced or centralized population, and inadequate 
infrastructure. A powerful natural event could wreak havoc on a population facing these 
types of challenges. In summarizing the tie between vulnerability and disaster, it is 
important to bear in mind that “societal factors affect the impact of disasters,” and it is 
individuals in low-income, non-democratic countries that often fall victim (Strömberg 
200).  
Anthony Oliver-Smith notes that more people worldwide are susceptible to 
natural disasters because of increasing population and communities living in more 
dangerous areas, such as along fault lines and in the shadow of volcanoes (“Theorizing 
Disasters: Nature, Power, and Culture” 43). A central tenet of vulnerability is, “the 
natural forces present in any environment have enormous power to affect society, but it is 
society that actualizes the potential of a hazard” (Oliver-Smith, “Theorizing Disasters: 
Nature, Power, and Culture” 42). The effects of an earthquake in the United States will 
vary greatly from the effects of an earthquake of the same size and intensity in a country 
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like Haiti or Indonesia. A disaster can manifest in a variety of ways depending on the 
vulnerabilities present in a society. 
 
Communities and Psychosocial Needs 
In Kimberly Maynard’s study of humanitarian intervention, mainly in cases of 
violent conflict, she comments that addressing only the physical suffering or discomfort 
of humans does not rectify all post-disaster needs (52). A crisis situation may result in 
profound personal suffering that comes with the death of a spouse, separation from 
family and community, homelessness, and the inability to resume a profession or 
livelihood. The loss of collective identity due to the destruction of communities and the 
dispersion of community members can affect survivors psychologically. The collapse of 
social institutions and intergroup relations can further the feeling of disorder beyond the 
physical destruction and visible chaos, exacerbating psychological vulnerability.  
The loss of collective identity can have harmful, long-term ripple effects on the 
psychosocial health of entire communities and has the potential to disrupt social networks 
far beyond the area of immediate physical destruction (Maynard 119). The psychological 
effects of a disaster may spread beyond those directly impacted—the victims and first 
responders—to family members, neighborhoods or communities in which victims live 
and work, to media personnel that experience the scene and “extend the experience of the 
trauma to the entire nation” (Breslau 185). 
Consider post-disaster displacement, which often correlates with relocation into 
temporary camps. Guglielmo Schininà and his colleagues at the International 
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Organization for Migration assert that within this unfamiliar setting, individuals must 
realign their “personal, interpersonal, socioeconomic, cultural and geographic boundaries” 
(158). Survivors in temporary camps may have to process the loss of family and key 
community members, live among strangers in housing lacking in privacy, worry about 
access to food, find an interim livelihood, and depend on the guidance of unfamiliar camp 
leaders. Internal displacement necessitates certain adaptations on the part of the affected 
population, including a redefining of “individual, familiar, group, and collective identities, 
roles and value systems” (Schininà et al. 158). As referenced in many post-disaster 
accounts, emotions run high and conflict occurs in camps for displaced persons, as the 
cultural and social systems and standards of pre-disaster life are often incompatible 
within the temporary settlements. Despite the natural resilience of many communities, 
these disruptions are all potential contributors to psychological distress. 
Many survivor accounts describe a spell of “post-disaster utopia” in which a sense 
of solidarity and unity overtakes the affected population immediately after a disaster. 
Individual concerns social disparities also seemingly disappear in the subsequent period 
of chaos. For example, during the Haitian quake of 1770 that decimated Port-au-Prince, 
Haitian historian Georges Corvington wrote, “blacks, soldiers, settlers rich and poor were 
all turned into mere people, leveled by common misfortune” (qtd. in Katz 55).  
Natural disasters may be an example of a shared “heritage of victimization” in 
which the perpetrator—in this instance, a natural disaster—inspires a sense of solidarity 
among those affected (Ashworth 232). According to Anthony Oliver-Smith, this period 
typically ceases with the influx of outside assistance (“Voices in the Storm” 14). 
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Socioeconomic concerns and class differences may reappear rapidly as aid is distributed, 
especially if it is allocated unevenly or is not given to certain groups. Susanna Hoffman 
observed that despite an initial sense of solidarity, community members drift apart and 
realign in ways much different than before the disaster (Hoffman 4). 
One theory is that communities go through similar psychological changes and 
phases of disaster summarized by Norman Faberow and Norma Gordon. The model 
begins with the “Heroic Phase,” the time immediately following the disaster when 
survivors act altruistically and emotions run high. The second phase is the “Honeymoon 
Phase” embodied by camaraderie and high hopes for outside assistance and recovery. 
Community members then enter the “Disillusionment Phase” in which prior promises of 
assistance are unmet and the community focus fades in favor of individual concerns. The 
model concludes with the “Reconstruction Phase.” Victims realize they cannot rely on 
outside assistance and must address their own problems (Breslau 185). 
Anthony Oliver-Smith advises the psychological distress that may accompany a 
disaster—a diminished sense of self and community identity—can contribute to a loss of 
meaning among those that survive the disaster (”The Centrality of Culture” 22). 
Displaced, removed from cultural context and social circles, survivors may feel 
disconnected from their place and purpose in life. For survivors, this abrupt change in 
social life and surroundings can “challenge people’s worldviews with profound 
existential questions” (Oliver-Smith, “Theorizing Disasters: Nature, Power, and Culture” 
38). In this instance, shared cultural practice can also promote social cohesion as well as 
resilience in the face of such challenges. 
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Following a 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, that claimed more than 5,500 lives 
and displaced another 320,000, an unprecedented number of psychologists and 
psychiatrists offered their services to disaster victims (Breslau 178). While Kobe stands 
in contrast to Haiti and Aceh for a number of reasons—including the high proportion of 
psychiatrists to the population—many of the psychological concerns remain the same. 
The earthquake impacted areas of the city in different ways. Psychologists and 
psychiatrists were key because they were centralized gatherers of information about the 
needs in the various communities. Mental health professionals went to community sites 
such as schools and temporary shelters. They spoke with survivors who had “intrusive 
thoughts and memories of the events, anxiety, and/or feelings of guilt about having 
survived while others died” (Breslau 180). They also talked about how they suffered 
because of the grief and sudden instability in their lives. This approach, which came to be 
known in Kobe as “care for the heart,” was widely supported as essential for recovery 
alongside physical rebuilding (Breslau 181). As a behavioral and social scientist, Joshua 
Breslau advocates for group therapy—like the “care for the heart” model—shortly 
following a disaster in order to process the trauma and avoid hampering long-term 
community recovery (185).  
International Organization for Migration staff members addressed psychosocial 
needs through the “Emergency Psychosocial Assistance” project that was mobilized in 
Haiti following the 2010 earthquake (Schininà et al. 159). In the first stages, teams—
consisting of a psychologist, social worker, animator-artist, educator and a team leader—
went into Haitian communities to provide “psychological first aid” (Schininà et al 159). 
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The teams counseled survivors both individually and in groups and led problem-solving 
workshops in temporary camps to tackle earthquake-related concerns. They addressed the 
increase in post-earthquake domestic violence and conflicts related to food distribution. 
The teams were also trained in providing art-based interventions for residents of the camp, 
especially children.  
 
Culture in Humanitarian Aid  
Following a disaster, numerous voices tend to chime in with opinions on 
emergency aid efforts as well as long-term reconstruction and development projects. 
These include individuals directly impacted by the disaster looking to share local 
knowledge, experts in the field of post-disaster redevelopment, and NGOs with 
preexisting information to share. The lack of success in many reconstruction efforts may 
be a result of a “failure to develop tools that can cope with…dynamism and complexity, 
compounded by a lack of understanding of the local contexts” (Oliver-Smith, “Voices in 
the Storm” 14). The cacophony of voices and opinions can create tension and make it 
difficult to align aid priorities. 
The issue of creating strategies for aid post-disaster is not a challenge limited to 
Haiti or Aceh. As Haitian filmmaker, political activist, and former Minister of Culture 
Raoul Peck notes, “nowhere in the world has the international community shown itself to 
be capable of managing crises in a sustainable way. Sticking plasters in an emergency, 
yes. But long-term nation building for the benefit of the population? No.” (Peck, “Dead-
end in Port-au-Prince” 44). In order for emergency humanitarian relief efforts and 
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potential long-term development projects to be effective, some cultural organizations 
have suggested that they should be designed with culture as a central concern from the 
outset. Communities experience disasters differently because of cultural variation and 
different degrees of vulnerability, a concept defined and discussed previously. Although 
respecting the culture and traditions of a particular region may cause discomfort or 
controversy among international aid workers or donors, ignoring or defying cultural 
foundations may compound difficulties and render efforts ultimately unsuccessful.    
Non-local aid agencies responding to a crisis situation, as explained by Mary 
Anderson in a chapter of Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, 
often revert to a mindset that “assumes victims of crises can do little or nothing for 
themselves” (139). Certain default modes of distribution rely on outside experts, 
imported infrastructure and the identification of the most deserving of assistance by non-
community members. Existing social and cultural frameworks are often circumvented, 
and efforts are concentrated on “delivery of things to these people, rather on problem 
solving with them” (Anderson 140). Anderson notes that all people “have materials, 
social systems, attitudes, and beliefs that enable them to survive” and move forward with 
their lives in productive ways (142). It may be more beneficial for outside aid to tap into 
local knowledge and resources in order to develop sustainable solutions. 
UNESCO endorses culture as essential in creating resilient communities that 
rebound from natural disaster or conflict. A quote from Haim Omer and Nahman Alon 
summarizes this concept: 
Social support will be less effective if supplied ad hoc and by external 
sources than when provided through the abiding social network; problem-
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solving skills will be more effective if they match the person’s usual and 
familiar activities than if they are perceived as extraneous; and preservation 
of old roles is more promising than acquisition of new ones…. Disaster and 
trauma mean disruption: prevention and cure should therefore aim at 
developing continuities at all levels. (Omer and Alon 275)  
 
It follows that in post-disaster chaos, leveraging the familiar cultural and social systems 
may better serve community needs than a multitude of different agencies and voices 
attempting to institute new structures and procedures (Daly 235). 
One example of leveraging familiar social networks is religious institutions 
embedded in disaster-affected communities. These institutions can also be a useful 
conduit for humanitarian aid when they work on behalf of the population and are 
entrenched enough in a community to know what is appropriate to place and culture. A 
study of a 1998 tsunami in Papua New Guinea examined the role of Combined Churches 
Organization (CCO), a group of Christian organizations dedicated to providing a 
“distinctive form of relief aid, informed by the local Melanesian culture and the Christian 
faith of its workers” with an eye on longer-term development work (Fountain et al. 321).  
Christian churches in Papua New Guinea were historically at the heart of other 
development projects in the area, achieving greater success—in some cases—than the 
local government (Fountain et al. 325). The CCO filled voids left by the government and 
other secular aid groups after the disaster by organizing a Sunday School, providing 
“personal interaction (including prayer, encouragement, support, and Bible Studies)…as 
well as the distribution of items such as Bibles and other religious tracts” (Fountain et al 
337). The grassroots response of the CCO may be seen as supporting the “abiding social 
network” and the “usual and familiar activities” mentioned by Omer and Alon (275).  
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When a community is separated and dispersed by disaster, existing social and 
cultural systems are challenged and may not be effectively utilized in aid efforts. 
Although vastly different from the situations in Haiti and Aceh due to the relative breadth 
of resources available in a wealthy nation, flooding due to Hurricane Katrina made it 
difficult for people to stay in their New Orleans communities due to the significant 
amount of property damage. John S. Petterson and his colleagues at Impact Assessment, 
Inc. noted that in the aftermath of the hurricane, “ethnic tensions have surfaced, net 
psychological effects are beyond measure, and even cultural identity and expression have 
been threatened, as many people have been separated from their home communities” 
(Petterson et al. 643). In order to maintain social relationships, many of the estimated 1.5 
million people displaced by the hurricane sought to live near familiar neighbors in their 
new cities. However, Petterson and his colleagues surmised that the physical destruction 
of communities and dispersion of the residents may have “accelerate[d] the cultural 
deterioration of bayou existence” (655) as many of those displaced did not return to their 
New Orleans neighborhoods.  
Disregard for the local context of a disaster, misunderstanding the local beliefs 
and value systems, or working outside the social and cultural frameworks, may generate 
relief that is ineffective and unsustainable. Worse, it may result in efforts that offend or 
further detract from the wellbeing of the population (Oliver-Smith, “Voices in the Storm” 
14). It may be advantageous for aid responders to understand the ideologies that guide a 
population, especially in considering plans for long-term support and programs.  
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In the Philippines, the “concept of bahala na…implies both a passive acceptance 
of fate, and a sense of risk-taking and courage” (Samuels 218). Guided by this concept, 
many Filipinos return to areas that are affected time and time again by disaster. An 
awareness of principles like bahala na can help external aid agencies better understand 
the population they are working with. What outsiders may see as fatalistic—a desire to 
repeatedly return to sites of disaster—can also be viewed as a valuable coping method. 
Bahala na is rooted deeply in local culture and encourages people to get back to daily life 
as quickly as possible.  
As will be discussed later in this thesis, in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, the reconstruction effort was challenged by the reluctance of foreign aid 
agencies and workers to integrate Islamic beliefs into their efforts. The flaunting of 
Islamic tradition was also cited as a concern of Pakistanis affected by a 2005 earthquake. 
A few specific instances also surface in an editorial written by Andrew Wilder, an 
international researcher, and anthropologist Tim Morris titled “Locals within locals’: 
Cultural sensitivity in disaster aid.” Wilder and Morris mention general instances of 
alcohol consumption and dancing at parties as examples of cultural and religious 
insensitivity (Wilder and Morris 2). Cuban medical workers in particular were cited for 
inappropriate dress (shorts and t-shirts) and for men and women cohabitating in tents 
(Wilder and Morris 1). It was non-local Pakistani women that drew the most ire from 
earthquake survivors for their “immodest” dress because they were held to a higher 
standard than international staff (Wilder and Morris 2). The Pakistani earthquake 
response is a reminder that conflict can occur not just between foreigners and locals. Aid 
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organizations may need to be responsive to urban and rural divisions, ethnic groups, and 
socioeconomic differences within the same community, region, or country. 
As Oliver-Smith explains, when locals, relief workers, military personnel, 
journalists, and politicians come together in the wake of a disaster, “the tensions among 
the social concepts, morals, ethics and goals” (“Voices in the Storm” 15) of all 
stakeholders can shape the resulting aid efforts and society—for better or worse—for a 
protracted amount of time. Some humanitarian agencies may find themselves in 
situations in which they may “need to make difficult choices between their principles and 
what is considered to be acceptable within a local culture” (Özerdem and Rufini 60). 
Local practices that marginalize women often fit into this area of concern. In a chapter of 
After the Conflict, Alpaslan Özerdem and Gianni Rufini specifically make mention of 
efforts to involve women in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Some donors and NGOs 
elected to end their assistance programs in the country because of the strict limitations on 
women, but in doing so, left some women without vital support (Özerdem and Rufini 60).  
James K. Boyce suggests, “aid is not like water, which sprayed on the flames or 
embers of conflict invariably helps to extinguish them. Indeed, it can be more like oil. 
Appropriate aid can diminish the risks of conflict, but inappropriate aid can fuel it” 
(Boyce 367). A number of examples support this idea that inappropriate external 
responses may worsen or prolong the effects of a disaster and delay reconstruction. In 
1970, the 7.9 magnitude Ancash earthquake caused a subsequent landslide in Peru. The 
earthquake and landslide left an estimated 70,000 dead or missing in North Central Peru 
(Oliver-Smith, “Traditional Agriculture” 108). In the response efforts, government and 
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international agencies addressed infrastructural damage but did not appear to understand 
local, cultural needs.  
In the hard-hit town of Yungay, the Peruvian government fought to relocate the 
surviving residents from a temporary camp to a new site 15 kilometers away. The 
government believed the location was safer should another earthquake strike. In 1977, 
Oliver-Smith noted that the survivors were in a state of “intense shock and emotional 
disintegration” (“Traditional Agriculture” 110) following the disaster. The Peruvian 
government’s relocation plan did not anticipate that many of the survivors had a strong 
emotional connection to the town. There was socio-cultural importance in remaining near 
loved ones buried by the landslide. The survivors united against the relocation plans 
because they feared their community would not survive if it lost its cultural roots. The 
relocation debate delayed redevelopment of Yungay for several years and tempered the 
flow of resources.  
Relief agencies in Yungay did not anticipate the problems that arose as they 
distributed resources. As supplies were given to various groups, the survivors’ initial 
sense of solidarity diminished because the region was divided along ethnic, social and 
economic lines. The distribution of essentials like food and clothing “reawakened the 
sharp lines of ethnic differentiation between Indian and non-Indian peasants and middle- 
and upper-class urban survivors” (Oliver-Smith, “The Brotherhood of Pain” 158). The 
egalitarian allocation of temporary housing—which conflicted with established class 
stratifications—caused a great deal of turmoil. The elites were most aggrieved by the loss 
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of established social order and insisted, “We are not equal!” (Oliver-Smith, “The 
Brotherhood of Pain” 159). 
Considering even this select number of instances in which aid efforts were 
unsuitable to lack of cultural understanding, it is evident that there is still much to be 
learned. In the role of United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami 
Recovery, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, notes that as an international community, 
…we must do better at utilizing and working alongside local structures…. 
Local structures are already in place and more often than not the ‘first 
responders’ to a crisis. The way the international community goes about 
providing relief and recovery assistance must actively strengthen, not 
undermine, these local actors. (3) 
Oliver-Smith makes the case that the anthropologist may be well positioned to serve as a 
“culturally knowledgeable mediator” in disaster response situations and to assist in 
aligning outside assistance with local realities and frameworks (“Voices in the Storm” 
14). 
Beyond immediate, emergency assistance, the efficacy of development programs 
in the months and years after a disaster varies widely, and, according to some experts, can 
be more destructive than helpful. Understanding the cultural nuances of an affected 
society may be key to providing appropriate emergency aid that supports long-term 
stability and ensuring that existing vulnerabilities are not perpetuated or worsened. A 
cooperative, culturally responsive distribution of emergency aid has also been shown in 
certain instances to reduce the ongoing dependency on aid. 
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Cultural Heritage, Identity, and Conflict 
It is prudent at this juncture to present a definition of “heritage” in order to 
understand how it has been connected to the concept of identity. Barbara Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett defines heritage as “a mode of cultural production in the present that has 
recourse to the past” (Destination Culture 150). Heritage may be understood as the 
product of shared beliefs, history, knowledge, and experience, tied to the past and 
performed in the present. Heritage may also be valued because it can function as a carrier 
of collective memory shared with future generations. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
term “heritage” encapsulates both tangible heritage sites—such as a monument or 
building of historical value—and intangible cultural practices.  
As Ian Russell states, “heritage and identity are not essences within any single 
person.  They are manifested and performed through interpersonal relationships and 
behavior” (Russell 33). Heritage exists because of an intentional choice to care for it and 
requires community participation in the present to sustain it. It follows, then, that 
destruction of a heritage site and the dispersion of a population can disrupt the behaviors 
and relationships that support it.  
Discussions around the value of heritage often center on the protection and 
perpetuation of identity. As Ian Russell explains, heritage may be conceived of as “shared 
identifications with stories, objects, symbols, performances [through which] one 
generation of a group can install the values of the group’s identity in the subsequent 
members of a group” (33). The emphasis on heritage protection to create “cultural 
solidarity” and perpetuate a group identity forms the basis from which cultural 
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organizations—like UNESCO—operate (McDowell 41). As Richard Palmer notes, 
“objects and places are not, in themselves, what is important about cultural heritage. They 
are important because of the meanings and uses that people attach to them, and the values 
they represent” (8). A threat to heritage may be seen as a threat to identity because it can 
interrupt the “transgenerational transmission of experiences,” meanings, and values 
(Russell 33). Therefore, protection of cultural heritage has been equated with the defense 
and continuation of group identity.  
Cultural heritage projects emerge in discussions of post-disaster relief because of 
their perceived community benefits. Heritage has been credited with creating solidarity 
and societal cohesion by linking communities with the past and creating social capital in 
the present (Lowenthal xiii). Generally speaking, cultural organizations are of the opinion 
that preserving the educational, economic, spiritual, aesthetic, communal, or historical 
value of cultural property can generate a sense of belonging and solidarity among disaster 
survivors. Heritage may also be called upon in support of a national identity. During a 
March 2010 conference convened to examine the long term rebuilding in Haiti, Prime 
Minister Jean-Max Bellerive expressed his concerns in saying, “look, I don’t want my 
country to look like the Dominican Republic or Indonesia or some other place. We’re 
searching for a genuinely Haitian way of rebuilding” (qtd. in Farmer 152).  
As heritage may be considered a source of collective identity and base for social 
cohesion, it may also be a target in instances of conflict. The intentional destruction of 
cultural property during warfare supports the principle that heritage is a critical 
component of personal and collective identity. The destruction of cultural property—
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whether intentional or incidental, as in the case of natural disasters—can erase cultural 
memories and challenge personal and collective identities (Hoelscher 200). There are 
numerous examples of cultural heritage sites strategically targeted in times of war as a 
tactic to demoralize and destabilize a population. 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, a number of ethnic and religious conflicts led to the 
intentional destruction of cultural property.  The Bosnian War (1992-1995) is frequently 
mentioned because of the extensive destruction of cultural property, despite the 
protections established by The Hague Convention of 1954. Cultural heritage sites in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were intentionally attacked in an attempt to destroy symbols of 
religious and cultural identity. Snipers damaged the façade of the National Museum of 
Bosnia. Serbian and Croat forces specifically targeted Bosnian mosques and other Islamic 
sites. Serbian anti-tank mines destroyed the historically significant Ferhad Pasha mosque 
in Banja Luka, dating to the 16th century (Maass 110).  
In the village of Mostar, Stari Most—a bridge hailed as a masterpiece of Islamic 
architecture—was reduced to rubble by Catholic Croat forces. The bridge was of minimal 
strategic importance but carried great cultural and historic significance for Muslims, in 
particular. The Old City of Dubrovnik in Croatia, designated as a UNESCO world 
heritage site, was shelled solely for its rich cultural tradition; its attack served no greater 
military purpose. 
Conflict in Kosovo (1998-1999) was rooted in conflicting views of national 
cultural identity. This contributed to the purposeful destruction of cultural property, 
namely historic architecture. Structures representative of Kosovo’s Albanian 
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population—including mosques, Islamic schools, monuments and libraries—were 
damaged (Herscher and Riedlmayer 112). The targeting of Islamic sites was indicative of 
the Serbian aim to attack Albanian cultural foundations. Albanians returning to Kosovo 
enacted revenge by damaging historic Serbian Orthodox sites such as monasteries, 
churches, and historic monuments (Herscher and Riedlmayer 112). 
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict was passed in 1954 as a reaction to the destruction of cultural heritage in 
World War II. As the above examples illustrate, it has not been universally signed on to. 
Although this thesis examines examples of unintentional cultural heritage destruction, the 
same principles hold true. It is also important that the cultural heritage of minority 
religious or ethnic groups is given equal consideration and attention in order to support 
the interests of all community members.  
 
Culture and Heritage in Development Work  
In the aftermath of a disaster, emergency humanitarian assistance and 
development activities can collide. Once the first wave of emergency aid has ended, the 
goals of short-term response programs and established development agencies may begin 
to align. One definition of international development characterizes it as “the processes 
and policies through which various actors seek to improve the living standards of 
societies that are not their own” (“(International) Development”). Development is often 
discussed in economic terms, but there are also social considerations. Development work 
may also focus on international objectives—such as eliminating “extreme poverty and 
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hunger,” reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and striving for “universal primary 
education”—and establishing standards to help guide development efforts (Basu and 
Modest 10).  
There are both local and non-local agencies working to achieve these objectives 
through various means—such as monetary output—and approaches. Anthropologist Maia 
Green describes the system of development organizations as, 
…existing in order to achieve whatever are currently defined as 
international development objectives…. The international development 
system includes a range of agencies and organizations, from small scale 
civil society organizations to international organizations with a global 
purview. Policy in development is contested and constantly changing. 
Implementation of development objectives is achieved through 
dissemination of policy through influence and the brokering of policy 
ideas, and through spending. (399) 
 
Development efforts may involve various NGOs, but governments have also used 
development programs as part of their approach to international relations. The 
involvement of states and organizations may prompt questions around their interests and 
how they benefit from their participation in development initiatives.  
Development approaches are not necessarily incongruous with humanitarian aid 
efforts. For example, one development approach looks to empower people to participate 
instead of being passive recipients, a stance echoed in many humanitarian aid programs. 
Researchers Ian Christoplos and Treena Wu explain that there may be disagreements 
about the “relative importance that should be given to sustainability versus speed” (44) 
when working to provide assistance. Humanitarian agencies may be focused on providing 
emergency solutions in difficult post-disaster situations in which quick response 
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outweighs any potential repercussions of their involvement, such as creating new 
dependencies or introducing unsustainable solutions.  
One concept that considers the continuum between emergency relief and long-
term strategies is the Linking of Relief, Reconstruction, and Development (LRRD). Both 
humanitarian aid and development organizations often look to alleviate chronic poverty 
and vulnerability—an issue in both Aceh and Haiti—but their approaches differ. Whereas 
a humanitarian organization addresses poverty by providing direct aid and social 
protection to the poor or those in greatest need, a development program may focus on 
reinforcing infrastructure in order to drive economic development.  
Both strategies have value because they meet initial needs and provide a 
foundation for sustainable solutions and opportunities. In order for LRRD to produce 
favorable results in a community, it may be essential for the response be fully considered 
in light of the local and broader cultural context. International organizations may also be 
challenged to determine how short-term aid and development programs can support 
communities in eventually reaching their own long-term goals without international 
assistance.  
In the article “Shifting Perspectives on Development,” Christoph Campregher 
makes a case for integrating local customs and cultural practices in aid and development 
activities. Western cultural practices or outsider, “expert” knowledge is not given 
preference over local knowledge and “culturally constrained beliefs” in aid or 
development programs (786). Campregher opens a discussion about what reconstruction, 
development, and the desire for change really mean, and questions who is driving the 
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process. The push to “build back better”—a phrase introduced during the Indian Ocean 
tsunami recovery and recycled following the Haitian earthquake—perhaps questions the 
capacity of a community to take care of itself or suggests that culture hinders its ability to 
do so. The concept of “building back better” can also be construed as an indictment of 
what a country, state, or community has failed to do, suggesting that an “externally-
driven top-down reconstruction effort” can rectify those failings (Daly and Rahmayati 
59).  
Anthropologist Christina Kreps comments on post-disaster humanitarian response 
following a 2005 earthquake on the Indonesian island of Nias and introduces the idea of 
‘cultural humanitarianism,’ which suggests that aspects of culture and cultural heritage 
can be used as a resource during the reconstruction and recovery process (“Cultural 
Heritage, Humanitarianism and Development” 252). Nias’ vernacular architecture 
demonstrated resilience to the seismic forces, but foreign NGOs pushed for homes to be 
constructed using concrete and other modern materials. Most houses were rebuilt with 
concrete—an environmentally inappropriate material—and were modeled after single-
family Western dwellings. However, the Museum Pusaka Nias (Nias Heritage Museum) 
was a proponent of Nias’ traditional architecture because it supported many aspects of the 
island’s cultural and social life. Kreps notes that the museum was only able to contribute 
a small number of traditional houses to the reconstruction effort, but the quality of the 
homes “modeled culturally appropriate, community-based approaches to housing” (Kreps, 
“Cultural Heritage, Humanitarianism and Development” 266). Homes rebuilt in the 
traditional style supported cultural and social practices—such as extended families living 
  35!
together—and could be built and repaired with local resources and techniques. Although 
Nias’ vernacular architecture was utilized sparingly in the recovery effort, this example 
demonstrates how cultural heritage can be a resource that meets both cultural and basic 
post-disaster needs (Kreps, “Cultural Heritage, Humanitarianism and Development” 267).      
Culture has been perceived as inimical to development efforts in years past as it 
was “associated with traditions and customs that were sometimes seen as obstacles” to 
modernization and development (Bokova, “The Power of Culture for Development” 1). 
The very idea of “development” is “synonymous with concepts of advancement, change, 
evolution, and progress” (Basu and Modest 4). Foreign interventions in the name of 
development assume that some states lag behind the modern world, and various programs 
and projects can help them draw level. This belief may also reinforce a colonial mindset 
and inequalities in the name of progress. Uma Kothari writes that these interventions—by 
virtue of trying to achieve some stated development goal—may “[ignore] the steps and 
strategies that people use to imagine and realize their own futures” (Kothari 68-69).  
UNESCO argues that culture is essential in both humanitarian and development 
activities, and it is crucial to creating sustainable solutions. Irina Bokova, Director-
General of UNESCO, discusses the “transformative power” of culture in a 2013 article 
aptly titled “The Power of Culture for Development” (3). Culture is cited as the “key” for 
achieving stability and security, creating socially inclusive development programs, 
fostering economic opportunities that improve living conditions, and protecting the 
environment (Bokova 12). UNESCO supports the view, 
…no development can be sustainable without a strong culture component. 
Indeed only a human-centered approach to development based on mutual 
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respect and open dialogue among cultures can lead to lasting, inclusive 
and equitable results. (Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativity) 
 
In addition to supporting a population’s creativity and innovation, UNESCO belives that 
cultural values and practices can guide economic growth and infuse reconstruction with 
local knowledge, technology and labor. As Paul Basu and Wayne Modest note, cultural 
knowledge “has generally been employed to support the achievement of…more 
fundamental objectives,” such as those initiatives described at the beginning of this 
section (11).  
Calling upon locals to take ownership of reconstruction efforts may allow cultural 
knowledge to be utilized in favor of imported structures and keep long-term development 
programs relevant. However, this positioning of culture as a tool for achieving 
development initiatives has been criticized for perhaps artificially dictating “the futures 
that its ‘beneficiaries’ should aspire to” (Basu and Modest 4). Furthermore, Basu and 
Modest write, little is understood or known about how—or if—culture can impact the 
progress toward the expressed development goals. There are insufficient tools in place or 
methods established to measure these claims (11).  
 
Heritage Preservation and Cultural Tourism 
According to a UNESCO report, “The Power of Culture for Development,” 
culture can be a “powerful contributor to economic development, social stability, and 
environmental protection” (2). As many communities worldwide suffer from widespread 
poverty, environmental destruction and natural disaster, capitalizing upon cultural 
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resources is one way to create economic opportunities. UNESCO holds the belief that 
culture can act as a renewable resource when it is given attention and care, but it can also 
be lost or destroyed by human or natural forces when neglected.  
Cultural tourism can be a driver of economic development and turn a location into 
a destination. According to a UNESCO report, cultural tourism accounts for forty percent 
of tourism revenue worldwide (Bokova, “The Power of Culture for Development” 2). In 
Destination Heritage, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett comments, “heritage is a way of 
producing ‘hereness’”—or an escape from “sameness”—that can turn a location into a 
tourist destination (153; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Theorizing Heritage” 371). In addition 
to revenue from visits to heritage sites, cultural tourism can also power sales of local 
crafts and products, drive the need for improved infrastructure, and create employment 
opportunities (Di Giovine 20). Despite the potential draw of unique heritage and 
experiences, politically unstable locations and destinations with insufficient 
infrastructure—such as commercial airports, hotels, and restaurants—are likely unable to 
produce or support a tourism industry.  
Despite the potential economic benefits, there are challenges and criticisms that 
come with treating cultural heritage as an investment opportunity. In Barbara 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s Destination Culture, she examines the action of turning cultural 
heritage sites into tourist destinations, in which heritage converts “locations into 
destinations and tourism [makes] them economically viable as exhibits of themselves” 
(151). On one hand, the presentation of cultural heritage sites as exhibition and 
entertainment turns locations that could not survive otherwise into economically 
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profitable sites. However, they become a commodity as “representations of themselves” 
(Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Destination Culture 151).  
The display and performance of heritage for economic gain—often outside of its 
intended context—can often be conflated with historical reality or idealized. The 
resulting destination may be a “heritage production” that is parts both recycled from the 
past and new (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Destination Culture 7). Although participants may 
benefit financially from heritage performance, the experience may also be built around 
the desires of the tourist, the consumer. The sites and performers essentially become 
“players in a show written by international tourist discourse” (Bruner and Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett 467). As Basu and Modest note, this version is often “safe, sanitized and 
simplified” (7). 
Tim Winter, in Post-Conflict Heritage, Postcolonial Tourism, urged caution when 
creating the narrative presented to heritage tourists and locals at cultural heritage sites. At 
locations with difficult or contested histories, it is important to consider that there is not 
only “one way of telling or experiencing” (Winter 13). Winter emphasizes the importance 
of a democratic approach in weighing the experiences of minority groups at heritage sites. 
Stephen Hoelscher writes that the heritage sites most often remembered and preserved are 
those of the elites or the ruling class (207). John Urry comments it is important to 
integrate the lived histories and values of marginalized groups into heritage site 
interpretation to “avoid a one-sided history which under represents the poor” (57).  
UNESCO’s approach to heritage entails the addition of physical sites and 
intangible practices to various lists intended to give heritage symbolic value and 
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protection. Heritage protection or preservation is positioned as a responsibility or civic 
duty. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett critiques the conversations around heritage preservation in 
saying, “heritage is not lost and found, stolen and reclaimed. Despite a discourse of 
conservation, preservation, restoration, reclamation, recovery, recreation, recuperation, 
revitalization, and regeneration…” that is frequently echoed by UNESCO and other 
cultural organizations (“Theorizing Heritage” 369). However, these “decisions about 
what to preserve, what to develop and what to destroy provoke questions concerning 
value to whom, and at what cost?” (Palmer 7). UNESCO’s lists and policies may also 
shape national heritage policies and may inadvertently guide governments into valuing 
and valorizing one type of heritage over another.  
 
Gender in Humanitarian Aid and Development 
Gender is a critical variable in emergency humanitarian relief efforts and 
development programs, especially as the role of women has changed in an increasingly 
globalized world. Globalization has created new economic opportunities, but it has also 
impacted women’s household status and responsibilities. Janet Momsen, in the 
introduction to the book “Gender and Development,” refers to the duties that women 
often fulfill. Within a family, women are likely responsible for raising children, taking 
care of the home, assisting with subsistence food production, and taking on paid 
employment outside of the home (Momsen 2). Female vulnerability continually comes to 
the forefront in post-disaster situations because of the “gendered systems that precede 
disasters” (Egert 89). 
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Gender roles and expectations vary greatly by country and culture. A universal 
approach is ineffective because each gender—as well as gender relationships—must be 
understood in a specific societal or cultural context. Women in a single country are 
“differentiated by class, race, ethnicity, religion, and life stage” and education level 
(Momsen 8). Gender equality is frequently cited as a development goal, but it does not 
mean the objectives or day-to-day needs of men and women are the same. As Momsen 
notes, gender equality “recognizes that men and women often have different needs and 
priorities, face different constraints and have different aspirations” (Momsen 8).  
Gender-specific needs and interests are important considerations in humanitarian 
relief efforts. As Philip Egert writes, the different culturally based roles and needs of men 
and women before a disaster “foreshadow the differences in roles, responsibilities, and 
accesses to resources that women and men experience after disasters” (75). Egert notes 
that disasters disproportionately impact women, citing “historic disadvantages” as the 
reason why women encounter greater suffering in post-disaster situations than men (Egert 
86).  
In general, women have disproportionately higher mortality rates than men when 
a disaster occurs. Egert cites a 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh in which women died in their 
homes because they were waiting for their husbands to return home and decide in favor 
of evacuation (87). Disasters also spur increased rates of domestic and sexual violence 
against women, especially in a temporary camp environment. Egert notes that increased 
violence against women following a disaster is “not limited to developing countries” (87). 
The incidence of reported rapes rose following events like Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
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the Loma Prieta earthquake that hit San Francisco in 1989 (Egert 87). Men dominate 
disaster response, from emergency responders on the ground to NGOs and emergency 
management agencies. The participation and voice of women in emergency relief 
planning and response helps to ensure that specific female needs are addressed or 
gendered cultural practices considered (Egert 88).  
Similarly, development programs and planners have come under fire for 
“assuming that any new resource will be good for all women” without understanding the 
roles of women in the home and in the community (Momsen 16). Since the 1970s, 
development programs have approached women in different ways with variable success. 
Early programs assumed that women would directly benefit if their husbands had greater 
economic opportunities. The assumption was proven to be inaccurate; in general, male 
income is less likely to be spent on the family (Momsen 1). Subsequent development 
programs focused on income-generating opportunities for women. The programs were 
largely unsuccessful because women did not have extra time—outside of their household 
duties—in which to pursue those opportunities. The goals of later development programs 
converged in the early 1990s. The approach emphasized the importance of understanding 
each gender’s respective roles and responsibilities to ensure greater program success, 
focused on the concept of “empowerment” to drive participatory approaches, and 
included women’s concerns at all stages of the project (Momsen 14).  
While women’s needs are most frequently mentioned in discussions of gender in 
humanitarian aid and development, men also face challenges after disasters. There are 
few studies on masculinity and how the male role changes following a disaster. Some 
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men are forced to migrate out of the disaster zone to find work (Egert 82). In many 
cultures, men are the head of the household and the family provider. After a disaster, men 
may experience “feelings of helplessness, loss, inadequacy, and stress” when their role is 
subsumed by NGOs and camp organizers (Egert 81). 
 
Discussion 
In this chapter, I presented the research questions and methodologies for this 
study of post-disaster humanitarian response in Haiti and Aceh. I also introduced a series 
of concepts and supporting examples that touch upon the complex nature of a disaster 
situation. These topics included societal vulnerability; the potential psychological impact 
of disaster; the link between culture, humanitarian aid, and development; the symbolic 
value of cultural heritage and its tie to identity; challenges around the idea of cultural 
tourism; and gender as a variable in aid efforts. The concepts explored in this chapter 
include both the conditions that may precede a disaster as well as the socio-cultural 
outcomes. Although not an exhaustive list of the issues that aid organizations may 
encounter or choose to consider in a post-disaster situation, this chapter endeavored to lay 
a foundation for how cultural beliefs, values, and practices may factor in a humanitarian 
response, as well as long-term development programs. The next chapter examines Haiti 
and Aceh specifically in order to understand the environmental, social, and cultural 
context of each disaster.  !!
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS 
To understand why natural disasters impact places and people differently, it is 
important to explore the historic and cultural factors that contribute to social and physical 
vulnerability. Disasters are at the intersection of “biophysical systems, human systems, 
and the built environment” (Masterson et al. 2). Disasters occur where there is 
socioeconomic inequality, poorly functioning government, inadequate infrastructure, and 
people living in hazardous areas like “coastal areas, floodplains, earthquake fault zones, 
and steep slopes” (Esnard and Sapat 67).  
This chapter explores the historical roots of the social and physical factors that 
contributed to vulnerability in Haiti and Aceh. These factors impede a population’s 
ability to both prepare for a natural event and recover from it. As detailed in this chapter, 
the vulnerability present in a location depends on “the different histories of particular 
places in combination with ongoing features of current political culture and social 
policies” (Bolin and Stanford 97). 
  
Haiti: Historical Vulnerability 
The 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck in the afternoon of January 12, 2010, around 
the time of the evening rush hour. In the space of 35 seconds, buildings collapsed to their 
foundations, claiming thousands of lives outright. The scene, described by both Haitian 
and foreign survivors, was one of chaos and confusion as Haitians looked for friends and 
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families in the rubble and tended to those rescued and wounded. International 
organizations and foreign governments moved quickly to mobilize supplies, search and 
rescue teams, and medical personnel. As the scale of the disaster was realized, a sum of 
around $2.21 billion was allocated for emergency relief efforts by foreign governments, 
and private donors contributed billions in turn.  
American physician and anthropologist Paul Farmer comments in Haiti After the 
Earthquake that more medical aid was available in urban Haiti than ever before. Doctors, 
nurses and other personnel poured into the city (Farmer 14). The USNS Comfort docked 
in the Bay of Port-au-Prince and functioned as a floating hospital. Journalists and news 
organizations clamored to the island to cover the unfolding story for the world. The 
Haitian Diaspora waited for news from their relatives in the capital as downed phone 
towers limited communication. New challenges emerged after the initial crisis subsided. 
An early February 2010 Port-au-Prince situation update by the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that of the 3.7 million 
individuals living in the earthquake-affected areas, 1.1 million were homeless and 2 
million were in need of food (United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs).  
The earthquake devastated both the poor and the more affluent of Haitians, as the 
latter’s more expensive concrete homes collapsed with the swaying earth (Kurin 18). 
Some estimates indicate that 86 percent of the homes destroyed in the earthquake were 
constructed between 1990 and 2010—new buildings that sprung up as the city grew 
(Etienne 29). In comparison, an earthquake measured at 500 times the strength of the 
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Haitian quake hit Chile a month later. Although the epicenter was not located in an area 
of high density, the relatively few deaths were the benefit of a strictly enforced building 
code (Oliver-Smith, “Haiti’s 500-Year Earthquake” 20).  
All institutional and governmental critiques aside, the Haitian earthquake, 
registering a 7.0 on the Richter scale, would have been damaging even in a more 
developed country. The infrequency of earthquakes must also not be discounted. Prior to 
2010, the last major Haitian earthquake was in 1770. Neither earthquake warning systems 
nor response procedures were in place at that time. 
Haitians faced many challenges prior to the earthquake. A post-disaster needs 
assessment, conducted in collaboration with the Haitian government, disclosed chronic 
malnutrition in 30 percent of children and an illiteracy rate of 38 percent in Haitians over 
the age of 15. Haitians are also affected by widespread poverty. Before the earthquake, 
67 percent of the population survived on less than two USD per day (World Bank 5). 
Overpopulation in Port-au-Prince contributed to the high number of casualties because of 
the dense, unsafe housing structures. Two-thirds of the Haitian population is still rural, 
and many lack access to basic services like heath care and running water (Kurin 30). The 
earthquake compounded the challenges faced by aid workers already working in the 
country and required new approaches to address post-earthquake needs.  
Although the earthquake served as a catalyst, the disaster was a result of Haiti’s 
vulnerability. Contributing factors to vulnerability include Haiti’s poverty, limited 
economic opportunities, insufficient infrastructure, urban centralization, and lack of 
building codes. Combined with the physical risk associated with living on a fault line, 
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these social factors may have left Haiti especially vulnerable to the January 2010 
earthquake.  
 
Exploring Root Causes 
Anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith explained in a chapter of Catastrophe and 
Culture that vulnerability is “generated through a chain of root causes” (“Theorizing 
Disasters: Nature, Power, and Culture” 28). Oliver-Smith linked the historical roots of 
Haiti’s vulnerability to the decimation of the native Taino population by European 
disease after the Spanish settled the island in 1493. In the early sixteenth century the 
Spanish turned to the import of enslaved Africans to provide labor and fuel the plantation 
economy. Additional slaves were brought to the colony during the seventeenth century, 
then called Saint-Domingue and under French control, to labor on the sugar and coffee 
plantations. As noted by Anthony Oliver-Smith in Tectonic Shifts, the Saint-Domingue 
slaves “were producing 40 percent of all the sugar and 60 percent of all the coffee 
consumed in Europe” by the end of the eighteenth century (“Haiti’s 500-Year Earthquake” 
18). The economy of the important and lucrative French colony was entirely dependent 
on slave labor.  
The establishment of slave labor as the driver of economic production was a key 
contributor to Haiti’s economic vulnerability and social inequalities. Although 
independence from France was finally acquired in 1804—when Napoleon mounted a 
military effort to take back the island and was ultimately defeated—Haiti was not 
welcomed on the world political stage as the first black republic. Haiti’s isolation from 
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the international community resulted in a sense of self-reliance among Haitians and 
propelled inward social and cultural development (Kurin 30). In 1825, under threat of 
invasion, France demanded the new Haitian republic to pay reparations for the monetary 
loss of slaves and land. The United States and Britain instituted embargoes to pressure 
Haiti into delivering the reparation payment. The fresh debt crippled the new Haitian 
republic. It inhibited its development and impoverished its citizens, establishing historic 
roots for Haiti’s economic instability.   
Throughout the nineteenth century, Haiti’s government and elites profited through 
the extraction of the nation’s resources—sugar, coffee, and indigo—to France and the 
United States (Oliver-Smith, “Haiti’s 500-Year Earthquake” 19). Haiti’s leaders and 
elites failed to construct viable infrastructure “while impoverishing the population with 
brutality, militarism, mismanagement, and corruption” (Oliver-Smith, “Haiti’s 500-Year 
Earthquake” 19). The systemic underdevelopment of infrastructure and the loss of 
resources hindered economic growth in Haiti and left the majority of the population in a 
sustained state of impoverishment. The United States invaded Haiti in 1915 in an attempt 
to institute political and economic stability in Haiti and the Caribbean region. The United 
States oversaw the nation until 1934. Its exit led to a series of brutal dictatorships during 
the twentieth century, which severely worsened Haiti’s delicate financial footing.  
Although foreign involvement in Haiti’s affairs contributed to economic, political, 
and social vulnerability, Haiti has also been unable to create stable economic or political 
systems in more recent years. The successive father-son dictators “Papa Doc” and “Baby 
Doc” Duvalier, increased Haiti’s foreign debt through misappropriation and theft. In 
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power from 1957 to 1986, the dictators further impeded the development of a stable 
Haitian state. The election of Rene Préval in 1996 was noted as the “the first peaceful, 
democratic transition of leadership in Haiti’s history,” but many Haitians found his 
leadership to be lacking in the aftermath of the earthquake (Kurin 30).  
Misguided global practices in the twentieth century also made Haiti’s path to 
stability more difficult, which former U.S. President Bill Clinton acknowledged in an 
address before the Senate’s Foreign Affairs Commission in 2010. In his speech, Clinton 
referenced trade policies established in the 1990s that made Haiti the Caribbean nation 
most open to trade. A dramatically lower tariff on rice imports—plunging from 35 
percent to 3 percent—allowed for American rice imports to overtake domestically 
produced Haitian rice varietals because of the comparatively low cost. Haitian rice 
production was rendered useless as cheaper American rice flooded the markets. Clinton 
noted in his speech that, 
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, until the last year or 
so when we started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot 
of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden of 
producing their own food…so they can leap directly into the industrial era. 
It has not worked. (qtd. in Farmer 150) 
Prior to these changes, Haiti imported only 19 percent of its food and was able to export 
both coffee and rice (Peck, “A Common Search for Greater Humanity” 26). With limited 
job opportunities in rural areas and environmental degradation due to deforestation, 
former Haitian rice farmers—unable to earn a living through rice production—relocated 
to Port-au-Prince to seek out other employment.  
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Haiti and Foreign Involvement 
Haiti is not unfamiliar with foreign involvement. Years of instability, both 
political and economic, left Haiti largely reliant on the aid of foreign nations. USAID has 
been referred to as “Haiti’s biggest donor,” providing grants to smaller NGOs to carry out 
a variety of social projects independent of the Haitian government (M. Pierre-Louis, 
“Restoration and Social Value of the Historic Gingerbread Houses” 93). The United 
States and the United Nations both intermittently established a military presence in Haiti 
under the premise of humanitarian intervention and stabilization. Despite the necessary 
and vital aid provided to the country, there is also concern that a constant stream of 
humanitarian aid results in a dependent population trapped in a cycle of poverty (Gros 2). 
The same concerns apply to humanitarian aid that comes in the wake of natural disaster 
when responding agencies try to create locally sustainable solutions for long-term 
recovery. 
Haiti experienced natural disasters before the 2010 earthquake that prompted 
international aid organizations to respond. In Tectonic Shifts: Haiti since the Earthquake, 
Rachel Beauvoir-Dominique discusses the response to Hurricane Jeanne in the 
northwestern port city of Gonaives. The situation in post-earthquake Port-au-Prince 
paralleled the problems that arose in the densely populated area of Gonaives.  
In the initial aftermath of Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, Haitians invited displaced 
neighbors into their own homes and provided drinking water from their own wells. NGOs 
offered residents tents and tarps as a short-term solution for structural damage to their 
homes. The tents were initially well received by the population, as an opportunity to 
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“[restore] one’s family…as part of the fundamental rights relating to human dignity” 
(Beauvoir-Dominique, “Humanitarian Assistance in Gonaïves after Hurricane Jeanne” 
15). However, thousands were still using the temporary tent shelters five months later, 
unintentionally creating makeshift camps and shantytowns with overcrowding, water, and 
trash disposal problems (Beauvoir-Dominique, “Humanitarian Assistance in Gonaïves 
after Hurricane Jeanne” 15). In Gonaives, foreign help was promised and engineering 
projects planned, but few new protections were actually put in place. Just four years later 
in 2008, river flooding claimed nearly 800 lives in the city as it “flooded past its rooflines” 
(Katz 8).  
The security situation in post-Jeanne Gonaives was also a point of critique. The 
UN forces deployed to the city, numbering around 750, were accused of simply “strolling 
around,” unable to effectively protect the city’s residents (Beauvoir-Dominique, 
“Humanitarian Assistance in Gonaïves after Hurricane Jeanne” 16). Beauvoir-Dominique 
suggests that this perception of the UN forces was due to cultural unfamiliarity and a lack 
of clarity in the purpose of the security forces’ presence. In direct violation of Red Cross 
guidelines, Haitian Vodou practitioners were excluded from certain humanitarian 
distributions, their culture less favored for aid than nearby Protestant communities 
(Beauvoir-Dominique, “Humanitarian Assistance in Gonaïves after Hurricane Jeanne” 
16). The purposeful allocation of resources away from equally needy communities on the 
basis of religious practice only served to heighten divisions in the community. The issues 
in Gonaives mirror some of the prominent issues that emerged in the aftermath of the 
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earthquake and highlight what is lacking between delivering an emergency response and 
developing effective long-term solutions. 
Apart from emergency disaster aid, international development projects also 
illustrate the serious repercussions that can accompany cultural misunderstanding. In 
1978, during the tenure of “Baby Doc” Duvalier, Haiti’s pigs were diagnosed with 
African Swine Flu. USAID, concerned about the spread of the disease to the United 
States and Canada, oversaw the eradication of all Haitian pigs by 1984 and led the 
ensuing effort to repopulate.  
In rural Haiti, pigs act as savings accounts and have been referred to as the 
“pillars of the peasant economy” (Jean-Baptiste 98). They may be bartered for goods or 
services, and are an important source of nutrition. The Haitian peasantry was financially 
devastated by the mandatory slaughter as infected pigs were quickly sold at less than a 
quarter of their value. Repopulation of the swine was a long-term project, and no 
financial assistance was provided to peasants in the interim to account for their losses. In 
short, the decimation of the pigs, as a result of foreign involvement, left the rural poor 
even more impoverished.  
A 1985 study cites great concern about the breeds selected by USAID to replace 
the infected pigs. The study cited that, “since these improved breeds require heavy capital 
investment (clean water, pig sties, etc.), high maintenance costs (feed, vaccine, 
medicines) and skilled veterinary care, they have no place in the Haitian peasant 
economy” (Ebert). These concerns were well founded: a 1994 article written about the 
project claimed that the search for a breed adapted to Haitian conditions continued a 
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decade later. The lack of knowledge about pigs’ role in the culture and livelihood of rural 
Haitians contributed to the failure of the project. The unsuccessful foreign plan increased 
vulnerability among some of Haiti’s poorest. The peasantry’s financial loss as the result 
of the pig slaughter has been estimated at $500 million (Jean-Baptiste 98). 
 
The Concept of Haiti as a Failed State 
At various points in its history, Haiti has been referred to as a failed state, defined 
as “a state that does not protect against risks” (Gros 18). Haiti’s persistent 
underdevelopment and a perceived inability to protect its citizens from disease and 
natural disaster contribute to this assessment (Gros 169). In an essay, Laura Wagner 
suggests that Haitians, “irrespective of class or politics, they largely concur that the 
government isn’t helping anybody. Their lives have always been their own responsibility” 
(18). While there may be disagreement around the definition of a “failed state,” or 
whether or not Haiti should or should not be classified as such, the designation prompts 
discussion around some of the challenges that faced the Haitian people and government 
at the time of the earthquake. 
The overpopulation of Port-au-Prince may be seen as an indication of a failed 
state. The concentration of goods and services in the capital city is a response of the 
leadership and elites to ensure the centralization and control of wealth and assets in order 
to maintain political control. The number of inhabitants in Port-au-Prince rose steadily in 
the decades prior to the earthquake. Impoverished rural Haitians flocked to the core to 
find work and access basic services. In a nation of an estimated 9 million people, between 
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2.5 and 3 million people lived in Port-au-Prince (Gros 174). The city was only equipped 
to handle a population of around 250,000 with its pre-earthquake infrastructure (Etienne 
28). The centralization of services ultimately exacerbated the devastation in the capital 
city. Unaffected areas outside of the urban core did not have basic resources—food or 
medical personnel—to send because supplies were concentrated and inaccessible in Port-
au-Prince (Gros 178). 
Haiti is also referred to as a failed state because of its inability to implement 
building codes. Dense, ramshackle housing grew on the unstable hills surrounding Port-
au-Prince to accommodate the exploding population (Oliver-Smith, “Haiti’s 500-Year 
Earthquake” 21). The homes were constructed haphazardly and without any safety 
oversight. Corruption in the formal building sector enabled construction to be completed 
with little to no engineering supervision. State corruption and lack of oversight allowed 
for substandard construction materials to be sold and used.  
In a discussion of the idea of Haiti as a failed state, Jean-Germain Gros believes 
that a significant overhaul of the state system is required before long-term development 
can proceed (188). Longtime Haitian aid worker and humanitarian Paul Farmer believes 
there is need for a “Marshall Plan” for Haiti, referring to the financial and development 
plan for the rebuilding of Europe after World War II (37). As Haiti has habitually 
suffered from a lack of trust between the government and the people, its reconstruction 
may benefit from being thought of as a “re-foundation” (Vigilante 30). In an article in the 
September 2010 UNESCO Courier, Antonio Vigilante notes that the first step in the “re-
  54!
foundation” process would be to strengthen the political leadership structures on a 
national level (30).   
Furthermore, what role would foreign organizations play in the process? There are 
still questions around how long-established aid organizations best work with Haitians in 
the rebuilding and development process. Vigilante also warns against the theories of 
cultural determinism. Any failures of development work in Haiti cannot be ascribed to 
“inherent flaws in cultural traits” (Vigilante 29). The examples of the rice tariff, the failed 
pig eradication project, and the misguided response to Hurricane Jeanne highlight the 
potential repercussions of ill-advised foreign involvement and how it can contribute to 
vulnerability. In an essay written for the Smithsonian Institution’s Saving Haiti’s 
Heritage Project, Elizabeth Préval, the former First Lady of Haiti, appealed to the 
international community to think of Haitian recovery in the long term, to help the nation 
“[rebuild] differently and [create] solid, accessible, and efficient public services” (E. 
Préval 17).  
A disaster like the 2010 earthquake does not have a singular cause. As noted by 
Anthony Oliver-Smith in “The Centrality of Culture in Post-Disaster Reconstruction,” a 
number of forces, including “cultural, social, environmental, economic, institutional and 
political” combine in a disaster (20). These forces are at play in Haiti because of its 
history of colonialism, slavery and subsequent independence, geography, and urban 
centralization. Whether or not it is accurate or fair to describe Haiti as a failed state, the 
chaos following the earthquake was a result of social vulnerability and governmental 
failure, not just the result of environmental or geographic challenges. 
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Aceh, Indonesia 
Halfway around the world, and just over five years prior to the 2010 Haiti disaster, 
a high-magnitude earthquake triggered a devastating tsunami that claimed an estimated 
150,000 lives in Aceh alone. Striking on December 26, 2004, the tsunami became known 
as the “Boxing Day Tsunami” by many news outlets. Tsunamis are not an unheard of 
phenomenon in Indonesia—created by both earthquakes and volcanic eruptions—but the 
swiftness with which the waves arrived on shore was particularly devastating due to the 
lack of warning. The tsunami waves up to 40 meters high hit Indonesia’s Aceh Province 
30 minutes after an earthquake triggered the withdrawal of the sea (Rand et al. 87).  
The three waves that hit Aceh rolled inland as far as 3 miles, destroying both 
coastal fishing villages and homes farther into the interior. An estimated 10,000 
kilometers of roads were destroyed in Aceh, and there was significant damage done to 
ports and airports, essential infrastructure to respond to a disaster (Rand et al. 187). While 
power plants in Aceh were not seriously damaged, the aboveground power distribution 
system was largely destroyed, as were many roads and bridges. The loss of this crucial 
infrastructure in many cases delayed both immediate rescue and humanitarian response 
and left some communities isolated (Cluff 16). Other structures that were well-
constructed and made with quality materials experienced far less damage. The La Farge 
Cement Plant, a cluster of steel, industrial structures outside of Banda Aceh, moved with 
the earth and withstood the waves with only superficial damage.  
Hyndman and Waizenegger note that nearly 500,000 people were displaced by the 
tsunami (around 15 percent of Aceh’s population) and 250,000 houses were destroyed. 
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Grass-roots reconstruction efforts began immediately after the tsunami to handle tasks 
such as cleaning out houses and burying dead bodies, a time-sensitive Islamic practice 
(Samuels 211). People displaced by the tsunami were sheltered in the homes of neighbors, 
friends, and family members. Just as in Haiti, basic services and infrastructure were 
destroyed: roadways, drinking water supply, schools, places of worship, and, in Aceh’s 
case, mosques, and health clinics.  
In response to the disaster, donors pledged 13 billion in USD, and within a few 
days, 60 international NGOs arrived in Indonesia to offer assistance (Kenny et al. 4). The 
number of NGOs grew to 200 in the following weeks. The Indonesian government also 
established the Bandan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Agency of the Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction for the Region and Community of Aceh and Nias), more simply referred 
to as BRR. The BRR was the primary coordinator of the reconstruction effort in Aceh 
and the nearby island of Nias. 
 
Context of Disaster 
To understand the response in Aceh at the time of the tsunami, it is important to 
understand the “geographical and historical context in which disaster strikes” (Hyndman 
21). Aceh province is located at the northwestern point of the Indonesian archipelago on 
the island of Sumatra. So positioned, it has long been a point of contact between Indian, 
Europeans, and Arabs on trade routes. Buddhism first gained a foothold in the 8th century 
before trade networks introduced Islam to the inhabitants in the 13th century. Because of 
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this history, present-day Acehnese are majority Muslim and live under Islamic law, but 
they continue to abide by some animist practices. 
Throughout its history, traders from a number of different European powers 
visited the sultanate of Aceh and attempted to set up trading settlements in the area. 
During Aceh’s golden age, which coincides with the rule of sultan Iskandar Muda from 
1604 to 1637, Aceh controlled a significant portion of the island of Sumatra and was an 
important trading center for spices, cloth, precious metals, and pepper (Cleary and Chuan 
93). After 1641, the sultanate’s political and economic influence and importance declined 
as the Dutch East India Company established a presence in the region. In an attempt to 
control the shipping lanes, the Dutch conquered nearby Malacca—now a part of 
Malaysia—and the kingdoms of the island of Java. Despite the Dutch presence, Aceh 
retained economic importance through its trade connections with local indigenous groups.  
By the late 19th century, in an era of rising colonialism, the Dutch attempted to 
conquer Aceh. The hostile action led to 25 years of open warfare until the surrender of 
the sultan in 1903. The Acehnese were oppressed, terrorized, and psychologically 
defeated by decades of war. The Dutch struggled to turn the damaged region into a 
functioning, profitable colony after years of physical destruction and cultural 
deterioration.  
Aceh was occupied by Japan during the Second World War, but after the Japanese 
defeat, the Dutch recaptured Indonesia in 1946 before the Federal Republic of Indonesia 
was established in 1949. The first president of the centralized Indonesian government, 
Sukarno, gave Aceh a distinct provincial status in 1959 in order to pacify Acehnese 
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murmurs of rebellion (Hyndman 25). This status gave Aceh relative autonomy on matters 
of religion, education, and culture in the province, but it carried little weight otherwise. 
Because Aceh province didn’t have control over its own natural resources, its citizens 
were subject to “economic domination” by the centralized government in Jakarta (Kenny 
et al. 8). Valuable resources, like liquid natural gas, were exported and Aceh province 
received little revenue.  
 
Acehnese Independence and the Indonesian State 
The Free Aceh Movement (otherwise known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or 
abbreviated as GAM) was established in 1976 as an agent of Acehnese independence. It 
“waged a low intensity separatist campaign” against the Government of Indonesia (GoI) 
in Jakarta over the ensuing decades (Daly and Rahmayati 59). The armed conflict was 
characterized by the presence of Indonesian security forces stationed in Aceh as part of 
counter-insurgency operations. The conflict resulted in the death of between 10,000 and 
26,000 people in Aceh, many of them massacred civilians (Kenny et al 8). Repeated 
attempts at a ceasefire and peace agreement, notably in 2002, did not hold.  
The tsunami did serve as a catalyst for peace in Aceh. It influenced the signing of 
a 2005 peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh 
Movement. This “disaster diplomacy” saw a peace treaty agreed upon that still persists to 
this day. The Indonesian government and its military forces and the GAM came to 
understand that in order for Aceh to recover following the tsunami, the conflict could not 
continue (Hyndman and Waizenegger 107). Although peace talks had been agreed to in 
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the lead-up to the tsunami, arrived at through secret negotiations, the disaster created the 
need for expedience to allow for international aid to reach Aceh. The devastation and 
suffering in Aceh necessitated that all the involved parties work to find a way to peace 
and sustain it.  
There is a strong sense of nationalism among the Acehnese because of its history 
of struggle against the Indonesian government. Efforts by the government to send 
Javanese to settle in Aceh province “was seen as a tactic by the central government to 
‘Indonesianize’ its rebellious province” and could be seen as an affront to the unique 
culture and religious practices of Aceh (Hyndman and Waizenegger 108). As a result, 
distrust and resentment was established between the Acehnese and the government of 
Indonesia and fueled secessionist movements. 
The concept of vulnerability, discussed in the previous chapter, has also been 
brought up in relation to the involvement of the Indonesian government in Aceh. As 
discussed by Jim Glassman in a 2005 editorial entitled “Tsunamis and other forces of 
destruction,” the Indonesian state may be partially to blame for increasing Aceh’s 
susceptibility to natural disasters. Aceh is natural resource-rich, including deposits of 
natural gas and oil. Glassman argues that Indonesian government, centralized in Jakarta, 
“redistributed wealth from the periphery to the core” (165). This flow of revenue and 
resources out of the province led to the Acehnese leading “marginal lives” (Glassman 
166).  
The rate of chronic poverty in Aceh before the tsunami was estimated at nearly 30 
percent of the population. In comparison, the poverty rate in the rest of Indonesia was 
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estimated at 17 percent (Christoplos and Wu 43). Years of conflict led to high rates of 
corruption in the province, a sense of distrust, especially of the centralized Government 
of Indonesia and foreign agencies, and underdeveloped local resources (da Silva 26). 
Because of the military conflict that was occurring in Aceh at the time of the tsunami, 
martial law was in full effect, complicating the entry of international NGOs. 
Aceh’s colonial history and struggle for independence—first from the Dutch and 
then from the Government of Indonesia—are contributing factors to its vulnerability to 
natural hazards. The contentious, distrustful relationship between the province and the 
Government of Indonesia is a recurring complication in Aceh’s history. Resources from 
the semi-autonomous province disproportionately benefited the GoI and weakened the 
Acehnese economy. Ongoing violent conflict increased Aceh’s political and social 
vulnerability and limited the province’s ability to provide assistance for its residents 
following the tsunami.  
 
Discussion 
Why compare the humanitarian response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 
2004 Boxing Day tsunami? There are plenty of incongruities. Haiti is less than half the 
size of Aceh and did not have the additional challenge of a long-term separatist conflict 
to complicate relief efforts. However, by comparing the two natural disasters that 
occurred in particularly vulnerable states—as defined by Oliver-Smith—certain aspects 
of cultural consideration come to the forefront. Aceh’s history of foreign involvement, 
natural resource exploitation, and strong sense of nationalism provide interesting parallels 
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to Haiti. Both disasters spurred enormous donations from around the world and an influx 
of international relief agencies. The mantra of “build back better” originated with the 
Indonesian tsunami recovery and was later invoked in Haiti, perhaps without full 
agreement on the meaning of “better.”  
As Jonathan Katz writes, the Indian Ocean tsunami response also served as a 
model for some of the Haitian response and organization. For example, the Interim Haiti 
Recovery Commission (or IHRC), an independent entity established to oversee 
reconstruction, was based on the Indonesian BRR. In both Aceh and Haiti, these 
reconstruction agencies were formed in response to the NGOs’ unwillingness to work 
with various levels of government, alleging corruption. The IHRC and BRR were in 
place to coordinate efforts among NGOs that would not have contact otherwise, either for 
simple logistical reasons or because “they view other agencies as competitors for favored 
projects, labor, or supplies” (Katz 151). However, the Haitian entity was considerably 
weaker than the Aceh model. 
 Five years separate the Southeast Asia tsunami and the Haitian earthquake, but 
similar issues and cultural considerations arose in both disaster responses. In a critical 
comparison of both disaster responses, the following general areas of cultural concern for 
responding international agencies rose to the surface: displacement and relocation; 
insider/outsider relations as foreign organizations attempted to work with locals; 
employment and development of local economies as part of relief programs; implications 
of religion and religious practice; and efforts directed at preserving and restoring cultural 
heritage sites.   
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 As Hyndman points out in Dual Disasters, specifically in a chapter entitled 
“Siting Conflict and Peace in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka and Aceh,” it is important not to 
oversimplify and overstate the similarities between two sites hit by natural disasters. Haiti 
and Aceh have distinct histories, and while both include struggle against colonial powers, 
their challenges and cultures are ultimately different and result in different post-disaster 
responses. A successful approach in one location may not be applicable in a secondary 
location due to cultural nuances.  
The lack of attention to the local cultural forces, customs, and complicated 
histories can impact the long-term efficacy of aid efforts. Haiti’s frequently ineffectual 
central government, and Aceh’s complicated quest for recognition as an independent 
Islamic province, are fundamental considerations when determining how to formulate a 
culturally appropriate disaster response. In their efforts, many foreign agencies and 
volunteer groups come in direct contact with the local population. However, working 
with locals directly does not guarantee success in the short or long term. International aid 
organizations may benefit from knowledge of the historical factors and cultural nuances 
that contribute to vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISPLACEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 The disruption of a community after a disaster can cause a great deal of distress 
because survivors are separated from their homes, social networks, and livelihoods. In 
Chapter Four, I examine the challenges of displacement from home communities, often 
into the stressful environment of a temporary camp or new communities lacking the 
resources to provide support. Two questions guided my investigation into post-disaster 
shelter: How are habitation patterns and social relationships impacted by disaster? What 
is the role of shelter in the recovery process? While temporary camps are often fixtures of 
post-disaster response, I evaluated how their resources and organization could either 
jumpstart or delay the psychological recovery of a community.  
I also posed an additional question around housing reconstruction: Did aid 
organizations approach rebuilding homes in ways that support local cultural needs and 
environmental constraints? In the last section of this chapter, I examine the issues and 
limitations around the reconstruction process, such as contested land ownership and 
unfamiliarity with the social functions of homes. I discuss how aid organizations are 
challenged by the requirement of materials and modes of construction appropriate to 
place and environmental challenges.  
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Tent Cities and Temporary Shelters 
The Haitian earthquake and tsunami in Aceh were both powerful natural forces. The 
natural disasters wiped out residential areas and basic services, forcing residents to seek 
shelter and supplies. Temporary camps are often the hubs for the distribution of 
emergency aid after a disaster. Survivors relocate to a camp in order to obtain food, water, 
medical care, and shelter because such necessities are no longer available in their home 
neighborhoods.  
The following section explores the challenges and problems that arise in the 
temporary camp environment. Survivors are often unwilling or unable to return to their 
home neighborhoods because supplies and services are centralized in the temporary 
camps. This limited access to food, water, health care, and shelter outside of the 
temporary camp can lead to permanence, perpetuating the disruption of community 
structures and social networks. 
Jonathan Katz explains in Tectonic Shifts: Haiti since the Earthquake, that these 
temporary camps are, at best, “planned relocation sites with temporary shelters…and 
social services such as security patrols, water, maintained toilets, clinics, and some 
simulation of a school” (111). The majority of temporary camps do not offer all of these 
basic services. To avoid these settlements becoming permanent— a problematic scenario 
for a number of reasons—it is important to consider a range of strategies for aid 
distribution and develop plans for permanent, replacement housing. As temporary camps 
are frequently funded by non-local organizations, they may not take into account cultural 
or social norms. 
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After the earthquake, many Haitians found themselves displaced, their homes in 
rubble or damaged to the point of structural instability. The aftershocks that shook Port-
au-Prince also drove people to live in the open air for fear of further collapse. According 
to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the estimated number of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) peaked around 1.3 million in the summer of 2010 (Schuller and 
Morales 111). Shelter became the primary concern for many Haitians, especially given 
the looming arrival of the rainy season. Four days after the earthquake, there were an 
estimated 107 temporary settlements for survivors. Six months later, there were between 
1,300 and 1,500 temporary camps, 800 of which were located in and around Port-au-
Prince (Katz 96). In the spring of 2011, more than a year after the earthquake, the IOM 
estimated 600,000 people were still living in temporary camps or “tent cities” (Schuller 
and Morales 111). 
In Haiti, some tent cities cropped up organically around food and water 
distribution points, such as the one that was established at the Petionville Club golf 
course. The U.S. military used the golf course as a base to hand out water and rations, 
and the temporary settlement quickly ballooned to tens of thousands of people (Katz 96). 
Many aid responders recognized the danger of the temporary camps becoming permanent 
slums, hindering redevelopment by occupying land meant for reconstruction. Although 
some of the Haitians living in the camps had habitable homes in close proximity, they 
were reluctant to leave behind the access to necessary supplies and chose to stay put.  
One survey conducted by the United States-based organization LAMP for Haiti 
examined living conditions in the camps. The survey involved teams of U.S. investigators 
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and Haitian student volunteers interviewing 90 Haitian families from six IDP camps (The 
LAMP for Haiti Foundation et al. 1). The survey found that a month after the earthquake, 
15 percent of the respondents lacked a shelter of any kind and were living in the open air. 
Three-quarters of families surveyed did not receive shelter from aid organizations—such 
as a tent or tarp—and instead created shelters from salvaged materials (The LAMP for 
Haiti Foundation et al. 8). 73 percent of survey respondents expressed a need for food 
assistance that was not provided (The LAMP for Haiti Foundation et al. 9). While the 
survey did not involve residents of all the temporary camps around Port-au-Prince, it does 
support an understanding that many camps did not meet residents’ needs for shelter or 
food.   
Many camp residents experienced stress and sleep deprivation, lax security—
despite a frequent military presence—and erratic food distribution. In Fault Lines, author 
Beverly Bell describes how residents rarely had “safe or private places to bathe, wash 
clothes, relax, or, in the case of kids, play” in the overcrowded camps (133). Access to 
water and bathroom facilities varied from camp to camp. Remote water sources or 
latrines made women “targets for sexual and physical abuse and assault” (Rand et al. 
201). Reports of gender-based violence surfaced in the camps, including women and girls 
attacked on the way to the latrines. In one “well-managed” camp, more than seven 
percent of women had been sexually assaulted in the three months following the 
earthquake (Farmer 147). 
With efforts to clear rubble in Port-au-Prince stymied by the lack of a clear plan 
for a dumping location for debris, most of the collapsed concrete structures in the city 
  67!
remained where they fell and rebuilding stalled. IDPs were left without alternative 
housing options and were forced to remain in the tenuous environment of the temporary 
camps. As time elapsed after the earthquake, some of the temporary camps became 
established shantytowns with informal economies (a topic further explored in Chapter 
Six). Others remained rows of flimsy tarp shelters. Providing IDPs with tarps rather than 
complete tents was a tactic used to prevent the tent cities from becoming permanent, but 
it came at the expense of resident comfort and safety.  
Temporary camp residents were further endangered by the impending hurricane 
season. An American humanitarian relief team proposed the construction of 125,000 T-
shelters, small, temporary plywood structures that provide a stronger barrier to inclement 
weather (Katz 99). The wealthy Haitian families that owned open land near to Port-au-
Prince were reluctant to donate any space for the T-shelters to be built (Katz 115). 
Without local cooperation, many IDPs remained in tarp shelters through the 2010 
hurricane season and beyond. Resident discomfort was likely high because the tarp 
shelters flooded frequently and provided little protection from the elements.  
NGOs working in temporary camps asked for representatives to claim and 
distribute assistance to the camp residents and to relay their needs to aid workers. 
However, NGOs often disregarded established local leadership or grassroots 
organizations when forming committees, bringing into question the legitimacy of such 
groups (Schuller 120). Jonathan Katz notes that young Haitian men most often came 
forward to claim the responsibility and serve as camp leaders (101). The imbalance 
between male and female camp committee members is a concern because of frequent 
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reports of gender-based violence in post-disaster situations (Schuller 120). Katz cites 
other examples of corruption and mismanagement in the Haitian camps as they were 
allowed to persist for months—and years—following the earthquake. In one camp, called 
Marassa, residents told the journalist that the camp’s governing committee reserved the 
best food and most favorable camping sites for themselves (Katz 103). The imbalance of 
men in the camp government and the breach of existing community networks raises 
concerns about how needs—and whose needs—are addressed in the temporary camp 
environment.   
Tsunami survivors in Aceh faced similar post-disaster challenges to those in Haiti. 
Immediate survival needs were addressed, including the demand for temporary shelter in 
the form of tents and barracks. Aceh was challenged with IDPs throughout the decades of 
internal armed conflict. The IDP crisis grew in 2004 as more than 500,000 people lost 
their homes and were displaced immediately following the tsunami (Fan, “Disaster as 
Opportunity?” 5).  
In Aceh—as in Haiti—there were instances of displaced persons settling in 
temporary camps. In the days following the tsunami, many survivors made their way to a 
hilly area southeast of Banda Aceh. The location quickly became the focus of 
humanitarian aid organizations because of the number of IDPs (Mahdi 145). The 
concentration of services and aid agencies created an IDP camp that drew other survivors 
from neighboring regions. A number of Acehnese went back to their tsunami-affected 
neighborhoods two or three months after the tsunami. While many no longer considered 
themselves IDPs because they “returned home,” they were largely living in tents or 
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makeshift structures (Mahdi 140). The movement of tsunami IDPs back to their home 
communities—and away from temporary camps—is a marked difference from what 
occurred in Haiti.  
The majority of tsunami IDPs, approximately 67 percent, migrated to nearby 
communities where they had family or connections through the gampong structure 
(Mahdi 140). In Aceh, gampongs are communities, “villages in rural areas and 
neighborhoods in more urban settings” with a leadership structure and shared social and 
religious values (Daly 240). Due to “gampong cohesiveness…grounded in kinship and 
family,” tsunami IDPs were welcomed and supported by neighboring “host communities” 
(Mahdi 136; 140).  
A study conducted in several Acehnese communities found that those with higher 
levels of education were more inclined to settle in host communities than in government-
built barracks (Rofi et al. 348). The study suggests Acehnese with higher educational 
attainment and socioeconomic statuses have wider support networks than those with less 
education. For disaster survivors with limited resources and small support networks, 
relocation to an IDP camp provides easier access to basic services and supplies. The 
study also revealed that a higher percentage of female-led households settled in host 
communities than in the IDP camps (Rofi et al. 348). The study responses imply women 
found more security and safety in staying with family than settling in a camp where 
gender-based violence is a risk.  
Approximately 17 percent of Acehnese tsunami IDPs chose to reside in 
government-built temporary camps. They moved into military-style barracks, a type of 
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housing not particularly suited to the gampong social structure. For researcher Patrick 
Daly and Yenny Rahmayati, Director of the Aceh Heritage Community Foundation, the 
“vital roles that gampongs play within Acehnese identity…are embodied within the 
vernacular landscapes of Acehnese villages” (64). The barracks did not provide the 
spaces needed for community social practices to take place as they did in the village 
environment. Limited amount of space in the barracks resulted in IDPs from the same 
gampong—or even the same family—being moved into different barracks (Mahdi 142). 
The barracks disrupted the communal nature of gampong life and the social order.  
The access to supplies was also a point of stress with some of the government-
built camps in Aceh. Survivors from the Al-Mukarramah neighborhood in Banda Aceh 
were divided between the government barracks, makeshift shelters in their destroyed 
neighborhood, and family members in other communities. The division was prompted by 
an inadequate number of barracks to house all the survivors from the neighborhood. It led 
to tension and disagreements between members of the same gampong.  
A number of survivors from Al-Mukarramah lived in temporary tents in their old 
neighborhood. There, they subsisted without sanitation and other essential infrastructure. 
They observed that the residents of the barracks were given supplies by the government 
and NGOs. They believed the barrack-dwellers to be in an advantageous situation. The 
barracks residents were faced with similarly poor living conditions, with “limited water 
and sanitation facilities and a lack of privacy” (Mahdi 143). Those in the barracks felt 
they were not receiving enough from the NGOs and would visit their former 
neighborhoods and ask for more supplies and support. The perceived resource inequality 
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led to jealousy and distrust among the dispersed community members, and they 
questioned their leaders. The forced physical separation of the community rendered 
useless the traditional methods through which such problems and tensions could be 
addressed.  
Survivors from another community, Gampong Lambung, had greater success in 
rebuilding their village and maintaining strong social relations. Lambung survivors 
centralized themselves while in an IDP camp, enabling them to stick together and 
organize. Male survivors built a barrack in their old neighborhood so that displaced 
residents, including women and children, could gradually return. The gampong 
leadership continued to meet, and all communication with aid agencies was centralized 
(Mahdi 146). Gampong Lambung did not face the same discord as Al-Mukarramah 
because they prioritized community organization and cohesion and were able to move 
gampong members out of the IDP environment.  
For Acehnese tsunami survivors, a primary factor in the choice to return to their 
home neighborhood was the desire to live in a familiar place in which social bonds 
connected them to neighbors and friends. As a student named Lina explained, “All our 
friends are from here, so if we would move we would again experience a loss. We 
already lost family members, now perhaps we would lose our neighbors too” (Samuels 
213). As Lina’s comment indicates, social relationships were a major driving force in the 
choice to return and rebuild in a tsunami-hit neighborhood. 
Government barracks were constructed in many neighborhoods after the tsunami. 
From the barracks, survivors connected with neighbors, engaged with NGO programs, 
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and oversaw reconstruction of their homes (Samuels 213). Several years after the tsunami, 
most living in the barracks had returned to their own homes, and familiar social activities 
resumed. Cultural anthropologist Annemarie Samuels cited the study of the Koran, 
marriages, and birth celebrations as important points at which neighbors intersected 
socially (Samuels 213). Informal daily interactions—like women meeting at the market 
or men gathering at a coffee shop before or after evening prayer— also helped build and 
rebuild community relationships (Samuels 214). 
Post-disaster temporary settlements in Aceh and Haiti significantly disrupted 
“individual, familiar, group, and collective identities, roles and value systems” (Schininà 
et al. 158). There were a number of problematic outcomes as a result of external agencies 
distributing aid outside of established social structures. Descriptions of temporary camps 
in Haiti demonstrate how the centralization of supplies and resources creates an array of 
problems, including dense, ill-equipped settlements. Insufficient shelter and the unstable 
IDP camp environment can be psychologically damaging and dangerous—especially for 
women. Several examples from post-tsunami Aceh depict how the physical separation of 
families and community members led to a breakdown of decision-making structures and 
lines of communication. All of these factors can delay the sense of normalcy that comes 
with returning to a familiar built environment.  
Emergency shelter is a necessity following a natural disaster, and the rebuilding 
process is often protracted. Aid organizations can support IDP camps as temporary, well-
managed sites that deliver an array of services in an equitable way, provide security, and 
address some of the needs that arise in a high-stress, high-density environment. Aid 
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organizations can also work with existing community leadership and grassroots networks 
to empower communities to organize themselves, advocate for their own needs, and 
promote cultural frameworks for social cohesion. 
 
Urban Connections and Rural Relocation 
Highly populated urban areas were impacted by the natural events in Haiti and 
Aceh, pushing some survivors to return to home villages and seek out community and 
family support. Aid organizations largely did not address the needs of survivors outside 
of the urban core and missed an opportunity to extend support to the rural host 
communities. The concentration of resources in urban areas did not encourage permanent 
relocation to rural communities. In Port-au-Prince in particular, opportunities in the rural 
hinterland could potentially ease overcrowding in the city center. 
As mentioned in the previous section, a high percentage of Acehnese tsunami 
survivors chose to relocate to host communities in which they had ties through the 
gampong system. Many of them were migrants that had been living in urban areas, like 
Banda Aceh, for work opportunities and chose to go back to their rural home villages. 
Relocating to their original gampong gave many survivors the opportunity and support to 
“mourn, to heal, and…in some cases, resources to start a new life” (Mahdi 141). The 
gampong structure supported mobility of the tsunami IDPs within Aceh, but many would 
find that humanitarian aid was difficult to come by in the rural interior. 
A divide existed between urban and rural Aceh prior to the tsunami, but the aid 
response brought to the forefront the advantages afforded the urban coastal population. 
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As Miller and Bunnell explain, the coastal capital city of Banda Aceh was largely 
protected from the violence of the separatist conflict because much of the fighting took 
place in rural rebel strongholds (85). Many urban Acehnese were unaware of the extent 
of the conflict, but rural Acehnese lived daily with “fear, fighting, forced migration, and 
internal displacement” (Miller and Bunnell 85). There were unaddressed needs that 
existed outside of the tsunami zone. 
Banda Aceh received a great deal of the resources funneled into Aceh after the 
tsunami. Miller and Bunnell cite a “broader pattern of post-disaster response…which 
tends to disproportionately channel recovery resources into cities” (89). Smaller cities, 
like Meulaboh in West Aceh, received inconsistent aid, and even tsunami-hit villages 
along the coast were abandoned because aid organizations and supplies failed to reach 
them (Miller and Bunnell 89). Few incoming aid organizations knew about the separatist 
conflict and were unable to divert their spending from tsunami relief to assist rural 
populations affected by war (Miller and Bunnell 90).  
Rural populations touched by the separatist conflict were not afforded the same 
benefits as urban coastal areas impacted by the tsunami. Tsunami IDPs that relocated to 
the rural interior risked losing out on opportunities only available in urban coastal areas, 
such as cash-for-work programs (Miller and Bunnell 90). Poverty statistics from 2006 
show that more than 30 percent of rural Acehnese households fall below the poverty line. 
In comparison, less than 15 percent of urban Acehnese are considered to live in poverty 
(Miller and Bunnell 93). Educational spending—which is tied to poverty levels—was 
focused on urban coastal areas after the tsunami. Miller and Bunnell note that 2,000 
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schoolteachers and 200 university-level lecturers died in the tsunami, and aid was needed 
to restart educational programs for students (94). Schools in the rural interior, damaged 
by the separatist conflict, did not receive much-needed support and investment, and 
teachers were reluctant to relocate to remote areas with fewer resources (Miller and 
Bunnell 95). 
The urban exodus was also a point of conversation after the Haiti earthquake. 
Haitian government officials saw the earthquake as a chance to address the severe and 
dangerous overcrowding in Port-au-Prince by relocating residents to other cities or rural 
areas. However, many aid organizations disagreed with this plan on the principle that 
survivors should remain as close as possible to their neighborhoods in order to preserve 
their social networks. This recommendation was primarily based on the experience of 
NGOs in Banda Aceh after the tsunami (Gros 184). However, the unregulated settlements 
in Port-au-Prince challenged this recommendation. The homes were illegal and unsafe 
and should not have been built in the manner or location in which they were. Many of the 
Haitian IDPs, estimated at up to 70 percent, were renting or squatting in the structures 
before the earthquake and were not homeowners (Gros 184). 
Rural relocation occurred naturally as tens of thousands of Haitians left the 
devastated capital after the earthquake. However, resources and aid workers failed to 
follow them to ensure they were supported during their transition away from the city 
(Katz 74). Katz cites the concentration of aid in Petionville, while the outlying 
neighborhoods of Carrefour and Léogâne —the actual epicenter of the quake—were 
largely ignored (Katz 105). Katz describes a sign he saw on the road to Léogâne: “SOS: 
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WE DON’T UNDERSTAND WHY EVERYTHING IS GOING TO PORT-AU-PRINCE 
BECAUSE LÉOGÂNE WAS BROKEN TOO” (Katz 84).  
An estimated 600,000 people fled from earthquake-stricken urban areas to rural 
towns where they had family connections (Katz 73). Jean-Germain Gros criticizes 
humanitarian organizations for insufficiently supporting the resettlement of displaced 
Haitians in rural areas. Without assistance from the government or any other organization 
to find food, shelter, or medical help, many Haitians were forced to return to tent cities in 
the urban core (Gros 184). There was little aid organization support and few employment 
opportunities in the rural fringe.  
The earthquake also presented an opportunity to support decentralization through 
the provision of aid specifically for Haitian peasants. The peasantry has typically been 
excluded from urban Haitian society, referred to as moun andeyò, or “outsiders” (Schuller 
and Morales 96). The lack of aid organization interest or investment in peasant wellbeing 
after the earthquake did not help to bridge the existing rural-urban divide, nor did it 
improve the lives of the rural poor that welcomed the urban migrant population back to 
the countryside.  
Jonathan Katz cites an example of aid distribution from the 1998-1999 conflict in 
Kosovo in which aid was delivered directly to families in their residences. The approach 
would not have been feasible in the city of Port-au-Prince itself, owing to the widespread 
destruction and displacement, but would have better supported the nearly 600,000 
survivors that took up residence with extended family in rural homes. The strategy could 
have directly supported peasant families housing displaced family members and could 
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have either stopped or tempered the flow of earthquake survivors seeking resources in the 
capital (Katz 98). The Haitian state did not act on further plans for relocation following 
the earthquake. Temporary tent cities supplanted the slums in Port-au-Prince and the rural 
poor remained without support.  
The tsunami and the earthquake both prompted migration from the urban core or 
coastal areas to the rural hinterland, an action especially needed to tame the 
overpopulation in Port-au-Prince. However, in Haiti, support was largely unavailable for 
those looking to relocate to rural villages. The rural peasantry had not been a priority for 
NGOs prior to the earthquake; therefore, support did not follow the exodus of survivors 
from Port-au-Prince into the countryside. In Aceh, a cultural and social framework was 
already in place—the gampong—that could support survivors moving inland from urban 
or coastal areas. In general, rural people and areas that were historically neglected did not 
receive any direct benefits from aid organizations that arrived following the disaster.  
 
Housing Challenges 
One challenge in rebuilding homes in both Haiti and Aceh was appropriate 
construction. In order to prevent structural failure during a future natural event, and to 
support the psychosocial healing process, new building projects can be considered in 
light of culture and place. Post-disaster housing is a desirable focus for NGOs because 
building projects can be documented and quantified for donors, more so than other social 
programs. This is not to diminish the restoration of the built environment. Safe homes, 
roads, and sanitation infrastructure must be in place before survivors can return to their 
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home neighborhoods and social networks (Daly 222). However, the participation of 
multiple aid organizations in rebuilding projects—especially those with limited 
construction experience and cultural understanding—can lead to mixed results.  
Local, national, and international organizations all participated in the rebuilding 
of homes in Aceh following the tsunami. Some houses were rebuilt where they stood 
before the disaster, but new settlements were also created. For some NGOs, this was the 
first time they built houses, and Aceh challenged them with environmental limitations 
and forced new approaches (Rand et al. 188). Some agencies allowed survivors to give 
input as to the kind of home they desired, while others gave them the materials to 
construct their own. In general, Acehnese survivors were provided a standard house built 
by an aid organization without any consultation as to their specific wants or needs. Many 
Acehnese families subsequently modified the houses and gardens when—and if—they 
were financially able (Samuels 220).   
The Haitian government and foreign NGOs made promises to rebuild homes, but 
more than a year after the earthquake, fewer than 5,000 homes had been repaired or 
rebuilt out of the estimated 190,000 that were damaged or destroyed (Regan 101). Haitian 
officials encouraged homeowners to return to their homes—which they claimed were 
largely habitable. Plans were put in place to rebuild safer neighborhoods and to assist 
homeowners in creating better-constructed homes, but renters and squatters were 
excluded from housing opportunities. Before the earthquake, it was common for Haitian 
families to pay rent in advance for terms ranging from six to 24 months at a time. The 
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lost rent paid out before the earthquake, coupled with lost livelihoods, left renters in a 
state of limbo and perpetuated their residence in IDP camps (Regan 101).  
Without a coordinated reconstruction effort, many Haitians found themselves in 
temporary camps months and years after the earthquake. Long-term residents in the 
temporary camps faced eviction because 60 percent of IDP camps were located on 
private property (Snyder 144). Landowners forced IDPs off their land through the threat 
of violence or by blocking aid. However, the decline in the population of various IDP 
camps was more likely attributed to survivors relocating to other camps or into damaged, 
unsafe houses. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), only 4.7 
percent of IDPs that departed a temporary camp took up residence in permanent housing 
(Snyder 146). 
In the months following the earthquake, a collection of community groups, camp 
committees, and nonprofits formed the Housing Reflection and Action Force (Fòs 
Refleksyon ak Aksyon sou Koze Kay, operating under the acronym FRAKKA). In 
addition to fighting for the rights of IDPs living in the camps, FRAKKA campaigned for 
the Haitian government to “develop a national housing policy for all citizens, not just 
earthquake survivors” (Bell 136). As a community coalition, FRAKKA asserted that the 
inadequate housing in Port-au-Prince contributed to the high number of earthquake 
deaths, but also insisted that rural Haitians also had the right to safe housing that allowed 
them to live with dignity. The earthquake created an opportunity for nation-wide housing 
issues to be addressed by the government and aid organizations, but I have not 
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encountered evidence to suggest that the disaster was a turning point for housing policies 
and practices. 
The following sections will explore several of the challenges and opportunities 
presented in a post-disaster situation when much of the housing stock has been eliminated. 
It is important to recognize that aid organizations are not reconstructing in a void. There 
may be opportunities for housing plans to take into account environmental pressures and 
resources as well as how the homes function for a family and within a community. Aid 
organizations approached the process of rebuilding in Aceh and Haiti in different ways. 
The outcomes of working with community members are explored at the end of this 
chapter.  
 
Architecture and the Environment 
This section explores the challenges of rebuilding in an environment with natural 
hazards and resource limitations. Aid organizations in Haiti and Aceh faced 
reconstruction in seismically active regions, and the preferred “modern” building 
material—concrete—was not as appropriate to the environment as other locally sourced 
materials. Housing models better matched to the environment are found in both Haiti and 
Aceh, but they are not suited to large-scale reproduction. While outside experts and 
architects may draft plans for innovative housing solutions, construction materials are 
ideally affordable and available locally in order for new approaches to take root. 
A major contributing factor to the number of earthquake casualties was the dense, 
poorly built slums in Port-au-Prince. Haiti did not have its own building codes prior to 
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the earthquake, only adopting international building standards following the disaster. In 
the years leading up to the earthquake, there was no oversight for how structures were 
built or the materials they were built with. Concrete was the preferred “modern” building 
material, introduced to Haiti in the 1920s and popularized by its use in public buildings 
such as the National Palace (Audefroy 448). Many concrete structures failed to meet 
basic building standards. Buildings had flimsy walls that could not hold up the slabs 
above when the ground shook. Floors and ceilings had insufficient reinforcement so their 
failure “brought buildings tumbling down like houses of cards” (Audefroy 448). The lax 
building standards and concrete construction was responsible for much of the destruction 
in Port-au-Prince.  
In 1751, a large earthquake destroyed Port-au-Prince, then a new colonial city. 
Colonists noted the “flexible wood structures withstood the quake better than rigid 
masonry” (Katz 37). With the widespread decimation of trees in Haiti, local knowledge 
of how to build wooden houses was largely lost. “Vernacular” structures—defined as 
owner-built with local materials and technology—fared better than concrete construction 
during seismic events (Audefroy 448).  
Architect Joel Audefroy details two different types of Haitian vernacular 
architecture that fared better than concrete buildings during the earthquake. Wattle and 
daub houses, in which “a wooden structure [is] filled with stone and bound together with 
a mix of lime and earth,” moved with the tremors and survived better than concrete 
construction (Audefroy 451). Homes with horizontal board walls with a twin-sloped 
roof—often made of lightweight corrugated sheets—were also found to have withstood 
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the earthquake with less damage (Audefroy 453). In addition to being able to better 
withstand nature’s threats, these types of homes also make use of locally found materials.  
In the post-earthquake rebuilding process, stone and wood were overlooked in 
favor of “modern” materials. Concrete and cement blocks were highly desirable—and 
costly—despite the widespread structural failure of concrete construction. Audefroy notes 
that Haitians rebuilding their own homes were left without technical support or guidance 
in how to make anti-seismic modifications (457). This resulted in quick builds once again 
vulnerable to environmental pressures.  
For Haitians to widely adopt anti-seismic housing models, construction materials 
are preferably readily available and inexpensive. Construction techniques may also be 
adapted to the machinery available and level of builder knowledge. Paul Fallon, an 
architect working in Haiti in the years following the earthquake, explained his building 
designs as “prototypes of Haiti’s vernacular construction, reinterpreted to withstand 
earthquakes” (Fallon, “On Shaky Ground: Haiti, Five Years Later”). Due to inflation and 
the fact that “labor was cheap and plentiful, while materials were expensive and 
machinery rare,” Fallon saw the cost of his buildings rise to $75 per foot (Fallon, “On 
Shaky Ground: Haiti, Five Years Later”). In comparison, Haitian-built homes before the 
earthquake were built at an average cost of $25 per foot. While the architect-led 
constructions utilized superior, safer materials, Fallon acknowledged that they do not 
meet the larger goal of anti-seismic homes that can be built by Haitians alone. The gulf in 
price between Haitian-built and foreign-built homes—regardless of the high quality—
makes it unlikely that survivors would, or could, choose the safer option.  
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 Aid organizations rebuilding in Aceh faced similar questions around materials 
and housing design. Pre-tsunami, 66 percent of the respondents in an Oxfam survey were 
living in a wood house (Rand et al. 199). Acehnese raised homes were constructed of 
tropical hardwoods and were safer than masonry homes during an earthquake. Masonry 
houses were preferred over timber houses because Acehnese saw them as a symbol of 
modernity, progress, and wealth. Yet masonry houses were “not part of the traditional 
building culture…and they were not suited to Aceh’s earthquake proneness or climate” 
(Rand et al. 193). It is a challenge for aid organizations to overcome this preference for 
concrete because of the qualities that it represents. I question how aid organizations can 
communicate the value of a non-masonry home and emphasize safety as a high priority. 
Acehnese wooden houses require a great deal more timber to complete than 
masonry builds. Many NGOs working on housing programs were under pressure from 
organizations like the World Wildlife Fund to be mindful of environmental damage as a 
result of logging (Kennedy et al. 27). The potential environmental impact of 
reconstructing wooden houses on such a large scale was staggering. After the tsunami, 
timber was in high demand both for construction and to fuel the firing of bricks. The 
demand for wood would have either necessitated increased importation of lumber into 
Aceh or sparked illegal logging practices. Therefore, many aid organizations chose to 
construct masonry structures instead of the traditional wooden homes (Kennedy et al 27).  
Vernacular examples of suitable construction existed in both Aceh and Haiti, but 
what may be feasible for small-scale building projects is not necessarily transferrable to 
extensive rebuilding. Thousands of homes with wood construction, while more 
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earthquake-resistant than masonry, require far more wood than is environmentally 
feasible. Therefore, other material solutions could be explored and risks weighed. Aceh 
did not experience the same widespread concrete structure failures that led to the high 
number of casualties in Haiti, but the preference for masonry structures may not be the 
most environmentally suitable in the long-term.  
 
Socio-cultural Practices and Housing 
While it is understandable that aid organizations prefer to have a standard housing 
model to keep costs down and simplify construction, it is important to consider that a 
one-size-fits-all approach does not take into account various cultural living arrangements 
and social practices. In addition to the common practice of extended families living 
together pre-disaster, new models of habitation may materialize to care for orphans, 
widows, and other vulnerable members of a population. It is also important to consider 
women in the design process, as their social life may be more closely tied to the home 
than it is for men. Ideally, if a standard housing model is used, there is some opportunity 
for a family to customize it to meet their unique needs. 
Oxfam was one of a multitude of organizations involved in providing shelter for 
displaced persons in Aceh. A survey conducted after the construction of permanent 
residences—although not the experience of every aid organization—provides valuable 
insight into the process. Oxfam’s plan for providing shelter post-tsunami was three-
pronged: supply emergency shelter for short-term protection (e.g. a tent); create 
“transitional” shelters like temporary dwellings or barracks that house multiple families; 
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and create permanent housing (Rand et al. 188). In a little more than five years following 
the tsunami, Oxfam “built 1,564 homes in 28 villages across seven districts in Aceh” 
(Rand et al. 189). The homes had a standard layout and components—two bedrooms and 
a living room, water and sanitary facilities—as well as earthquake-resistant features. 
Residents commonly adapt the organization-built housing to meet their needs and desires 
after they move in. 
More than 350 of the households that received an Oxfam home after the tsunami 
participated in a survey to gauge residents’ satisfaction with their home. The survey 
consisted of a household questionnaire, individual interviews, and group discussions. 
Resident judged aspects of their Oxfam housing on a 1-5 scale in which 1 corresponded 
to “definitely unacceptable” and 5 indicating that it “significantly exceeded expectations” 
(Rand et al. 196). Interviewees were selected to ensure that both genders and different 
population categories were represented, including more “vulnerable” households headed 
by tsunami widows, widowers, and orphans (Rand et al. 194).  
The survey found that a widow, widower, or orphan was the head of 33 percent of 
the interviewee households (Rand et al. 97).  This is not the only change from pre-
tsunami occupancy patterns. Fewer people on average lived in each house—an average of 
5.1 people pre-tsunami, and 3.6 people post-tsunami. Throughout Indonesia, as well as in 
Aceh, it is typical for multiple generations to live together in one home, and have 
multiple households living under the same roof. Many eligible, tsunami-impacted 
households chose to accept their own house rather than continue to live with extended 
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family members (Rand et al. 199). This may suggest NGOs disrupted the practice of 
multigenerational cohabitation, at least in the short-term. 
Due in part to limitations on the timber supply, the vast majority of Acehnese 
Oxfam survey respondents (approximately 95 percent) moved into masonry houses built 
for permanent occupation. The design and construction of many masonry houses did not 
support some of the socio-cultural practices or customs of women in particular. As 
explained by Patrick Daly and Yenny Rahmayati, the areas beneath the traditional 
wooden, raised Acehnese homes—or in the kitchen in non-raised houses—were the 
places in which women interacted in groups. Although men still had their coffee shops to 
gather and engage in dialogue, the construction of “modern” masonry houses disrupted 
the social patterns of women and brought about increased feelings of isolation (Daly and 
Rahmayati 66). 
The Oxfam survey also mentions the psychological benefits of having a home to 
move into, or even simply the promise of a new home. It allowed survivors to focus on 
reestablishing their livelihood. Men in the Acehnese village of Sawang noted they “didn’t 
need to think about our house construction anymore because they were being built by 
Oxfam. We could focus more on our livelihoods” (Rand et al. 201). Having a stable home 
is an important step for social and economic recovery, both for home-based industries 
(for example, making fishing nets or weaving) and for Acehnese that work away from the 
home.  
Land ownership is an important cultural undercurrent in the humanitarian aid 
narrative that has come out of Haiti. Being a landowner is a sign of both freedom and 
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wealth, especially in light of Haiti’s plantation system past. The USAID program that 
killed off Haiti’s indigenous pig population, coupled with a decline in sugar and rice 
production, led to widespread internal migration as agriculture was abandoned for urban 
prospects (Beauvoir-Dominique, “The Social Value of Voodoo throughout History: 
Slavery, Migrations, and Solidarity” 104). The rural social system of lakou, in which 
groups of peasants claimed land as their own and organized as a system of shared 
responsibilities and resources, was difficult to transfer to the setting of Port-au-Prince 
(Katz 100). The lakou also has important cultural ties to Vodou, as the shared space 
“represents the overlapping of natural and social forces” where spirits have great powers 
(Beauvoir-Dominique, “The Social Value of Voodoo throughout History: Slavery, 
Migrations, and Solidarity” 103). 
In urban Haitian communities, efforts were made to recreate the lakou—an 
“extended family”—in the nearby suburbs (Beauvoir-Dominique, “The Social Value of 
Voodoo throughout History: Slavery, Migrations, and Solidarity” 104). The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) articulates the possible benefits to using the lakou 
system in the planning and reconstruction of new settlements post-earthquake. Such 
guidelines would include relocating a segment of the population in the same camps and 
organizing new settlements around courtyards. In an article written by IOM staff, the 
authors postulate that such organization could help to care for minors orphaned or 
displaced by the earthquake, at-risk elderly populations and households led by women 
(Schininà et al 161). While using the rural lakou to guide reconstruction of housing is a 
model grounded in Haitian culture, many Haitians did not own land or a home. Renters—
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often the poorest of the poor—were excluded from housing development projects. It is 
unclear if lakou-based housing could be built on a large scale or if it would benefit renters, 
the population that may benefit most from the support the model provides. 
In response to misguided attempts, some non-profits put forward potential 
housing models. One such model was a small-scale land and housing co-op in which 
residents operate as a community, combine resources, and engage in shared decision-
making and planning (Bell 138). Another small-plan community included homes with 
water and electricity generated through rainwater collection and solar panels (Bell 138). 
While these models appear to address the cultural and social needs of the Haitian 
earthquake survivors—and address some environmental concerns—they were relatively 
small-scale, experimental proposals. 
Aid organizations rebuilding homes have the opportunity to evaluate how design 
can either support cultural and social norms or disrupt them. Designing for extended 
families to live in the same home and utilizing cultural models—like the lakou—can aid a 
community in recovery and support its most vulnerable members. Aid organizations may 
also choose to weigh gender-based needs in the design of the home. While men may 
engage in social activities out in the community, Acehnese women in particular socialize 
in and around the home. A dwelling that addresses socio-cultural needs and leverages the 
familiar can support community cohesion and stability.  
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Rebuilding with Communities 
In addition to issues around environmental and cultural suitability, aid 
organizations may have an opportunity to reflect on how community stakeholders 
participate in the rebuilding process. The following section explores how collaborating 
with locals can help move a project forward and address problems and challenges that 
arise throughout the process. External agencies operating without an understanding of 
community needs and priorities can waste time and resources pursuing projects with 
minimal impact and damage their relationship with the community they were meant to 
serve. 
In Aceh, issues of land ownership arose for a number of reasons and impacted the 
ability of aid organizations to construct new housing. Many households did not hold 
formal land titles and many existing title documents were destroyed by the tsunami. 
External agencies were unable to move forward with housing allocations without clarity 
around land ownership. Local leadership, in tandem with input from the community as a 
whole, was an important factor in resolving questions of land ownership so that the 
external agency projects could proceed (Daly 242). Those communities that prioritized 
community-mapping efforts resolved the ownership issues sooner and were able to move 
forward more quickly with rebuilding efforts.  
Some of the houses purposely built for tsunami survivors were never occupied. 
The reasons for vacancies included life events—such as remarriage and cohabitation—
and extended families choosing to live together. Some individuals were given multiple 
houses by different aid agencies, suggesting a lack of coordination and communication 
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between agencies and communities. The housing allocation process was described as 
complicated and “wide open for abuse” despite efforts made in community mapping and 
land titling (Daly and Rahmayati 68).  
The majority of organizations in post-tsunami Aceh also adopted a contractor-led 
construction approach instead of relying on the community or individuals to build their 
own homes. Some NGOs ran into challenges in overseeing housing construction projects, 
especially the coordination and direction of myriad subcontractors. The complicated and 
inefficient project management structure led to “delays, confusion, and…the construction 
of housing that is often inappropriate within local cultural and social contexts” (Daly and 
Rahmayati 66). Although Daly and Rahmayati do not detail why the project management 
structure was inefficient, language barriers and changing NGO staff could have 
complicated the building process.  
Contradictory feedback about the level of satisfaction with contractor-built homes 
may point to a general approval of the quality that construction experts lend to the 
process, but it suggests deficiencies in how the home met the needs or desires of an 
individual family (Rand et al. 207). There were also problems that stemmed from using 
locals in construction projects. The use of unskilled laborers slowed the building process 
and led to frustration among the housing beneficiaries and the organizations that 
measured success by the number of completed houses (Kennedy et al. 27).   
On paper, and to some degree in practice, Oxfam appears to have consulted with 
the community and responded to their concerns with the building process. Oxfam’s 
approach to reconstructing housing included “cash grants, gender 
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considerations…specific targeting of vulnerable populations [and] technical training” 
(Rand et al. 189). The organization initially began with a program that provided materials 
and training to individual homeowners—or to communities in some cases—and allowed 
them to rebuild their own homes. The recipient family guides the project because they 
build the home to their own specifications. Oxfam was specifically guided by the 
principle of accountability, explained in this case as “ensuring that affected parties 
participate in and can influence decisions affecting them, so that the affected parties’ 
needs, interests, and ability are fully considered” (Rand et al. 189). Through the 
community feedback received as a part of an accountability model, Oxfam made the 
decision to enlist larger contractors to build several homes at a time, rather than continue 
with the original model (Rand et al. 192). The ease and speed of construction were 
important to recipients because they were likely in a temporary shelter through the 
rebuilding process. 
Oxfam also created housing committees in the communities it worked in and 
allowed for co-management of housing construction. Predominately male “housing 
committees” were elected in the various Aceh communities to oversee the construction 
progress and serve as the means through which residents could pass along their concerns 
during the homes’ construction (Rand et al. 202). The presence of these housing 
committees led to overall higher rates of satisfaction than in communities that did not 
have a means through which they could communicate throughout the process. This 
consultation appeared to be the key in achieving high resident satisfaction, more so than 
residents physically participating in the construction process. 
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According to the survey, the Oxfam-built houses had a much lower vacancy rate 
than homes built by other aid organizations, 5 percent in comparison to 21 percent. 
Oxfam theorized that the low vacancy rate could be in part attributed to the inclusion of 
desirable components like electrical wiring and sanitation facilities, assuming that not all 
other aid organization housing came with these features standard (Rand et al. 189). It may 
also be due to the close involvement and communication with the community. In the 
Oxfam survey, 79 percent of the respondents said that they were consulted during 
construction of their home, and 57 percent in some way participated in building their own 
house (Rand et al. 199).  
In Haiti, with rubble and collapsed buildings stalling reconstruction in the capital, 
permanent housing projects were slow to take off. Rebuilding in Port-au-Prince fell under 
the jurisdiction of the Government of Haiti, but the earthquake severely restricted its 
ability to operate. Shelter organizations worked locally, but the frequent turnover of staff 
working directly with communities led to decisions being made by external, international 
staff with little knowledge of the realities on the ground. Aid organizations had “debates 
and divergent views on what a sustainable approach to shelter would look like in an 
urban environment” (Fan, “Disaster as Opportunity?” 23). There was a “tendency for 
shelter agencies to [favor] transitional shelter, or ‘T-shelter,’ construction over other 
possible responses” (Fan, “Shelter Strategies” 74). Aid organizations could control the 
end product of the investment—T-shelters were of a standard design and construction—
more so than if they distributed materials or cash for survivors to build their own homes.  
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The cost of the T-shelter was comparable to what a Haitian family would spend 
on a permanent house. Earthquake survivors saved money on construction materials and 
rent by living in a T-shelter, but “they had not been asked if they wanted to live there or 
not” (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 54). Coupled 
with a lack of support and planning for permanent housing, Haitians living in the T-
shelters assumed that they would stay there for several years. With that belief in mind, T-
shelter residents expressed disappointment that they were not consulted about their 
preferences and that their requests were not considered. The small living space of the T-
shelters, measured at 18 square meters, was one of the primary complaints. As one survey 
respondent notes, “it did not matter if there were three or nine in a family, they gave 
everybody the same” (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
55). 
There are many accounts of promised homes that never materialized as well as 
costly—yet substandard—contractor-built homes. While organizations like the American 
Red Cross raised huge sums of money for housing projects in Haiti, bureaucratic delays 
and mismanagement led to a lack of discernable results on the ground (“In Search of the 
Red Cross’ $500 Million”). The Red Cross planned to rebuild 700 homes in Campeche—
and made promises to residents—but difficulty acquiring land rights and bureaucratic 
delays within the agency dramatically altered the scale of the project. Rather than 
constructing new homes, the Red Cross focused on smaller repair projects as well as the 
building of a road (“In Search of the Red Cross’ $500 Million”).  
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Another project, a Housing Exposition coordinated by the Haiti Recovery 
Commission, was intended to provide housing models for organizations involved in the 
rebuilding. However, as David Odnell, director of the Unit for the Construction of 
Housing and Public Buildings in Haiti commented, “some of [the models] had nothing to 
do with the way we Haitians live or think about housing. It was a completely imported 
thing” (Haiti Grassroots Watch, “Questions about the Reconstruction’s Housing 
Projects”). Due to poor planning and project management, the homes were largely 
forgotten after their 2011 unveiling. Earthquake survivors were not presented with the 
homes, nor were the housing models purchased for new, rebuilt communities. Instead, 
squatters took over the vacant site (Haiti Grassroots Watch, “Questions about the 
Reconstruction’s Housing Projects”). 
 The approach to rebuilding homes in Haiti was complicated. Many Haitians 
needed immediate shelter solutions and long-term, sustainable housing requires a 
coordinated effort—that includes the Haitian government—and community participation. 
Frantz Duval, editor-in-chief of the Haitian national newspaper Le Nouvelliste claims 
that aid organizations, 
…had these grand visions to erase the country and start all over. They 
thought Haiti was a blank slate. They forgot the model. Usually, Haitians 
take 20 to 25 years to build their houses, room by room, with the help of 
friends and family (qtd. in Porter “In Haiti, a failure to ‘build back 
better’”). 
Rather than provide displaced earthquake survivors with the materials or funds to support 
their own rebuilding projects, aid organizations invested in T-shelters and planned for 
new communities without understanding the conditions on the ground. Duval suggests 
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that funds should have been invested in the existing neighborhoods to improve sanitation, 
trash pickup, and health clinics (Porter). Long-term plans for permanent shelter solutions 
stalled despite the huge amount of funding available for housing projects and 
neighborhood improvements. 
 Unsurprisingly, a lack of consultation with stakeholders leads to varying degrees 
of satisfaction with post-disaster housing. In Haiti, earthquake survivors were grateful to 
have the rent-free T-shelters as temporary, transitional housing. T-shelters, however, did 
not meet families’ needs for permanent shelter, and the proposed housing solutions were 
not widely implemented. Instead of viewing Haiti as an opportunity to start over with 
new housing models, aid organizations may have occasion to invest in neighborhood 
infrastructure and support Haitians in building homes that fit their families and their 
cultural needs. Based on the Aceh Oxfam survey, establishing a system for feedback and 
allowing contractors to handle the building process led to higher satisfaction for residents 
and more timely construction. The consultation with residents is essential; a top-down 
approach led by outside “experts” does not guarantee culturally appropriate housing or 
actual progress on the ground. 
 
Discussion 
 This chapter explored three questions around post-disaster shelter: How are 
habitation patterns and social relationships impacted by disaster? What is the role of 
shelter in the recovery process? Did aid organizations approach rebuilding homes in ways 
that support local cultural needs and environmental constraints? Through the exploration 
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of these particular lines of inquiry, I identified key concepts as well as additional 
questions.  
 Disaster can alter habitation patterns and social relationships in a number of ways. 
Temporary camps or shelters can divide families and community members and disrupt 
social institutions like the gampong system. As evidenced by the rifts that emerged in the 
Al-Mukarramah neighborhood, this separation can have ramifications for how a 
community problem-solves and communicates. Ideally, aid organizations are able to keep 
families and communities together, but if the situation necessitates separation, are there 
strategies for how to keep social relationships intact and address conflicts that arise? 
Even in a stressful camp environment there may be ways to better host areas for women 
and men to socialize. Leveraging local leadership and better representation in temporary 
camp environments. 
Aid organizations may also see the composition of households change following a 
disaster as family structures change and survivors seek out means of support. Following 
the tsunami, there was a rise in Acehnese households led by widows, widowers, and 
orphans. Through marriage, remarriage, cohabitation, and migration, households can 
actively change following a disaster. This state of transition can complicate how aid 
organizations distribute housing and resources. In order to take advantage of additional 
assets, multigenerational families may opt to live in separate homes. While household 
composition may again shift, aid organizations may find value in understanding common 
habitation patterns. There were other “vulnerable” groups—such as orphans and the 
elderly—that lost family members and their networks of support. This raises questions 
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around how communities provide social support to these groups. Can it be built into 
temporary and permanent housing in a way that is similar to the lakou system?  
 There is also a question of who should be entitled to a home after a disaster. How 
do aid organizations measure need? Haiti has the problem of high number of renters who 
have no claim to land or a permanent dwelling. Renters and squatters were left in a state 
of limbo because they were not eligible to receive an NGO-built home. There were few 
rental options after the earthquake because of the widespread destruction. The question of 
housing need and entitlement also applies to people living in rural Haiti and Aceh—
including disaster survivors, peasants, and persons displaced by the separatist conflict—
that had similar, urgent housing needs. If urban decentralization and rural support is a 
goal, housing and opportunities would also need to extend into the rural interior. 
I initially posed a question around the role of shelter in the recovery process. Why 
is shelter so important? From a comparison of the Aceh and Haiti case studies, I believe 
shelter provides several benefits in a post-disaster context. At the most basic level, shelter 
provides protection from the elements, stability, safety, and privacy in a chaotic camp 
environment. Shelter can also provide peace of mind so that survivors can focus on other 
aspects of recovery, such as returning to their pre-disaster livelihood. Aid organizations 
that focus on providing permanent, secure housing can incidentally support economic 
recovery. The push for permanent housing, however, can be problematic if aid 
organizations take a one-size-fits-all approach and do not weigh the size of a family or 
their socio-cultural needs.  
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 Humanitarian research fellow Lilianne Fan says that aid organizations must think 
of shelter as a process (72). Emergency shelter—like a tent or tarp—can be provided 
immediately following the disaster, but a plan should be in place for transitional and 
permanent shelters. Aid organizations or donors may believe that by supplying a tent, the 
need for shelter has been addressed. It is a more complex issue. Tents or tarps are not 
sufficient shelter; they do not offer much in terms of privacy or protection from the 
elements. However, providing more than a tent or tarp might suggest permanence, which 
is problematic in a temporary camp environment. This leads to a bigger question: how 
much investment should aid organizations make in temporary camp shelter and services? 
From the accounts in Haiti and Aceh, life in temporary camps may lead to instability and 
delay the return to normalcy. Could investment in better housing make the temporary 
camps better in the short-term, but could it also make them more permanent? It would 
seem to be a delicate balance between addressing the immediate need for safety and 
shelter and continuing to pursue permanent shelter that addresses social and cultural 
needs.  
In both Haiti and Aceh, the environmental and cultural appropriateness of NGO-
built homes is perhaps up for debate. It is difficult to gauge how the homes withstand 
natural threats absent another disaster. Vernacular housing models can provide valuable 
insight into key design components suited to the environment, but aid organizations face 
critical material and financial limits. Regardless of the materials and approach to 
rebuilding homes, the process may improve if a feedback mechanism is instituted so that 
recipients can weigh in on the process and how the homes meet their socio-cultural needs. 
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The opportunity for home recipients to be involved in the process raises an important 
question. How much consultation is sufficient for aid organizations to move forward? If 
timely house construction is important, how can aid organizations support home 
recipients in making later modifications to the home so that it fits their needs?  
In general, temporary camps and transitional shelters have not been shown to 
support community healing and a return to normalcy. While having a permanent home 
provides more security and stability than the temporary camps, it may not be beneficial if 
the construction leaves the inhabitants prone to environmental threats or social discord. 
Despite the urgency to rebuild, aid organizations may have an opportunity to consider the 
potential ramifications of taking a one-size-fits-all approach without a plan to address 
later modifications.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT 
In this chapter, I investigate some of the complicated relationships and occasional 
tensions that arise as part of foreign involvement and assistance. With the influx of high 
numbers of foreign, non-local responders, conflict and confusion may occur. Aid 
organizations can benefit from working with and through existing decision-making and 
leadership structures and leveraging local knowledge. Two questions guided my inquiry 
into the experience of aid organizations and disaster survivors in the recovery and 
reconstruction process: To what extent do cultural differences present a challenge to 
disaster recovery, and how are they addressed or negotiated? Finally, how do aid 
organizations work with community groups and social institutions to address needs?  
The post-disaster environment can present a number of challenges. Haiti, for 
instance, was already open to international agencies because of its history of foreign 
involvement and reliance on aid. However, a history of misguided foreign policies and 
unmet promises—both briefly mentioned in Chapter Three—complicated relationships 
between the aid workers and aid recipients. In Aceh, the ongoing military conflict made it 
difficult for foreign agencies to make initial headway in tsunami-hit areas. Aceh is an 
Islamic province, and according to researcher Patrick Daly, sharia law made international 
NGO involvement more complicated. In both locations, many aid agencies were under a 
great deal of pressure to spend the enormous funds from foreign donors. They were 
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expected to achieve measureable results quickly, all while consulting with the community 
and improving aid organization collaboration and communication.  
 
“Mountains of Misunderstandings” 
This section examines some of the cultural differences and points of mutual 
misunderstanding between foreign aid workers and the populations they assisted in Haiti 
and Aceh. For foreign aid workers that lived apart from the people impacted by the 
disaster, it may have been difficult to understand the challenges faced by disaster 
survivors. The cultural divide can also impede relationships, breed distrust, and 
complicate aid activities.  
As detailed in The Big Truck that went By, Jonathan Katz’s first-person account of 
the earthquake and its aftermath, cultural differences made response and redevelopment 
matters in Haiti difficult. Katz refers to the divide between the nèg and the blan as “the 
cardinal division of Haitian society” (56). Although derived from the French word for 
‘white’, the word blan more accurately means “foreigner.” Many blan came to Haiti via 
NGOs with the desire to help in the aftermath of the earthquake. The Kreyol word nèg 
simply means “person.” 
In his account of the Haiti earthquake, Katz equates the cultural difference 
between blan and nèg to “us” and “them” (56). He explains that some blan equated nèg 
with instability and violence, taking measures to protect themselves against a perceived 
danger. Aid workers and UN staff were strongly encouraged to live in select 
neighborhoods, creating what Katz refers to as the “Blan Bubble” (57). This fear of the 
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nèg was continually reinforced as aid workers were told not to walk through the IDP 
camps or were given a 6 p.m. curfew (Miles 49).  
The mutual misunderstanding between the blan and nèg manifested itself 
throughout recovery efforts. The blan anticipated violent behavior on the part of the 
Haitian earthquake survivors, reinforced by “vague reports of civil unrest” (Katz 73). 
Food distribution in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake was chaotic and largely 
ineffective as a result of “pervasive stereotypes of Haiti—‘poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere’” (Miles 45). Aid organizations expected looting and violence to erupt at 
distribution sites and sent soldiers to enforce order. Katz observed UN soldiers firing 
warning shots and releasing pepper spray on crowds forced to wait hours in the sun for 
cooking oil and rice, only serving to increase the level of panic (Katz 80). The presence 
of the armed soldiers likely contributed to a sense of instability and danger—on the part 
of aid workers and aid recipients—and called into question who the soldiers were 
intended to support and protect.  
Other approaches taken for food distribution—such as airdrops from cargo planes 
or helicopters—induced panic and were deemed unsafe (Katz 79). The indirect food 
drops were ineffective because they did not make use of the existing cultural frameworks. 
A Haitian named Thomas Louis told Katz that he believed “food could have been 
distributed more effectively through existing networks, such as churches” (Katz 80). The 
armed soldiers and airdrops did not create an opportunity for constructive dialogue to 
occur around survivors’ concerns and needs. If aid agencies had made use of community 
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relationships in food distribution, perhaps much of the panic that erupted around 
distribution centers could have been avoided. 
The perceived divide between the blan and the nèg intensified after the outbreak 
of cholera, unintentionally brought to the country and introduced to the water supply by 
Nepalese UN soldiers. The epicenter of the cholera epidemic was in Mirebalais, outside 
of the area most affected by the earthquake (Piarroux et al. 173). In addition to anger 
directed at the Nepalese UN soldiers, there was a belief among Haitians that the mobile 
UN medical teams brought cholera into new areas as they tried to stay ahead of the 
contagious disease (Katz 232). The confusion was understandable considering that 
dispatch of NGO medical personnel and mobile clinics into the countryside often 
coincided with the arrival of the new cases of the disease due to its natural spread and 
advance. Although, this dislike and distrust of UN soldiers was not a new phenomenon in 
Haiti, it further strained Haitians’ relationships with foreigners (Katz 224). 
There was a similar tenuous relationship with some of the foreign responders that 
arrived in Aceh after the tsunami. Many of the incoming aid workers “had limited 
understanding of Acehnese or Indonesian culture, social practices, religion, and local 
languages,” save those that had spent time in Aceh pre-tsunami, so there was a general 
unfamiliarity with the realities of Acehnese life (Daly 239). Ismet Fanany notes that it is 
“virtually impossible for foreign organizations of any kind to operate without an 
Indonesian partner organization” because of the complexity of Indonesian society (109). 
Aceh had been closed to foreigners because of the separatist conflict, so it is not 
surprising that incoming aid workers were unfamiliar with aspects of Acehnese culture.  
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Many Western aid workers and agencies held a negative view of Islamic law, 
sharia, and viewed fundamentalist religious beliefs as an impediment to redeveloping the 
area (Miller 41). Miller cites the “othering” of the Acehnese by “foreign development 
workers on the basis of their Islamic identity” (41). Foreign donors and aid organizations 
that opposed the implementation of sharia law found themselves at odds with Acehnese 
ulamas, Muslim scholars. As Miller explains, disagreement on the subject of sharia law 
made it difficult for stakeholders to relate to each other and agree about recovery 
priorities and development programs (36). Aid organizations that were vocal in their 
opposition to sharia law either elected to leave Aceh or were asked to.  
While certain international aid agencies espoused a neutral position on the subject 
of sharia, it is difficult to determine the impact of personal biases. The fundamental 
disagreement between foreign aid workers and sharia advocates about the role of Islam 
in the recovery process “affected their capacity to relate to one another” (Miller 36). 
United States military personnel were one such group that experienced strained 
relationships with the local population. Some of the military personnel had been deployed 
directly from the Middle East to Aceh. They felt uncomfortable in Muslim-majority Aceh 
having recently been targeted by radical Muslim militant groups in Iraq (Miller 41).  
The incoming non-Muslim aid workers were also a concern for religious leaders 
in Aceh. Islamic groups—looking to increase their own power in post-tsunami Aceh—
promoted the theory that the United States was actively attempting to undermine Aceh’s 
Islamic foundations and the “moral fabric” of the province (Miller 42). The American 
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offer of humanitarian assistance to Aceh was in part a strategic foreign policy move 
intended to serve as proof that the United States was not anti-Islam (Miller 39).  
The physical distance between foreign aid workers and the communities they 
served was a criticism leveled at aid organizations in Haiti and Aceh. It is difficult to 
understand cultural nuances, negotiate cultural differences, and build relationships 
without investing considerable time into living and working with people on a local level. 
The stationing of UN aid workers on a cruise ship outside of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
illustrates the concern around absentee aid workers and the enormous amount of 
funding—estimated at $112,500 per day—required to provide such amenities (Bell 79). 
As Nadève Ménard inquires, “how can these people be drafting plans to help Haiti when 
they have no contact with Haitian life or even Haitians?” (Ménard 50). Blan aid workers 
spent off days exploring the mountains and lingering on beaches before returning to work 
in the earthquake-stricken Haitian capital. While the argument could be made that aid 
workers need time away from their difficult work, there may be a public perception that 
they were provided comforts unavailable to disaster survivors.  
Haitian filmmaker Raoul Peck offered a critical perspective on the efforts and 
priorities of the outside aid agencies. He described NGOs as disconnected from the 
culture and reality of Haitians in the days following the earthquake. As Peck explained, 
“everyone instead got overexcited about occupying the largest intervention space possible, 
which was the worst thing for practical help, and the best thing for diplomatic vanity” 
(Peck, “Dead-end in Port-au-Prince” 44). NGOs expended time and energy competing for 
space and resources while vital aid remained undistributed (F. Pierre-Louis 200).  
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The fear of violence on the part of the nèg—introduced earlier as a concern 
around food distribution—also emerged during emergency rescue efforts. Instead of 
heading into Port-au-Prince, many foreign responders in Haiti focused their efforts on the 
well-publicized “priority” sites where foreigners were trapped—namely the Hotel 
Montana (Katz 72). The potential for violence was perceived to be high in Port-au-
Prince; many Haitians were left to dig family, friends, and strangers from the rubble 
without much assistance (Katz 73). For the most part, the expected societal breakdown 
and descent into chaos did not come. 
A similar critique surfaced in Aceh, that very few aid organizations “actually had 
personnel living or spending significant amounts of time in villages,” which would 
suggest a limited amount of sustained engagement with local processes and procedures 
(Daly 246). While this may be attributed to limitations on time and funding for projects, 
very few aid workers learned the ins and outs of daily life in Aceh. As another respondent 
in Aceh put forward, most aid workers were on “tours,” spending a year or two at most in 
Aceh before moving on to other countries and aid situations (Daly 246). 
The blame is not laid entirely on the aid workers in the affected area, as their 
parent organizations may have not set an expectation of close involvement with the local 
population in their work. As Katz explains further,  
“…the problem often was that these individuals were merely the vanguard 
of distant, massive organizations whose managers seemed less interested 
in nuances or painful lessons on the ground. And …our ability to report 
back on those nuances was inhibited by the fact that we were viewing life 
through a bubble, separated by language, class…” (Katz 57) 
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Katz makes this statement as a foreign journalist—an outsider—working in Haiti. Raoul 
Peck also levels criticisms against the foreign journalists working in Port-au-Prince. 
Despite journalists’ knowledge of Haiti and Haitian society, Peck questions articles with 
“dramatic and scandalous headlines” and photographs of the earthquake aftermath that 
seem to make Haitians “conform to the image [non-Haitians] have of us” (Peck, “Dead-
end in Port-au-Prince” 46-47). Peck expressed concern about the lack of nuance in the 
media coverage—whether the work of the journalists or of their editors overseas—
because it focused on the sensational and did not allow for discussion of Haiti’s 
complexities (“Dead-end in Port-au-Prince” 46).  
 In addition to the physical distance between aid workers and the people they 
endeavor to work with, there are “oceans of history, mountains of misunderstandings, 
storms of prejudices” that separate them (Peck, “Dead-end in Port-au-Prince” 47). 
Pervasive stereotypes and personal discomfort with aspects of culture—such as sharia 
law—can impact how aid workers and communities are able to work collaboratively. The 
time that many aid workers spend in direct contact with people is often too brief to 
comprehend the realities of life in a post-disaster landscape. Aid workers spent their 
“tours” living apart from the affected communities and in a degree of comfort that 
disaster survivors were not afforded. Without consistent, meaningful contact between aid 
workers and disaster survivors, cultural misunderstandings can persist.   
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Working with Locals 
Criticisms leveled at aid organizations and workers are balanced by genuine 
efforts on the part of aid organizations to understand a population, involve locals in the 
reconstruction process, or turn the process over to them entirely. The idea of participatory 
aid, in which the beneficiaries are “empowered to outline their own needs and priorities,” 
has been a part of development thinking for much of the last 25 years (Daly 237). In 
participatory aid practices, the expertise of foreign aid agencies is minimized. The 
following section examines some of the successes and failures of NGOs in Haiti and 
Aceh in regard to their ability to defer to local expertise, plan for the future with 
meaningful community participation, and collaborate with government entities.   
There were examples that emerged from Aceh, as cited in Patrick Daly’s survey 
of post-tsunami aid workers, in which “local laws, customs, and cultural practices” were 
important considerations in the conception and implementation of projects in the 
province (Daly 245). For one particular aid organization working in Aceh, all members of 
the organization leadership were required to be in contact with the local Acehnese to 
better understand customary law (adat) and incorporate local systems into the aid 
organization structure. The Indonesian government, in the master plan for Aceh’s post-
tsunami recovery, recommended that external aid organizations leverage the traditional 
village structures, the gampong, and look to existing cultural and social practices for 
guidance as to the types of projects that are culturally appropriate and can function within 
local norms and restrictions (Daly 234).  
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Even though there were differing views on sharia law among aid organizations 
and workers, this is not to say that NGOs were dismissive of Islam as it was practiced in 
Acehnese communities. On the contrary, as one Acehnese NGO worker notes, 
“international organizations did not want their workers to dress wrongly, for men and 
women to be hanging out and having relationships, and for people to drink openly” for 
fear of offending the local population and running counter to their Islamic social 
framework (Daly 245). This was especially important as some NGOs in Aceh looked to 
work locally through the gampong system.  
The structure of the gampong is complex and composed of a number of religious 
as well as secular leaders with specific oversight on traditional activities such as food 
crops, sea-related livelihoods, agricultural fields, and markets (Daly 240). There is also 
leadership at the mukim level, which is a collection of villages. Daly also makes mention 
of existing community social practices that exist at the gampong level that ensure care for 
village members, such as tsunami widows and orphans, and provide charity (242). Care 
for tsunami survivors can be an important social function of the gampong in a post-
disaster environment.  
In interviews conducted with both foreign and Acehnese aid workers involved in 
the post-tsunami recovery, all respondents supported the idea that the gampong had the 
capacity to be leveraged in the reconstruction process and the distribution of aid (Daly 
240). The gampong, and the mukim at a higher level, have the framework in place for 
“decision-making, resource allocation, and aid governance” (Daly 241). As the gampong 
consists of religious leaders, it also has the ability to help interpret and apply Islamic law 
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within the community. The gampong also has a forum structure in place for public debate 
and discussion to occur, an important consideration if the community as a whole is 
expected to be involved.  In addition, the gampong could function as a mechanism for 
problem-solving between locals and external aid organizations through practical 
assistance, such as mediating delays on projects or resolving issues with late worker 
compensation (Daly 241).  
An example of the benefit of NGOs working within existing local Acehnese 
structures is cited by Patrick Daly in a 2015 article. The panglima laot, the local authority 
with oversight on matters of fishing and other “sea related activities,” was a critical 
partner in getting a number of small-scale boat projects up and running (Daly 242). As 
many of the projects were conceived by external agencies with varying degrees of 
understanding and familiarity with traditional livelihoods, partnering with the panglima 
laot, with an understanding of the community structure, led to a higher degree of success 
in implementation. 
Beverly Bell expresses a fear that “it’s not Haitians who will decide what Haiti we 
want, it’s people in other countries” (73). There was little belief that aid organizations 
and foreign workers had much interest in the needs and wants of ordinary Haitians. Annie 
Joseph, a factory worker, expressed her frustration that “we protest, they don’t listen. We 
have a sit-in, they don’t listen. We don’t have a president, really; our president is the 
white foreigners” (qtd. in Bell 83). This sentiment is understandable. Haitians may feel as 
though they have lost agency when the post-disaster response is directed by non-local 
organizations. Jonathan Katz supports this idea and notes that aid organizations had the 
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power to function in Haiti “without oversight or accountability” (51). Haitians had no 
recourse to challenge the “expertise” of NGOs or push back against unwanted 
development projects.  
The Haitian Response Coalition (HRC), a group of small- and medium-sized 
NGOs that had been working in Haiti for many years, attempted to get assistance into a 
number of neglected areas through collaboration with Haitian community leaders. The 
HRC focused on the identification of self-formed committees within the displaced 
persons camps to help assess the needs within the community and potentially help with 
the distribution of aid. However, due to the overall sense of distrust or fear of the Haitian 
victims, as mentioned previously, aid distribution was limited to large NGOs distributing 
supplies while under military protection, rather than on a smaller, more personal scale 
(Miles 48).  
The HRC also looked to expand Haitian participation and autonomy in the aid 
distribution process by creating working groups and selecting representatives to attend 
meetings (Miles 47). However, among other challenges, these aid meetings were held in 
English or French, with translation into Haitian Creole infrequently provided to attendees 
(Miles 47). The lack of regard for the local language was an enormous barrier to 
community participation and excluded representatives from community groups and IDP 
camps (Bell 84). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that these critical meetings were 
held on the UN Logistical Base—not out in the community—and were primarily attended 
by foreign aid workers. In Katz’ assessment, the response in Haiti could generally be 
described as top-down, utilizing foreign responders to direct the distribution of aid (105). 
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In general, a lack of meaningful consultation with locals led to uninformed decision-
making and an unequal allocation of resources.  
The Coordinating Committee of Progressive Organisations, a collective of Haitian 
groups, released a joint statement that called for the “international brigades” to contribute 
to humanitarian aid “appropriate to our reality, respectful of our culture and our 
environment” (Coordinating Committee of Progressive Organisations). While they 
welcomed international assistance because of the staggering scale of the disaster, they 
implored foreign NGOs not to undermine the grassroots work they had done with Haitian 
communities over the span of several decades. Beverly Bell endorses local aid models as 
exemplars for how to create humanitarian aid approaches founded on “respect, 
democratic participation, generosity and dignity” despite limited funding and capacity 
(Bell 51).  
Bell cites an example of a local organization, the Association for the Promotion of 
Integrated Family Health (APROSIFA), at work in a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. 
The organization used international grants to pay 60 female street vendors to cook a meal 
for the same designated families each day. APROSIFA estimates that it fed upward of 
4,800 people each day (Bell 54). Food for the meals was purchased from rural Haitian 
farmers. Bell contrasts the communal meal sharing with the chaotic scenes of armed 
foreign soldiers distributing imported rice (Bell 54). The APROSIFA model approached 
food aid as a local task that prioritized recipient dignity and reinforced community. 
From the responses in Patrick Daly’s survey of aid workers in Aceh, there is a 
suggestion that locals were only consulted at the beginning of the project as a way to 
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ensure that the project was technically deemed “participatory.” Survey respondents 
suggested there was a “patronizing” quality to the way in which aid workers engaged 
with local stakeholders, suggesting that the local participation was “token” (Daly 249). 
While the concept of community participation was often discussed, the survey 
respondents acknowledged that in practice, they were hampered by “ignorance of how 
communities in Aceh operate; how they make decisions, organise, allocate resources, 
mobilise and resolve conflicts” (Daly 249).  
Unfamiliarity with local Acehnese customs surfaced in a variety of ways. In one 
example, the common NGO approach of gathering a wide swath of Acehnese community 
members for focus groups—including men and women of varying ages and education 
levels—was not a culturally-appropriate practice. Men and women typically gather in 
separate forums to discuss issues and, therefore, in a mixed group, women are unable to 
express their thoughts on the matters at hand (Daly 2015). While non-Acehnese NGO 
staff saw success from gathering a diverse group, their approach went against local 
custom. As a result, the female perspective was unrepresented or underrepresented. The 
lack of meaningful input from women was a significant omission and suggested a lack of 
understanding of the nuances of gender in Aceh. 
This is not to suggest that the success or failure of participatory or community-
based projects rests solely on the shoulders of the foreign aid workers. As Daly notes, the 
quality and capabilities of the local leadership varied by village, especially with the high 
human toll of the tsunami. There were questions as to if and how community leadership 
would be able to handle the influx of funding for local projects and distribute to 
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beneficiaries in an equitable way; some oversight was needed to keep elites from 
disproportionately benefitting. Despite the loss of local leaders in the tsunami, many 
communities displayed a high degree of resilience, reassembling their leadership 
structures in order to move rebuilding projects forward. However, for projects that 
extended beyond the community level, such as rebuilding roads and other major 
infrastructure, health initiatives, and education programs, aid workers surveyed agreed 
that they were better approached through higher levels of government rather than through 
local avenues (Daly 243). 
Haiti found itself in a slightly more complicated position in terms of working 
from a state or national government level. Among many foreign governments and aid 
agencies, there was a perception—and an expectation—that the Haitian government was 
corrupt and would mismanage funding. This perception resulted in a reluctance to give 
Rene Préval and his ministers direct control over the monetary aid pledged to Haiti and 
assigned “spectator status” to the Haitian government (Bell 79). Katz suggests that the 
perception of corruption is misguided and Eurocentric and, as some working for 
humanitarian aid would claim, circumventing governments “made fragile states weaker” 
(Katz 111; 128). Excluding the Haitian government from the recovery process likely did 
not improve their capacity to handle future disaster situations. 
The NGOs and foreign agencies were present in Haiti because of its political and 
economic instability. Nadève Ménard suggests, “had…national institutions been 
stronger…it would have been more difficult to suggest skirting them to rebuild” (Ménard 
51). If foreign aid agencies continue to bypass the Haitian government, and refuse to 
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involve officials in any recovery efforts, it offers little possibility for the government to 
participate in the rebuilding of the country in any meaningful way.  
Aid organizations arrive in a post-disaster situation with their own expertise, but 
the knowledge and experience of local, grassroots organizations is invaluable. Examples 
from Haiti and Aceh demonstrate that working directly with locals and through 
community structures can confer a sense of dignity. In contrast, militarized aid 
distribution tactics can fuel distrust between aid organizations and the community. For 
participation to be meaningful, aid organizations can move to convene meetings out in 
the community, converse in the local language, and consider the suitable forums for both 
men and women to convey their needs. Foreign aid organizations can also be more aware 
of how they work in tandem with government entities. Governments are unable to build 
capacity to handle future crises if they are excluded from emergency assistance programs 
and reconstruction plans.  
 
Discussion  
In this chapter, I investigated several issues that came to the forefront as a result 
of foreign involvement in Haiti and Aceh. The two primary questions that guided my 
inquiry were: To what extent do cultural differences present a challenge to disaster 
recovery and how are they addressed or negotiated? Additionally, how do aid 
organizations work with community groups and social institutions to address needs? 
There is overlap between the two post-disaster environments, but there are unique 
considerations as well.  
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In Haiti, the “othering” of the Haitian survivors by international organizations was 
a primary concern. It created a perception of reliance on predominately white foreigners 
to maintain order and dictate the post-disaster recovery process. A long history of 
imposed foreign assistance contributed to the impression Haitians are powerless, 
unwilling to help themselves, and potentially violent. As demonstrated by some of the 
aforementioned examples in this chapter, this view can keep foreign aid workers at a 
distance from the communities they are meant to assist. Similar concerns arose in Aceh 
around strict Islamic beliefs and practice. With these issues in mind, how can such 
misconceptions be addressed before aid workers head into a disaster area? It can be 
difficult when certain practices and customs have been sensationalized and reinforced by 
the media.  
 In the same thread, a general awareness or sensitivity to local customs and social 
frameworks is not necessarily enough to build meaningful relationships between aid 
workers and the populations they work with. In both Haiti and Aceh, aid workers were 
accused of “drive-by” development efforts in which engagement with locals happened 
through very surface level encounters. To help counter misunderstandings and charges of 
token community participation, aid workers and organizations could spend a greater 
amount of time living and working in the affected locations. In order to do so, donor 
expectations around time and results would need to be recalibrated. Adjusted timeframes 
could allow aid workers to make personal connections, develop programs to meet the 
needs identified by the community, and engage in meaningful discourse throughout the 
life of a project. For situations where a longer timeframe is not possible, in what ways 
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can an anthropologist best support aid workers and recipients and expedite the project 
identification and development process? 
 It is important for foreign aid organizations to work on a local level to ensure that 
resources are distributed and projects developed in an equitable, intelligent way. The 
scale of international funding and involvement is such that projects with a larger scope, 
such as infrastructural rebuilding, are best addressed at a higher state or governmental 
level. For these projects, international NGOs may choose to take into account how their 
work may circumvent the governing body or officials. Foreign governments and NGOs 
distrusted the Haitian government and elected officials, and they feared corruption and 
mismanagement of humanitarian funds. However, keeping them out of major national 
development projects may perpetuate the widespread belief—among outsiders and 
Haitians—that the government is incapable of protecting and providing for its citizens. 
As discussed throughout this chapter, there were parallels between the nominal 
involvement of governmental bodies and how NGOs engaged citizens in the recovery 
process. Can aid organizations adopt similar methods for working with survivors and 
foreign governments? Perhaps respectful, participatory approaches on both local and 
national levels could counter the belief that foreigners direct survivors’ futures.  !
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CHAPTER SIX: EMPLOYMENT AND LOCAL ECONOMIES 
In September of 2008—more than a year before the earthquake—former Haitian 
President René Préval spoke to the United Nations General Assembly. Préval thanked the 
organization for monetary donations and resources after four successive hurricanes 
rocked the country. Préval called attention to a greater concern for Haitians as he noted, 
I am worried, because I dread that once this first wave of solidarity and 
human compassion has dried up, we will be left, as always, alone but truly 
alone, to deal with new catastrophes and to see restarted, as if in a ritual, 
the same exercises of mobilization. (R. Préval) 
In other portions of his speech, Préval called attention to the traditional way in which aid 
is distributed, what may be understood as the ‘paradigm of charity’. Préval noted that 
charity has never helped any country to recover from under-development. He suggested 
that if the international community wanted to do something productive in Haiti, it would 
be to help Haitians maximize their potential. 
This chapter delves into how aid organizations can comprehensively support local 
economies and livelihoods following a disaster. Préval’s concerns voiced in 2008 around 
providing Haitians with meaningful training or employment—and thereby maximizing 
potential—could also be applied to thinking long-term about Aceh. The cessation of 
armed conflict left a plethora of former GAM soldiers looking for another source of 
income. The upheaval of the tsunami created an opportunity to examine employment 
needs and development opportunities.  
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In both Haiti and Aceh, the physical scale of the destruction led to a widespread 
loss of employment, which was magnified by high poverty rates pre-disaster. Many 
Haitians had flocked from rural areas to Port-au-Prince to find work. The city’s collapse 
destroyed their place of work and few opportunities were accessible in the rural fringe. In 
Aceh, the tsunami destroyed much of the coastal land and livelihoods linked to the sea.  
With these changes in mind, I posed two questions around post-disaster 
economies to guide my research: In what ways does natural disaster impact livelihoods 
and the economic system? In a post-disaster economy, how can aid organizations support 
economic recovery through employment opportunities without creating new 
dependencies? Studies of other natural disasters suggest that the loss of income and 
livelihoods can trap survivors in a cycle of poverty (Christoplos and Wu 43). Cash-for-
Work programs and NGO-sponsored jobs are transitional sources of income, but 
employment opportunities rooted in local needs and industries are a crucial long-term 
consideration for aid organizations.  
 
Cash-for-Work Programs 
Aid organizations often look for ways to generate jobs out of the disaster recovery 
effort. Infrastructure and public works projects hold potential for short-term job creation. 
One strategy used by aid organizations in Haiti and Aceh was “Cash-for-Work” (CFW), 
an opportunity for survivors to pick up short-term, unskilled, minimum wage jobs 
essential to the recovery effort. NGOs have utilized the CFW program in many post-
disaster contexts in order to provide income for survivors as well as encourage the 
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circulation of cash in the local economy. The benefits and disadvantages of CFW are 
explored in this section. 
Cash-for-Work programs in Haiti received criticism for being unproductive—
workers were observed underperforming or were noticeably absent—and for the low 
wages that were offered. Duties included clearing out earthquake debris, excavating 
drainage ditches, and building latrines in the temporary camps (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 
“Cash for What?” 83). The work would earn Haitians an “unlivable” wage of five USD 
or less per day (Bell 150). The CFW program offered short-term work but neglected to 
provide stable income. After receiving reports of CFW teams neglecting their duties, a 
CFW coordinator for the American Refugee Committee commented that the program 
may be providing “a visual association of working with not necessarily working hard” to 
other Haitians (Haiti Grassroots Watch, “Cash for What?” 85). While the CFW programs 
in Haiti—by limited accounts—may have produced positive results, they may have been 
hindered by poor management and low wages.  
Although CFW jobs are temporary and often menial, some Haitians saw the 
availability of paid work as evidence that NGOs could—and should—address Haiti’s 
basic needs. As one Haitian Cash-for-Work manager is quoted, “Our future lies with 
NGOs! We can’t count on the government. If it were for the government, we would be 
dead already” (Haiti Grassroots Watch, “Cash for What?” 86). A growing dependency on 
foreign NGOs for employment opportunities could undermine the Haitian government 
and establish an economy fueled by Cash-for-Work and other foreign-funded programs. 
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In Aceh, Cash-for-Work programs were also established to allow survivors to 
receive compensation for tasks like clearing agricultural land and drainage ditches, 
moving corpses, and cleaning houses. CFW programs took on tasks like planting rice, 
creating fishponds, and repairing boats that could also aid the return to livelihoods rooted 
in the local resources (Doocy et al. 283). Participants were given a small daily sum—on 
average less than four USD—for their efforts (Doocy et al. 282). Jobs that required more 
skill or responsibilities were paid at a higher wage. The Aceh CFW program was phased 
out in part due to concern that participants were becoming dependent on CFW income, 
delaying the return to pre-tsunami modes of employment (Doocy et al. 286). A similar 
issue of foreign dependency arose in both Haiti and Aceh around Cash-for-Work 
programs. Although they provide economic assistance, CFW programs may postpone the 
to pre-disaster livelihoods. 
The concerns about dependency may be brought to the forefront when NGOs 
leave. In Aceh, the jobs made available by the influx of the NGOs and the governmental 
recovery agency—the BRR—were high paying, but they were only available to some. 
When the NGOs and BRR decamped, the jobs left with them, leaving the economic 
situation fairly tedious (Samuels 220). As told to Jonathan Katz, Haitian Billy Chery 
explained his persistent attempts to find employment in post-earthquake Haiti. He noted, 
“[he] couldn’t stay under the care of aid…They won’t be around forever” (Katz 106). 
Jobs created through CFW programs and other NGO sources are typically not reliable 
sources of income because they are dependent on the coordination and funding of outside 
organizations.  
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Despite concerns around dependency, Cash-for-Work programs may produce 
benefits outside of the economic realm. Participants in a CFW program organized by 
Mercy Corps responded to a survey and indicated that CFW income allowed them to 
return to their tsunami-hit neighborhoods. Survey respondents also disclosed that CFW 
jobs enabled them to “remain active while reducing feelings of trauma and stress” 
(Doocy et al. 293). The Mercy Corps CFW programs in Aceh allowed tsunami survivors 
the opportunity to work collaboratively with their friends and neighbors to improve their 
own community and remain productive. 
Broadly speaking, Cash-for-Work programs can be useful income generators in 
the interim period between when traditional income sources are disrupted and when they 
resume. As well as reintroducing money into the local economy, CFW programs can also 
be used as a strategy to clean up debris and restore the infrastructure needed for survivors 
to return to pre-disaster employment. As suggested by the experiences in Haiti and Aceh, 
CFW programs are more effective when they are properly managed and approached in a 
way that encourages participants to invest in their critical, albeit temporary, work and 
improve their own communities. Difficulties arise when the temporary CFW jobs are not 
replaced by program participants’ former source of income or by a new form of 
employment that does not rely on temporary aid organization funding. Once the period of 
emergency relief has ended, and outside organizations depart, disaster survivors are 
ideally in a position to sustain economic development.  
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Local Economies and Foreign Investment 
Industries in Haiti and Aceh were significantly affected by natural disaster. This 
section examines two industries that received support or attention after the events. The 
Acehnese fishing industry was impacted at all levels, from the fishermen that lost their 
boats to the destruction of fish processing facilities. Post-disaster, the local fishing 
authority was instrumental in identifying the industry’s immediate needs. Furthermore, 
the destruction of the coastal ecosystem impacted the ability of locals to utilize the 
natural resources. In Haiti, the earthquake sparked renewed interest in garment factory 
investment from foreign companies, but there was little discussion of how that industry 
could create a stronger Haitian economy. The focus on low-paying factory jobs and 
dearth of meaningful job and training opportunities raises questions about whether or not 
aid organizations are helping to create an independent Haiti.  
 
Haiti’s Garment Industry 
Official government statistics vary greatly, but between 40 percent and 70 percent 
of the Haitian population was unemployed before the earthquake (Katz 141). Haiti’s 
historically cheap labor and close proximity to the United States market has made it 
vulnerable to foreign exploitation. Even for those that were employed—often in foreign-
owned assembly or garment factories—the daily wage paid was often lower than what 
was legal. Haitians need employment options, but economist Camille Chalmers remarks, 
the opportunities must “develop our human resources or reduce poverty” (qtd. in Bell 
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182). Many Haitians accepted that a low-paying, exploitative job was better than none at 
all. 
After the earthquake, there was interest in building more international garment 
factories outside of Port-au-Prince in subsidized free-trade zones. Garment factories had 
long been part of the global development plan for Haiti. Paul Collier, an Oxford 
University economics professor, pointed out shortly after the disaster that the earthquake 
could serve as the pivotal event that sparked a garment industry investment boom in Haiti 
(Bell 180). As of June 2010, nineteen garment factories employed approximately 23,000 
Haitians, less than one half of one percent of the working population (Bell 181). As 
Camille Chalmers puts forth, the garment industry “contribute[s] little toward making the 
economy more productive”, but not only because it employs a low number of Haitians 
(qtd. in Bell 181). The raw materials are purchased outside of Haiti, and the products are 
sold in foreign markets. In order for foreign investors and factory owners to be profitable 
in the industry, Haitian “garment-worker wages must remain at poverty levels” (Katz 
141). The push for additional investment and development of the foreign garment 
industry in Haiti faced opposition due to these concerns. It also raises questions around 
the extent of foreign involvement and control over Haiti’s economic future.  
 
Aceh’s Fishing Industry 
Acehnese were employed in a number of different industries before the disaster, 
but the fishing industry was directly impacted by the tsunami. The number of part- and 
full-time fishermen in Aceh was estimated at around 88,000 in 2003, the year before the 
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tsunami (Janssen 5). An extensive study conducted by the International Collective in 
Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) estimates that approximately ten percent of the fishermen 
in Aceh lost their lives in the tsunami (Janssen 10). Fishing activities were suspended for 
around three months following the tsunami due to the initial recovery efforts, the search 
for family members, and resettlement into temporary camps.  
In addition to the widespread loss of fishing boats, the tsunami also destroyed 
market facilities and aquaculture farms (Griffin et al. 176). Fish and shrimp were farmed 
in cultivated coastal ponds, or tambak, before the tsunami. From interviews with 
Acehnese farming the ponds, the tsunami destroyed the tambak and greatly influenced 
their ability to continue their livelihood (Griffin et al. 176). In the Acehnese village of 
Pande, the force of the tsunami eroded away beaches and pushed sediment further inland, 
reducing the amount of available land in which to reconstruct new ponds (Griffin et al. 
179). Many employed by the fishing industry or on the aquaculture farms were left 
without a livelihood following the tsunami. They were forced to obtain alternate 
employment, like Cash-for-Work programs (Janssen 18).  
While the lengthy armed conflict impeded fishing activities in Aceh in a variety 
of ways—including periodic fishing bans and seized boats—the tsunami was particularly 
devastating to their livelihood. Many of the fishermen privately owned their own small 
boats that were lost in the tsunami (Janssen 6). The impact on the fishing industry was 
not limited to the fishermen and the aquaculture farmers. Owners of large boats with 
crewmembers, fish processors, and fish market workers were also left without their 
regular source of income. It is unclear from post-disaster economic reports if responding 
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aid organizations were aware of how the tsunami created need in all parts of the 
Acehnese fishing economy.  
The coastal landscape, like beaches, forests, reefs, and rivers were all dramatically 
altered. The destruction of the mangrove forests along the coast made the loss of 
employment more severe. The mangroves created an aquatic ecosystem in which locals 
could regularly find fish, shellfish, and crabs, a free source of food (Griffin et al. 180). 
Mangrove wood and bark was once used to construct the ponds and dye fishing nets, but 
supplies had to be purchased at additional cost after the tsunami. Women customarily 
used mature mangrove leaves to make cigarettes as a way of supplementing income. 
Even though some mangroves have returned to the coast, the leaves of the immature trees 
were too small to be used in this way (Griffin et al. 180). Although those employed by 
the fishing industry were most obviously in need of economic support, the change in the 
coastal landscape also resulted in a loss of family income that may or may not have been 
addressed by aid organizations. 
Foreign aid organizations partnered with local organizations to implement 
specific projects around fisheries because many of them were unfamiliar with the sector. 
There was a specific focus on working with and through the panglima laot, the traditional 
authority in the gampong that enforced local fishing operations. Economic programs that 
worked with and through the panglima laot generally avoided the missteps made by those 
that tried to circumvent the local systems. For example, the ICSF reported that foreign aid 
agencies donated boats and canoes unsuited to fishing activities, and they were 
subsequently abandoned or unused because of their poor quality (Janssen 21). The 
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panglima laot had the ability to provide aid organizations with basic information, such as 
the type of fishing boats that the majority of locals preferred. 
 
Training Opportunities and the Informal Economy 
Another concern raised in Haiti is the sustainability of foreigners filling jobs 
created by the disaster. NGO job opportunities that did not involve manual labor typically 
carried an English language requirement, eliminating most Haitians from consideration 
(Ménard 49). An alternative to awarding foreigners higher-paying, desirable jobs is to 
train Haitians for the same positions. Thus, if an NGO or governmental agency decides to 
leave their Haitian post, a trained worker is left in place. Nadève Ménard makes specific 
mention of the thousands of Haitian university students—with expertise in social work, 
psychology, engineering and medicine—sitting idle in the aftermath of the Haitian 
earthquake (50). For Ménard, the university students possess valuable skills that could be 
put to use, as well as the cultural knowledge to create sustainable, appropriate solutions: 
When, three months after the earthquake, free food is plentiful, but jobs 
are scarce, is that really helping Haiti? Will the world always be willing to 
give us free food? Shouldn’t we be starting now to learn or remember how 
to earn it? (Ménard 51-52) 
The lack of jobs and relevant training for ordinary Haitians can impact the long-term 
outlook on the recovery. An opportunity may have been missed because Haitians were 
not trained or employed in roles that were vacated when foreign aid workers moved on to 
the next crisis.  
In Aceh, communities led aspects of the reconstruction process as a method of job 
training. There were organizations in Aceh—including Oxfam—that had community 
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members build houses as a way to pick up on-the-job training in “seismic-resistant 
construction techniques” (Kennedy et al. 17). The hope was that it would lead to both 
future employment and informed, safe construction. It is not noted in a post-project 
survey if any of those that participated in the physical construction of houses were able to 
leverage their training and skills on later construction projects as a means of long-term, 
sustainable employment (Rand et al. 201). Many survivors returned to their traditional 
livelihoods and were reluctant to pick up construction as a new trade. Furthermore, many 
of them recognized that after the post-tsunami building boom, the opportunities for 
construction would be considerably diminished (Kennedy et al. 28).  
While aid organizations can provide assistance for survivors in terms of 
temporary employment or can invest in training or job creation programs, Haitians and 
Acehnese have informal economies and small businesses. In Kreyol, the term cherche 
lavi is used to refer to different types of work in the informal sector. This could include 
such activities as selling or bartering juice, fruit, clothing, phone cards, and other items 
on the street or in the IDP camp. Many Haitians included in official unemployment 
statistics were, in reality, part of this economic system and could be considered to have a 
job providing goods and services. As Katz notes, Haiti was not lacking in “jobs.” It was 
lacking in jobs that would offer stable incomes and security (Katz 142). A foreign aid 
organization may not understand how this economic system operates or how to best 
support it. 
Acehnese tsunami survivors also found ways to generate income for themselves 
in response to their post-tsunami reality, often out of necessity. Samuels cites examples 
  129!
of two women, both tsunami widows, who set up small kiosks in front of their homes to 
sell food, cigarettes, or other products to neighbors (Samuels 215). Many disaster-
impacted individuals—who may have had a low income even before the tsunami 
struck—were in need of access to lines of credit in order to invest in starting or 
improving their businesses.  
The number of individuals in Aceh that were beneficiaries of economic recovery 
assistance from NGOs was limited (Samuels 216). Although some NGOs gave small 
grants to survivors looking to start their own businesses, many borrowed money to fund 
their small business endeavors from family and neighbors (Samuels 215). Annemarie 
Samuels cites an example of a tsunami widower who borrowed money from friends to 
start a small shop that later grew into a coffee house business (216). Some Acehnese 
would use their social networks to find job opportunities in other towns and migrated 
locally to find work (Christoplos and Wu 42). This reliance on social connections to 
further one’s livelihood—in both the short and long term—is an important consideration 
for future aid efforts.  
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, having a home can also provide economic 
benefits. In an Oxfam-conducted survey, 91 percent of participants thought their Oxfam-
constructed home improved their livelihood. The home is for many Acehnese “a base for 
income generating activities” (Rand et al. 202). A study following a 2001 earthquake in 
Gujarat, India showed that residents used their newly reconstructed homes to further their 
livelihoods, whether it was running a shop out of their own home, or simply being able to 
securely store tools related to their line of work. In Aceh, these activities included 
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weaving, making nets, and building boats. A home can provide the space and security for 
residents to pick back up their trade.  
A few points of consideration emerge from the examination of the impact of 
disaster on local economies. Both Haiti and Aceh were faced with widespread poverty 
and unemployment at the time of the natural disasters, but this does not mean that disaster 
survivors should accept any and all aid or investment. For example, the garment industry 
has been called exploitative because it is only profitable if Haitian workers are paid less 
than a living wage. From the experiences noted in Aceh, aid organizations that do not 
consult community members about their livelihoods and their needs run the risk of 
wasting their investment. Organizations that circumvented the panglima laot in Aceh, for 
example, donated boats that were not useful to the fishermen and were ultimately unused. 
Foreign aid organizations can learn from people’s ability to leverage local networks to 
find job opportunities and support their small-scale business endeavors. Closely working 
with community members may give aid organizations better insight into where 
investment can support organic economic growth. 
 
Rural Livelihoods 
 Much of the post-disaster response focused on coastal and urban areas in Haiti 
and Aceh. The lack of investment and consideration paid to the Haitian and Acehnese 
rural interior is detailed in this section. An example from Haiti—in which donated seeds 
threatened the independence of Haitian farmers—draws attention to the flaws of foreign-
directed investment. The Acehnese recovery did not fully address the needs of former 
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combatants living outside of urban areas. The natural disasters created an opportunity to 
address issues of poverty and create employment opportunities, but not all populations 
were given equal consideration.  
Foreign policies enacted over the years have been particularly unkind to Haitian 
farmers. Cheap foreign food supplies flooded Haitian markets and priced out local 
producers. After the earthquake, peasants were still subject to questionable foreign 
involvement in Haitian agriculture. The American agricultural biotechnology corporation 
Monsanto sent “hybrid seeds and vegetable seeds” to Haiti (Jean-Baptiste 99). The 
donation was approved by the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture and was funded by U.S. 
taxpayers. The Minister of Agriculture assured the public that the gift did not include 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), but Haiti had no system in place to test whether 
or not this was true (Jean-Baptiste, 99).  
The sustainability and appropriateness of the project was called into question on 
several fronts. The seeds had never been tested in the country, and their effect on the 
Haitian ecosystem was unknown. There was no understanding of the irrigation and 
fertilization requirements. Furthermore, what happened to farmers if the hybrid seed 
technology failed? Little information was available about the potential outcomes, and 
farmers ran the risk of being dependent on Monsanto for seed distribution.  
Creole seeds, on the other hand, were widely available in the local markets—a 
fact publicized in a Catholic Relief Services report before the Monsanto gift (Bell 125). 
The Creole seeds were already known to be suitable to for Haitian ecology. Local farmers, 
organized by the Peasant Movement of Papay, protested the hybrid seeds in June of 
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2011—leading a call for “food sovereignty”—and there were reports of seed stocks being 
burned (Bell 124). The Monsanto gift raised awareness that some aid may come at the 
expense of the Haitian environment or potentially create foreign reliance.  
There are opportunities for investment in local economies that could lead to 
meaningful and sustainable employment and support for existing livelihoods. For 
example, in 2010, the Coca Cola Company announced a collaborative effort with Haitian 
mango farmers to create a mango limeade beverage. Ménard estimated that the project 
would “involve 25,000 Haitian mango farmers” in an effort to increase income and 
develop the industry (Ménard 50). This type of project is more likely to be sustainable 
considering it taps into an existing trade and seeks to be a long-term partnership rather 
than a temporary solution. However, the program has been criticized for the fact that 
mangoes are already in surplus in Haiti. Additional funding from Coca Cola to increase 
mango production would not serve to increase the production of food crops that were 
more urgently needed by the Haitian people (Katz 149). In addition to the benefits for 
mango farmers, as Ménard notes, “several NGOs…stated that they will start buying rice 
and other goods from local farmers…” (Ménard 49). Encouraging aid workers to support 
the local economy, rather than purchasing from foreign vendors can also support the 
recovery efforts. 
In Aceh, there were issues with former militants that needed to be addressed with 
the same urgency as the tsunami survivors. While funding was specifically allocated to 
tsunami relief, there was significantly less consideration given to those most affected by 
the end of fighting. An important distinction should be made—the tsunami primarily 
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affected the coastline while the conflict with the Government of Indonesia (GoI) was “a 
more inland concern” (Hyndman and Waizenegger 116). A line was drawn between the 
coastal populations that were hit by the natural disaster and the inland populations that 
were affected by a political conflict. Both were in need of humanitarian and economic 
assistance, but the response may be seen as uneven.  
Foreign aid agencies that arrived in the aftermath of the tsunami were hesitant to 
get involved in assisting Acehnese that were not impacted by the tsunami but were 
affected by the political conflict. Others were also bound by the intent of their donors, as 
funds collected abroad were intended for tsunami-impacted victims and related causes. 
Although there were both tsunami IDPs and displaced persons due to the separatist 
conflict, the families displaced by the armed conflict outnumbered families displaced by 
the tsunami. These two populations, living in close proximity to one another, received 
vastly different amounts of support in the years following the tsunami.  
The discrepancy in the amount of aid and attention paid to the coast in contrast to 
the interior “exacerbated longstanding disparities in development patters between the 
relatively prosperous coastal areas and the underdeveloped hinterland” (Hyndman and 
Waizenegger 119). Former combatants were compensated during the conflict, and the 
cessation of hostilities also meant a loss of their livelihood. They had fewer skills on 
which to build post-conflict careers and faced poverty. “Peace dividends” were 
distributed to the GAM elites, but less funding and opportunities were available for the 
remainder of the former GAM combatants (Hyndman and Waizenegger 115). Nearly four 
years after the tsunami and the peace agreement, approximately 75 percent of the former 
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combatants in Aceh had not found employment (Hyndman and Waizenegger 120). 
Reported crimes—including serious offenses such as extortion and robberies—were 
higher in former GAM areas  (Hyndman and Waizenegger 120). This data may suggest 
that former soldiers sought out alternative sources of income due to the lack of 
opportunity. 
In Haiti and Aceh, certain populations fell outside the scope of the post-tsunami 
work of many aid organizations. Their economic needs were either overlooked or 
addressed in what may be considered an inappropriate way. In Haiti, the earthquake 
created an opportunity to address poverty and the longstanding needs of the peasantry. 
However, it is unlikely that the Monsanto donation was made with long-term 
sustainability in mind. The potential was high that the hybrid seeds would continue 
Haiti’s dependency on foreign organizations. In Aceh, the former Free Aceh Movement 
soldiers were handled much differently than tsunami survivors. The former soldiers were 
left without their source of income when a peace agreement was signed, and many lacked 
the skills to find a new livelihood. There is an opportunity for aid organizations to work 
with these forgotten or marginalized populations because their needs are likely not 
addressed by short-term aid programs. 
 
Discussion 
Issues around economic support and development emerged in Haitian and 
Acehnese post-disaster accounts and merited further exploration in this thesis. The two 
research questions that I developed around disaster and economies are as follows: In what 
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ways does natural disaster impact livelihoods and the economic system? In a post-disaster 
economy, how can aid organizations support economic recovery through employment 
opportunities without creating new dependencies? As discussed throughout this chapter, 
disaster can be disruptive to key industries and income generators. Disaster can also 
present opportunities for economic investment, employment training, and new industries 
to emerge. As foreign aid organizations participate in and support local economies, it 
may be advisable to understand the complexities surrounding their involvement, 
including concerns over foreign dependencies and discussion around what constitutes a 
fair, livable wage. 
Despite the criticisms of the Cash-for-Work programs, the short-term, transitional 
jobs can be an important source of income at a time of economic and social upheaval. 
Although no two post-disaster situations are exactly the same, there may be broad 
considerations to improve participant satisfaction and overall productivity in CFW 
programs. Could greater output and commitment perhaps be achieved through 
community identification of the projects to undertake? Establishing a firm end date for 
the project at the outset—and gradually reducing the hours and income obtained through 
CFW programs—may also alleviate some of the concerns around dependence.  
Long-term employment opportunities were also critical to the reconstruction 
efforts in Haiti and Aceh. Disaster may create an opportunity for economic investment 
and job creation. Paul Farmer notes that in Haiti in particular that there is an urgent need 
for “jobs that would confer dignity to those in greatest need. Jobs in both education and 
healthcare are essential as are opportunities for women” (Farmer 37). Farmer’s focus on 
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“dignity” may be a guiding principle for NGOs focused on introducing new industries 
and employment opportunities. The need for sustainable jobs in Haiti and Aceh existed 
before—and persisted after—the natural disasters, and the introduction of well-paid, safe 
jobs can diminish reliance on foreign aid. Questions remain about what this looks like in 
practice. Haiti and Aceh should not be closed to foreign investment and industries, but 
who is advocating for equitable wages and safe working conditions? What role can aid 
organizations play—if any—in supporting the rights and needs of workers in potentially 
challenging post-disaster economic conditions? 
Before implementing strategies for employment programs, NGOs may benefit 
from an understanding of how livelihoods are rooted in cultural systems and practices. 
The examples cited in this chapter suggest there were opportunities for NGOs in Aceh to 
work through culture-based leadership structures—like the panglima laot—to ensure that 
needs are better met and to leverage local resources. However, I question how common it 
is to have economic leadership so clearly established. Is it more common that NGOs will 
encounter local worker organizations, like the Peasant Movement of Papay mentioned in 
this chapter? If so, what other strategies or approaches to economic support may need to 
be considered?  
Prior to the disasters and the influx of aid, communities in both Haiti and Aceh 
had functioning informal economies that were powered by entrepreneurs. There were 
social systems in place to support the growth of small or home-based businesses and to 
connect community members with job opportunities. Micro-loans are a noteworthy 
option for aid organizations looking to support economic development. Micro-loan 
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distribution may be feasible in one small community or on an individual basis, but what 
does this look like in practice when you have high numbers of people in need? There 
were several examples cited in this chapter in which Acehnese tsunami survivors went to 
family members or friends for business loans. Does bringing in outside loans have the 
potential to disrupt this existing practice?  
The natural disasters discussed in this thesis also seem to have created an 
opportunity to share the post-disaster financial support with oft-forgotten populations. 
Investment in rural livelihoods may encourage urban-dwellers to relocate to the 
countryside and decentralize overcrowded cities in the process. The same concern for 
self-sufficiency and independence applies to projects focused on peripheral populations, 
but how are the economic needs of rural or marginalized populations different than those 
living and working in urban areas? Are there specific aid programs, training, or 
investment strategies that better support and benefit Haitian farmers or former GAM 
soldiers? Without sufficient, appropriate support and opportunity, it will be difficult for 
these marginalized groups to break the cycle of poverty.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
“And I saw when he opened the sixth seal, and there was a great earthquake; […] and 
every mountain and island were moved out of their places.” 
        - Revelation 6 
 
Religion was another cultural belief and practice I chose to explore in this thesis. 
Post-disaster research suggests that high-casualty disasters can create feelings of “intense 
fear, horror…helplessness” and can “challenge fundamental assumptions about the world 
and one’s sense of safety within it” (Frankenberg et al. 499). Even those not directly 
experiencing personal loss may confront death, devastation, and disruption within the 
broader community. I developed two questions to explore religious belief in post-disaster 
circumstances. Can religious belief or practice benefit survivors of disaster and contribute 
to community recovery? If so, how do aid organizations leverage and support religious 
beliefs and practices as part of their approach? 
In both Haiti and Aceh, post-disaster accounts indicate that religion may have 
impacted how survivor needs were addressed and aid was allocated. I was particularly 
interested in how religious beliefs influenced relationships between the disaster survivors 
and aid workers, especially those from religious aid organizations. The following chapter 
explores how religion can benefit and hinder survivors as they adjust to a new post-
disaster reality.  
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Religious Belief and Practice as a Stabilizing Force 
 In researching the role of religion in post-disaster Haiti and Aceh, I encountered 
examples of how religious belief and practice can contribute to a community’s stability 
and recovery. In light of the staggering scale of human loss and physical destruction, 
religious leaders and organizations mobilized to offer spiritual and material suport. This 
section delves into the ways that religion and faith-based aid efforts can sustain a 
population as they come to terms with their post-disaster reality.  
A number of religious denominations are recognized in Haiti, although there is no 
official record of the number of Haitians that identify with each. Unofficial estimates 
identify approximately 70 percent of the population as Roman Catholic and 30 percent 
Protestant. An unknown—but high—percentage of the population also practices Vodou 
to varying degrees (Payton 237). Catholicism in particular exists in a “creolized 
symbiosis with Voudou” (Desmangles and McAlister 75). Catholic and Vodou traditions 
and practices intermixed and gradually came to coexist over the hundreds of years since 
Catholicism was introduced into Haiti society.  
Churches and religious organizations, especially those under Protestant leadership, 
have long had an important role in Haitian society. Churches filled some of the social 
services gaps left by the government, such as education, food distribution, and medical 
care (Germain 249). After the earthquake, Haitian religious leaders stepped forward to 
provide spiritual and physical assistance to the people as they struggled with the meaning 
of the disaster. A number of religious leaders were tapped to distribute food aid and 
advocate for the communities they worked in (Desmangles and McAlister 70).  
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According to post-disaster accounts, survivors sought out places of worship and 
familiar religious rites. Churches—including the iconic Notre Dame cathedral in Port-au-
Prince—and Vodou temples were destroyed, forcing leaders and their congregations to 
hold rituals in makeshift spaces or in the open air. People took to the streets to pray, read 
bible verses, and sing hymns (Desmangles and McAlister 70). The earthquake diminished 
the ability of the clergy and religious leadership to adhere to religious customs, but 
disaster survivors adapted to the circumstances.  
More than 100 Catholic priests and nuns perished in the earthquake, and the 
remaining clergy was unable to administer last rites (Desmangles and McAlister 75). It 
was difficult to provide a traditional burial for earthquake dead, and many were rapidly 
and anonymously buried in mass, common graves (Oriol 16). Improper burial was not 
just a concern for Roman Catholics. Vodou practitioners believe in the close connections 
between the worlds of the living and the dead, and personal wellbeing is the “result of the 
harmony that an individual is able to create within his [or] her context and the natural 
world” (Schininà et al. 161). Many Haitians believe that spirits of ancestors and deceased 
family members can directly impact their emotional welfare. As a result, Vodou 
practitioners experienced feelings of guilt and feared retaliation from angry ancestors 
because they were unable to properly bury them. At a UN meeting shortly after the 
earthquake, a theologian raised concern over how to preserve the dead for future “proper” 
burial (Farmer 59). In response, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) 
collaborated with religious leaders to develop burial rituals “in the absence of corpses” 
(Schininà et al. 162).  
  141!
Despite the varying estimates of the number of practitioners, Vodou has been 
described as “part of the fabric of the Haitian nation” and is an integral part of the Haitian 
cultural experience (Germain 259). Vodou has “traditionally empowered Haitians” and 
has been credited for sparking the colonial-era rebellion against the French (Germain 
248). It offered ways for self-reliant Haitians to cope with everyday life in the face of 
governmental failures and international apathy. In an example cited by Felix Germain, 
Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, Vodou is 
important support for women who are victims of sexual assault. It provides an 
opportunity for victims to call upon “spirits to hunt their offenders” as their only avenue 
for justice (Germain 260). Germain suggests that the threat of retribution from spirits 
could serve as a deterrent for potential rapists, a pertinent concern in the IDP camp 
environment (260).  
In Aceh, a number of incoming international aid organizations were unaware of 
the faith-based needs of the Acehnese. The overwhelming majority of the Acehnese 
population, around 98 percent, is Sunni Muslim. A very small minority identifies as 
Catholic or Protestant. Aid workers focused on the wellbeing of the survivors, but many 
Acehnese were concerned with providing proper Islamic burial for the deceased. The 
joint CGI-Bappenas report issued by the Indonesian government and the Consultative 
Group on Indonesia (CGI) echoed the sentiment that efforts to rebuild “must take into 
consideration that Islam is the primary cultural force” in Aceh (Miller 38). Acehnese 
communities were centered on mosques, students attended Islamic schools, and there was 
an Islamic university in the capitol Banda Aceh. Organizations like the World Wildlife 
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Fund (WWF) used Islam and Islamic values as the basis for new initiatives. They 
believed that local participation in development programs would increase if they “were 
positioned within an Islamic framework” (Miller 37). In this instance, religious beliefs 
and values could inform non-religious humanitarian programs.  
Aceh is the only province in Indonesia that has an official policy of sharia law. 
Sharia is typically associated with ultraconservative, restrictive forms of Islam. A police 
force is in place to dole out reprimands and caning for more serious offenses. According 
to former governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf, “sharia law was created not to get humans 
into trouble but to form an Islamic community” (Miller 44). Michelle Ann Miller of the 
Asia Research Institute contends that sharia has the potential to be a stabilizing force and 
to address serious crimes in the province, but it has not yet been realized (Miller 47). 
While it is important to note that the CGI-Bappenas report stressed the importance of 
acknowledging Islam in development efforts, it remained neutral on the appropriateness 
of sharia law in Aceh (Miller 38). 
Aid organizations and human rights groups in post-tsunami Aceh expressed 
concern that sharia law unequally punished the poor and women, focused on “moral 
minutiae”, and did nothing to further social welfare concerns or address Aceh’s economic 
issues (Miller 44-45). Public interest led to the investigation of particular offenses, like 
adultery, gambling, the consumption of alcohol, and women wearing non-Islamic dress 
(Miller 49). Miller contends that sharia law, and Islam, could better serve the 
redevelopment of Aceh and create a “fairer and more equal society” if there was “less 
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emphasis on punishments for minor moral infringements” (Miller 52). As of 2010, there 
were no laws established to address serious crimes like murder, rape, and theft. 
Following the tsunami, Muslim militias gained a foothold in Aceh province. Their 
primary purpose for mobilizing in Aceh was to ensure that sharia law was adhered to 
despite the influx of Western aid workers. The militias also filled cultural voids left in the 
relief efforts and provided proper mass Islamic burials for thousands of tsunami victims. 
Militia members distributed “prayer kits” containing prayer mats and Qur’ans (Miller 43). 
Their presence was met with mixed reactions. The village leaders knew why the militias 
were showing interest in the survivors—to promote their strict form of Islam—but their 
work on behalf of the deceased and the living was appreciated (Miller 43).  
 Based on the accounts of anthropologists and aid workers, churches and religious 
aid organizations addressed a number of crucial faith-based needs in the post-disaster 
period. Religious belief and practice offered an opportunity for Haitian and Acehnese 
survivors to address post-disaster suffering and loss. Haitians used Vodou as a 
mechanism for coping with crimes that may otherwise go unpunished and to address 
societal problems. The situation in Aceh was more complicated because foreign 
organizations did not fully understand the province’s cultural and religious foundations, 
including Acehnese support for sharia law. Aid recipients appreciated providers that 
acknowledged the role of Islam in Acehnese society and in the recovery process. 
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Understanding Disaster as Divine Retribution 
In both Haiti and Aceh, many of the disasters survivors reported that they felt an 
extreme sense of guilt. They believed they were the recipients of divine punishment, 
either through their own doing or through the misbehavior of others. Spurred by the 
disaster, a number of survivors recommitted to living devout lives. Some placed blame on 
particular segments of the population, and others accepted the idea that they had no 
control over their own destiny. This section looks at religious practice following the 
disasters and how belief systems were both embraced and vilified. 
There is a belief among Christian Evangelicals, both in Haiti and abroad, that 
Vodou is “evil” (Desmangles and McAlister 75). American broadcaster and conservative 
Christian minister Pat Robertson blamed the earthquake on a well-known ceremony that 
sparked the slave rebellions. Robertson blamed the destruction on the invocation of Afro-
Creole spirits in the 18th century, vilifying the religion and Haiti’s heritage in the process 
(Desmangles and McAlister 71-72). Robertson claimed Haitians “made a pact with the 
devil” to free themselves from slavery (Payton 238). 
Vilification of non-Christian beliefs also came from within Haiti and as a result, 
many Haitian Christians felt pressured to reject Vodou practice. The suggestion that “evil” 
Vodou spirits were the root cause of the earthquake was circulated widely after the event. 
As Haitian Claude Adolphe is quoted, “some people say that it is God that hurt 
them…because they do a lot of Vodou” (“Claude Adolphe”).  For those that believe 
disaster to be a form of punishment, they may have strong feelings of guilt and remorse—
for individual and collective behavior—and call for strict religious observance. 
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In an article written for the UNESCO Courier, Haitian anthropologist and 
sociologist Michèle Oriol noted religious beliefs and superstitions contributed to the 
mindset of many Haitians post-disaster. An evangelical preacher named Guibert Valcin 
proclaimed in front of thousands of displaced Haitians that the earthquake was the 
cataclysmic event that signaled the end of the world (Desmangles and McAlister 74). 
Religious leaders and ordinary Haitians repeated biblical verses referencing disaster and 
the apocalypse. If the earthquake was interpreted as a sign that total destruction loomed 
large, it is not inconceivable that the population was emotionally destabilized and fearful. 
The notion of Haiti being unlucky—through natural disasters, incompetent leadership, 
and foreign intervention—may have contributed to a sense of victimhood. Those who 
believe they are victims may doubt their ability to take care of themselves and control 
their own destiny (Oriol 18).  
In contrast, some Haitian survivors surveyed about their spirituality post-
earthquake expressed feelings of “specialness” and the belief that their lives had been 
spared for a purpose (O’Grady et al. 298). As one respondent said, “all that has happened 
to me has affected my spirituality. I…realize that my life was not destroyed because I 
need to finish certain tasks that God has asked me to do” (O’Grady et al. 298). In a 
survivor’s oral history collected by Claire Payton, Protestant Francoise Erylne recounts “I 
wasn’t hurt at all…God did it for a reason, a well-determined reason” (Payton 241). As 
several years have elapsed since the earthquake and the collection of these accounts, it 
remains to be seen whether the survivors determined their special, personal calling or 
maintain an increased dedication to their faith.  
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After the 2004 tsunami, many Acehnese believed that the disaster was punishment 
for a lack of devoutness. In post-tsunami interviews conducted with survivors, many 
Acehnese saw Islam as both the cause of the tsunami—punishment for immoral 
behavior—as well as the “antidote to fear and grieving” (Miller 35). As a result, many 
Acehnese renewed their commitment to their Islamic faith and the enforcement of its 
principles. Faith was frequently referenced in post-tsunami survivor accounts and seemed 
to contribute to their understanding of the disaster as well as their outlook. There are 
stories of people praying to Allah while stranded on rooftops or floating in the water 
waiting for rescue (Samuels 217). Mosques were left standing in the debris field in 
villages like Lok Nga, serving as physical evidence of the divine at work (Hyndman 22). 
Many people also expressed the belief that their time of death had already been pre-
determined by Allah. There was no need to fear moving back into areas where the 
tsunami had hit because death could come anywhere; it was out of their control (Samuels 
213). 
Some survivors saw the tsunami as a cleansing force—or a warning—for the 
province to repent and grow stronger in their faith. The majority of Acehnese believed 
that the key to avoid another disaster was to adhere to sharia, and the message was 
repeated and reinforced by religious authorities during times of prayer (Miller 35). The 
NGOs that provided assistance in the area coordinated education programs to provide 
information about earthquakes and tsunamis and to address misplaced feelings of guilt. 
Mosques continued to promote the message that moral failings and divine intervention 
played a part in the disaster (Miller 35). 
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While sharia law had taken root in Aceh prior to the tsunami, the police force was 
established in the aftermath to ensure that the policies were adhered to (Hyndman 21). 
Although a stabilizing force during the tsunami recovery efforts, the enforcement of 
sharia law disproportionately punishes women as well as religious minorities. Islamic 
theologians in Aceh specifically placed blame on women for the tsunami, publicly 
criticizing their immodest dress and behavior (Hyndman 21). As stated by sharia judge H. 
Marluddin A. Jalil, “the Holy Koran says that if women are good then the country is good” 
(Miller 35). Jalil’s statements were not unique. Other Acehnese religious leaders offered 
as proof that women were at fault for the tsunami because more women died than men 
(Miller 35). In the years following the tsunami, sharia police were specifically ardent in 
enforcing restrictions on form-fitting clothing on women and shaming women that did 
not wear Islamic dress (Hyndman 21).  
The blame for the tsunami was not placed solely on women. There were reports that 
“Javanese government soldiers were smoking and drinking at an important religious site” 
only the night before the waves hit Banda Aceh (Hyndman 22). Again, this “moral 
inferiority” was cited as a potential cause for the tsunami, an incitement of God’s wrath 
(Hyndman 22). In other reports, the tsunami was also interpreted as punishment, or vonis, 
for Aceh waging war with Indonesia (Hyndman and Waizenegger 114). 
At the beginning of this chapter, I posed a question: can religious belief and practice 
benefit survivors of disaster and contribute to community recovery? The previous section 
explored how people relied on their religious beliefs and practices to navigate their post-
disaster circumstances. In this section, I chose to discuss how religious zeal can surface 
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following a disaster. In Haiti and Aceh, some survivors felt guilty because they believed 
that their improper behavior incited divine retribution. Others trusted that they had been 
spared for a particular purpose. However, religious leaders that appeal for devoutness 
while maligning women, Vodou practitioners, and other marginalized populations can 
aggravate existing community divisions.   
 
Religion as a Source of Community Conflict 
Despite the stability that religion provided after the disasters in Haiti and Aceh, 
diverging beliefs also led to tension. As introduced in the preceding section, discord 
emerged as particular religious practices—like Vodou and sharia—were targeted and 
denounced. Religious beliefs also reportedly complicated working relationships with 
foreign aid organizations. Some religious aid groups opposed beliefs that were unlike 
their own and prioritized conversion. The practice of Vodou and the controversial 
enforcement of sharia law were particularly polarizing. The challenges of working to 
address needs—while contending with complicated belief systems—are detailed in this 
section. 
Religious beliefs divided Haitian society along economic lines. The International 
Organization on Migration identifies “subcultures” in the Haitian socio-cultural system 
(Schininà et al. 161). The more educated upper and middle classes hold Catholic and 
Protestant values, and the lower class is guided by Vodou principles. Following the 
earthquake, there were instances of what were described as groups of primarily Protestant 
evangelicals at odds with Vodou practitioners. In one particular incident in the Cite Soleil 
  149!
neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, Protestant evangelicals attacked a Vodou memorial 
ceremony in honor of the earthquake dead. Urged on by a pastor, evangelicals threw 
rocks at the Vodou practitioners. As explained by Desmangles and McAlister, the 
purpose of the attack was to destroy Vodou ritual objects and deter the practitioners from 
contacting spirits (72). Following the well-publicized episode, Protestant religious leaders 
retracted their condemnation of Vodou in favor of a more tolerant approach.  
Religious organizations were central to the initial recovery efforts in Haiti. Staff 
and supplies were mobilized to earthquake-hit communities in the days following the 
earthquake. Some religious relief organizations were criticized by more entrenched 
NGOs for “not collaborating with more established missions that would stay in Haiti 
long-term” (Desmangles and McAlister 77). The criticism may be due to the religious 
organizations that deployed staff to the island with the primary goal of “saving souls” 
rather than addressing immediate physical needs. Vodou practice was a point of 
contention for some foreign aid workers assisting Haitians on behalf of Christian 
organizations. Material support often had an underlying theological agenda to “discredit 
and often vilify the indigenous belief systems” (Germain 251). Catholic aid groups took a 
more permissive approach to Vodou and blended religious beliefs, but Protestant 
churches largely disallowed theological overlap. 
Haitian evangelicals and American missionaries cast Vodou practice as an 
impediment to recovery efforts and at the root of the nation’s troubles. They criticized 
Vodou for its perceived fatalism. As one Haitian remarked, “…all over the streets, 
profiting from the destruction of Catholic churches, the ‘preachers of the militant hordes 
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of American churches,’ are calling for people to reject Vodou, which is them the cause of 
all the nation’s woes” (Le Bris 33). Protestant missionary preachers spoke out against 
Vodou practice and claimed “Jesus talks to them and tells them that Vodou is evil…” 
(Desmangles and McAlister 73). Vodou elder Max Beauvoir condemned evangelical aid 
efforts that prioritized converted Haitians and excluded Vodou communities (Desmangles 
and McAlister 73).  
Similarly in Aceh, sharia law was met with reticence from foreign aid workers, 
and it was a hurdle in how aid workers built relationships with the Acehnese. Aid 
organizations that were openly critical of sharia law—primarily Christian groups from 
North America—were asked to leave Aceh. Some chose to leave under pressure from 
Islamic groups or because attempts to convert the Muslim Acehnese proved unsuccessful 
(Miller 36).  
Miller cites an example of the Christian organization WorldHelp that attempted to 
relocate 300 Muslim tsunami orphans from Aceh. WorldHelp’s goal was to move the 
children to a Christian orphanage in Jakarta in order to convert them to Christianity 
(Miller 36). The Indonesian government intervened and ended the removal of any 
orphans from Aceh, and WorldHelp ended its work and fundraising efforts for tsunami 
victims. There was a parallel incident in Haiti in which American Baptist missionaries 
attempted to move 33 Haitian orphans from the country. It was discovered that the 
children were not orphans, and the scandal lead to increased scrutiny on religious groups 
working in Haiti (Desmangles and McAlister 77). WorldHelp may be viewed as an 
extreme example of a foreign organization flouting local religious customs. There were 
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numerous faith-based aid organizations working in Aceh and with the Acehnese without 
issue. These organizations refrained from evangelizing and criticizing sharia out of 
concern they may “undermine their credibility, activities, and community relationships” 
(Miller 37).  
The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) focused on reconstructing 
homes, mosques, and infrastructure in Aceh post-tsunami. The IIRO approached the 
reconstruction with an eye on religious needs and operated under the philosophy of 
“religious imperative that comes hand-in-hand with aid” (Miller 40). Their approach 
appealed to sharia law supporters in Aceh that saw the need for aid to include Islamic 
education in addition to physical repairs (Miller 41). Despite addressing faith-based needs, 
the IIRO and the affiliated World Assembly of Muslim Youth both had links to Al-Qaeda 
and were accused of using their humanitarian efforts as an opportunity to spread the 
radical ideas of Wahhabism (Miller 40). Suspect activities included the dispersal of 
Wahhabist literature as well as the emphasis on supporting worldwide, violent jihad 
(Miller 40).  
These instances of conflict suggest religious needs and differences may be a 
crucial concern for foreign aid organizations. If socioeconomic classes mirror the 
divisions of religious groups, there may be the potential for unequal aid distribution. 
Depending on the religious organizations that provide assistance following a disaster, the 
predatory practice of withholding aid in order to force religious conversion may emerge. 
The question remains as to if—or how—aid organizations could be monitored to ensure 
that preference is not given to one particular religious group over another. Regardless, it 
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may be beneficial for foreign aid organizations to understand local religious divisions and 
challenges in order to curtail inequality and avoid worsening contentious situations.  
 
Discussion 
In approaching this chapter about religious belief and practice as an important 
cultural concern, I focused on two research questions: Can religious belief or practice 
benefit survivors of disaster and contribute to community recovery? Additionally, how do 
aid organizations leverage and support religious beliefs and practices as part of their 
approach to working with disaster survivors? In regard to the first question, my research 
suggests that religion was a framework through which both the Acehnese and Haitian 
survivors began to understand and process the natural disasters. Religious belief can play 
a role in a community’s resilience because it provides “a sense of coherence within the 
chaos of disaster” (O’Grady et al. 290). Survivors looked to spiritual leaders for guidance 
and to religious practice for solace. As evidenced by both Haiti and Aceh, disasters may 
prompt self-examination and give people the impetus to live more purposeful or devout 
lives. Is this post-disaster religious devotion and self-reflection a short-term reaction? Or 
can disaster create long-term changes to a survivor’s values and outlook?   
Religious belief may also bring about less favorable outcomes in a post-disaster 
situation, including survivors experiencing feelings of guilt and helplessness. Religion 
has been used as a vehicle for excluding and vilifying segments of the population. Aid 
organizations may benefit from an awareness of religious divisions and inter-religious 
relationships in a community to ensure that protection and support is given to 
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underrepresented religious groups. Some Haitians—fueled by the words of religious 
leaders—blamed Vodou practitioners for the earthquake and targeted them with violence. 
Aid organizations may benefit from better understanding and anticipating religious 
divisions. However, what is their responsibility, if any, to interfere in a situation that 
involves religious violence against a segment of the population (e.g., Vodou 
practitioners)?  
The second research question focused on how aid organizations leverage and 
support religious belief and practice as an aspect of a culturally appropriate response. 
Based on my research, aid organizations can strengthen community relationships by 
recognizing that religion can provide comfort and stability for survivors and by making 
spiritual needs a priority. As discussed previously in this chapter, communities in both 
Haiti and Aceh expressed a need to bury the deceased according to religious tradition. 
Aid organizations were responsive to this particular concern and worked to come up with 
a solution. If this need—or other needs—went unacknowledged, what would the 
ramifications be for personal and community recovery?  
The importance of sharia is an important one for incoming aid organizations. 
Radical Islamic groups were opportunistic and introduced their message providing 
essential support. In order to combat radicalism, aid organizations may elect to provide 
direct and timely religious support. Conflicting religious beliefs and practices can lead to 
discomfort among responding aid workers, especially those with religious affiliation. I 
reiterate a question introduced earlier in this chapter: how would religious aid 
organizations be monitored to ensure that they were not threatening or coercing a 
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distressed population? Their assistance may be essential, but how might their 
involvement in relief efforts lead to further disruption?  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: HERITAGE PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN AID 
Previous chapters of this thesis focused on how cultural beliefs and practices were 
taken into account in several different aspects of disaster recovery. The central question 
explored in this chapter was prompted by the numerous local and international 
organizations that respond to cultural heritage believed to be under threat following a 
disaster. Natural forces destroyed cultural heritage sites and disrupted heritage practices 
in both Haiti and Aceh, and many of the responding organizations viewed their work in 
heritage protection and preservation as an essential part of a humanitarian response. In 
this chapter, I sought to answer the following question: what is the impact on a 
community when heritage sites are destroyed, heritage is threatened, or heritage practices 
suspended after a disaster?  
The definition of cultural heritage used in this thesis was introduced in Chapter 
Two and is reintroduced here. In summary, heritage may be defined as the product of 
shared beliefs, history and experience and may be tangible or intangible. Cultural heritage 
is of interest to this thesis because of its perceived benefits in a post-disaster environment. 
Local and international heritage organizations have supported protection and preservation 
efforts because it has been suggested that the shared nature of heritage can be “a source 
of identity and cohesion for communities disrupted by bewildering change and economic 
instability” (“Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativity”). Their post-disaster 
actions are in response to the idea that heritage sites and practices are “an anchor that 
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retains identity” (Rico, “The Limits of a ‘heritage at risk’ Framework, 159). Therefore, 
reestablishing such places and practices may be seen as an important undertaking for the 
wellbeing and cohesion of a community.  
This chapter studies how disasters impacted cultural heritage sites and practices in 
Haiti and Aceh with a specific focus on how it may affect community recovery. It 
examines the work of several key cultural heritage organizations—both local and 
international—to restore and protect cultural assets. It also raises important questions and 
turns a critical eye on the attention given to post-disaster cultural heritage, especially in 
relation to how heritage priorities are identified. The chapter concludes with a look at a 
museum exhibition that highlights how cultural production could contribute to 
community recovery after a disaster. 
 
International Aid Organizations Respond 
In the aftermath of the natural disasters in Haiti and Aceh, a number of 
international organizations mobilized to assess the damage and determine next steps for 
heritage sites. The Prince Claus Fund, UNESCO, and The International Committee of the 
Blue Shield are introduced in this section because they were involved in post-disaster 
cultural heritage support. These organizations initiated both large- and small-scale 
projects in tandem with local heritage organizations.  
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
established in 1945, advocates for culture at the core of development programs. 
UNESCO emphasizes the importance of tangible and intangible cultural heritage in its 
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various programs and identifies cultural heritage as an instrument for social stability and 
economic growth (“The Power of Culture for Development” 2). The organization takes 
on projects to protect and rehabilitate cultural heritage sites and museums and also trains 
cultural professionals. The organization’s World Heritage mission claims to identify and 
protect sites of special value to all people, not just those in the territory in which they are 
located. While raising the profile of cultural heritage worldwide, UNESCO has been 
criticized for the disproportionate number of European heritage sites on the list. 
The Prince Claus Fund is an Amsterdam-based organization founded in 1996 on 
the tenet that culture is a basic need. From the perspective of the Prince Claus Fund, 
every humanitarian emergency is a cultural emergency since the cultural values of a 
community may be threatened. After the looting of the Iraq National Museum in 2003, 
the Prince Claus Fund established the Cultural Emergency Response (CER) initiative in 
order to provide immediate aid to threatened or damaged cultural heritage sites. In 
practical terms, the CER program provides rapid, emergency aid to stabilize cultural 
heritage sites and works in tandem with a local partner organization. After stabilizing the 
site, The Prince Claus fund may assist in acquiring the funding necessary to complete the 
restoration work (Stolk 84). The Prince Claus Fund awards fairly small sums for the 
initial recovery work—capped at around 35,000 Euros per disaster (Stolk 84).  
The CER program takes action after natural disasters, manmade disasters, and 
warfare to protect the environment, people’s livelihoods, social networks, community 
values, and heritage. Its goal is also to raise awareness of how culture may be a basic 
need in times of emergency and is crucial for the “psychological survival of people in 
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disaster situations” (Mendez 4). The Prince Claus Fund believes that without prompt 
attention, psychological traumas may linger and hinder the healing and rebuilding process. 
Allocating resources cultural support can “contribute to [the] overall resilience and 
empowerment” of a population (Stolk 83).  
The International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) is an organization 
dedicated to the protection of cultural property from a variety of threats, both natural and 
manmade. It describes itself as the “cultural equivalent of the Red Cross” (“Who We Are 
& What We Do”). The ICBS is comprised of pillar organizations with specific expertise 
in museums, libraries, monuments, and archives. The Blue Shield symbol serves as a 
physical marker of cultural sites protected under the 1954 Hague Convention. The ICBS 
mobilizes to safeguard world cultural heritage sites in the event of an emergency, restore 
damaged cultural property, and assist professionals around in the world in disaster 
recovery. Local committees in 20 countries support the ICBS. The U.S. Committee of the 
Blue Shield (USCBS) is one such local committee. 
 The three aforementioned organizations are profiled in this thesis because their 
post-disaster work is driven by their belief in the social benefits of cultural heritage. They 
address post-disaster cultural heritage loss as an issue as significant as housing and 
healthcare. They often work in tandem with heritage groups and professional 
organizations in order to identify local priorities and address post-disaster needs. Their 
approaches vary and may include funding small-scale projects, collaborating on 
professional training opportunities, or creating global initiatives built on the benefits of 
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culture. The specific involvement of the Prince Claus Fund, UNESCO, and USCBS in 
Haiti and Aceh will be detailed in upcoming sections. 
 
Haitian Cultural Heritage 
In a 2011 article written for “Museum International”, Michele Duvivier Pierre-
Louis, former Prime Minister of Haiti, called Haiti a “paradox” (“Restoration and Social 
Value of the Historic Gingerbread Houses” 90). Haiti’s literacy levels are among the 
lowest in the hemisphere, but it is home to a number of award-winning poets, writers, and 
artists. However, few resources were available preserve cultural heritage sites and offer 
protection from environmental threats. In this section, I detail how Haitian cultural 
heritage was affected by the earthquake and assess the collaboration between 
international cultural organizations, Haitian groups, and the Haitian government to 
identify and address heritage needs. These points are explored in order to address how a 
community may be impacted when heritage sites are destroyed, heritage is threatened, or 
heritage practices suspended after a disaster. 
The 2010 earthquake directly affected Haitian cultural heritage sites. Haitian 
Wole Soyinka, a previous winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, describes the loss of, 
…the venerated spots and landmarks, the patina of ancestry of familiar 
walls, the communal spaces such as market squares, arbours, ageless trees 
under whose shade a community is renewed…where knowledge of 
identity passes from the old and is embedded in the young. (9) 
The destruction of significant community sites and familiar landscapes—as Soyinka 
describes—can translate into the loss of collective identity. Cultural heritage can inform 
the “living culture, its values, attitudes and sensibilities” and can serve as a reminder of 
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Haiti’s struggles and resilience (Kurin 30). Marie-Laurence Jocelyn Lassegue, former 
Haitian Minister of Culture and Communication, similarly puts forward that “the sense of 
identity and citizenship needed for social cohesion can only emerge when knowledge and 
skills are valued and passed on from generation to generation,” through the preservation 
and sharing of heritage (14). These statements suggest a belief that cultural heritage loss 
can disrupt the transfer of cultural knowledge, identity, and values to future generations 
of Haitians.  
The destruction of cultural heritage sites in Haiti was unprecedented. Libraries, 
historic buildings, museums, archives, art galleries, churches and artists’ workshops were 
both damaged and destroyed (Kurin 20). A number of foreign organizations—including 
UNESCO, USCBS, The Prince Claus Fund, and the Smithsonian Institution—arrived in 
Haiti to address the cultural heritage needs they identified, but local organizations were 
crucial to the response. Foreign cultural organizations supported Haitian agencies like the 
Institute for the Protection of National Heritage (ISPAN) and The Foundation for 
Iconographic Research and Documentation (FOKAL) with funding, resources, and 
expertise. The Musée du Panthéon National Haïtien (MUPANAH) withstood the 
earthquake and assumed a central role in the subsequent recovery efforts. In the 
immediate aftermath, its resources—including staff and storage space—were offered to 
other institutions and collectors (Paret 45). MUPANAH was viewed as an important 
guardian of Haitian cultural heritage before the earthquake and actively offered support 
(Paret 45).  
  161!
In March 2010, USCBS president Corine Wegener visited Haiti with Richard 
Kurin of the Smithsonian Institution to meet with Haitian colleagues and look for 
opportunities for a joint cultural heritage recovery project. The Haiti Cultural Recovery 
Project was organized in tandem with the Haitian Ministry of Culture and 
Communication—a branch of the Government of Haiti—and was managed by the 
Smithsonian Institution. The project relied on support from USAID, the National 
Endowment for the Arts, National Endowment for the Humanities, Institute of Museum 
and Library Services and other members of the arts community. Cultural preservation 
organizations—such as U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield, FOKAL, and UNESCO—
were key program partners.  
The murals of the Holy Trinity Episcopal Cathedral were of special concern to the 
Haiti Cultural Recovery Project partners. A collection of 14 murals at the cathedral—
including Marriage at Cana by prominent Haitian painter Wilson Bigaud—“offered a 
distinctively Haitian take on biblical events” and were painted by several Haitian master 
painters (Brubaker 46). Eleven of the murals were destroyed, including Bigaud’s work. 
Haitian sculptor Patrick Vilaire stabilized the surviving murals and protected the site 
from looting in the hope that “the murals could be saved and restored, and thus 
appreciated as part of Haitian and human patrimony” (Vilaire 26).  
At the time of the earthquake, there were few professionals in Haiti that were 
trained to address the damage. The Haiti Cultural Recovery Project was instrumental in 
pulling together a team to support and train Haitian colleagues to restore the three 
surviving murals. The mural restoration efforts were intended to demonstrate the how 
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closely the Episcopal Church was integrated “into the Haitian experience” and the role it 
plays in Haitian society (Delatour 149). Preserving the work of well-known artists brings 
up further questions around heritage priorities. Who recognized the master artists’ murals 
as worthy of such extensive attention and preservation? Is it members of the Haitian art 
community and international organizations that have distinguished it as culturally 
important, or ordinary Haitians that find it personally relevant?  
Several other Haitian arts organizations are mentioned in post-disaster accounts. 
The Centre d’Art, an institution viewed as a creative hub over its sixty-year history, 
suffered a total structural collapse. It trained a number of Haitian artists and facilitated 
the sale of their work. The extensive art collection kept onsite was damaged when the 
structure gave way. In the first month following the earthquake, staff members pulled 
works from the rubble by hand in an attempt to save what they could. The Centre d’Art 
became a partner in the Haiti Cultural Recovery Project in order to take advantage of “the 
expertise of foreign specialists versed in methods and techniques of conservation and 
restoration” as well as the additional training that was offered (M. Pierre-Louis, “Forging 
the Partnership” 59).  
Similarly, the 20,000 works of the Nader Museum—Haiti’s first private art 
museum—were trapped under earthquake rubble. George Nader, Jr. led a personal six-
month effort to retrieve as many paintings as possible because he felt that “national 
heritage, pieces of Haitian art that gave the people the sense of community and of being 
one, was at stake” (Kurin 32). Nader was able to unearth 16,000 paintings—3,000 of 
which were damaged—but the repair and re-housing process required resources and 
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expertise not found in Haiti. The Foundation for Iconographic Research and 
Documentation (FOKAL) and The Haiti Cultural Recovery Project mobilized to 
reassemble damaged artworks before restoration experts took over the process. In both 
the case of the Centre d’Art and the Nader Museum, it is unclear how the recovery efforts 
benefited ordinary Haitians, or to what degree they had contact with either institution. 
The work likely protected and elevated the profile of Haitian arts and artists on a global 
scale, but its local impact is more difficult to measure. 
There were a number of more public heritage sites that were mentioned in post-
disaster accounts. The majority of Haitian government ministry buildings—including 
finance, communications, and education—were reduced to their foundations (Katz 54). 
Journalist Jonathan Katz equated the destruction of the Haitian National Palace to “the 
destruction of the White House, the collapse of Westminster. The substance and symbol 
of the state itself was under those fallen domes and ceilings” (Katz 29). Despite the 
perceived failures of the government, the presidency seemingly held great symbolic 
meaning and importance for Haitians. As one Haitian remarked, “We saw the National 
Palace destroyed. I would like to see Haitian engineers rebuild it, not foreign engineers, 
so we can look proudly in the future and say that Haitians built the National Palace” 
(Katz 146). This sentiment suggests that people may value local participation and 
coordination in heritage restoration efforts. It also raises the possibility of potential 
benefits from undertaking more visible or widely symbolic heritage projects. 
The Prince Claus Fund was involved in Haiti prior to the 2010 earthquake. In 
2008, a year of multiple natural disasters in Haiti, the organization was involved in 
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emergency restoration work at several Vodou sanctuaries. Immediate action was taken at 
the sanctuaries of Ozias, Bernardo, Alberic and Ti Paul to preserve a number of paintings 
that offer historical insight into Haitian Vodou practice (Stolk 86). The Prince Claus Fund 
believed that preserving the shrines and the paintings would support Vodou-related 
artistic expression and creative output in Haitian culture. As mentioned in a previous 
section, some aid organizations demonstrated bias toward Voudou practitioners because 
of their religious beliefs. The Prince Claus Fund intentionally chose the sanctuaries to 
show support for Vodou practitioners. 
The same sanctuaries were damaged by the 2010 earthquake and once again 
required urgent attention. CER responded again to restore the sanctuaries because of the 
belief that they were an indispensable safe haven in a time of catastrophe (Stolk 87). In 
an essay for Museum International, Deborah Stolk of The Prince Claus Fund offered an 
explanation of why these sanctuaries were restored not once, but twice in the aftermath of 
natural disaster. Stolk explains, 
Restoring the spaces where Vodou is practiced offers the community a 
place to gather and grieve, a place to ask questions and to try to come to 
terms with recent events. Above all it offers a place with which people are 
familiar, where they feel at ease and safe. The restoration of the 
sanctuaries could provide people with a feeling of continuity and a sense 
of normality in a situation that was disrupted by disaster. (86) 
The decision to support restoration work at the sanctuaries was intentional, a show of 
support for practitioners at a time when Vodou culture was maligned. By focusing on the 
sanctuaries’ restoration, The Prince Claus Fund aimed to provide a refuge for Haitians 
looking for stability and normality. The project focused on a more public site, a different 
approach than the aforementioned efforts directed to private art institutions.  
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In addition to work at Vodou sanctuaries, the Prince Claus Fund brought 
international experts to Haiti to train local professionals and treat recovered library and 
archival collections. The project began in 2011 and focused on the recovery of 30 
libraries and archives in the greater Port-au-Prince area. The Prince Claus Fund assisted 
in the creation of a center to retrieve and treat paper documents damaged by the 
earthquake (Stolk 89). The Prince Claus Fund viewed the project as an investment in the 
libraries and archives that protected Haitian cultural heritage. The loss of archives and 
libraries was detrimental to Haitian cultural history, but it was also problematic in a 
practical sense for Haitians that lost official documents (Stolk 88). The Prince Claus 
Fund’s program may have helped Haitians by treating and returning their personal 
documents and restoring a sense of identity in the process.  
The Prince Claus Fund also assessed architectural damage in Port-au-Prince in 
collaboration with the World Monuments Fund. The “gingerbread houses” in Port-au-
Prince were a primary focus. The houses are a remnant of colonial occupation in the 
capital, but they are also recognized as a Haitian architectural style adapted to the 
environment and developed at a time of prosperity and creativity (Stolk 88). The distinct 
style is colorful and elaborate, with many structures incorporating steep pitched roofs, 
towers and turrets, and latticework on the exterior (M. Pierre-Louis, “Restoration and 
Social Value of the Historic Gingerbread Houses” 91). Many gingerbread houses were 
deteriorated and at risk of demolition prior to the earthquake. The CER program 
supported the conservation of the gingerbread houses, in part by training locals how to 
repair the homes (Stolk 88). The Prince Claus Fund saw value in their preservation 
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because—as discussed in a previous section—the architectural design was well suited to 
the seismic conditions and could provide insight for future construction.  
FOKAL, ISPAN, and other Haitian organizations also committed resources to 
address the deterioration of the gingerbread houses. The effort pre-dates the earthquake, 
but the disaster provided an opportunity to advance the project. The improvements were 
not intended to be limited to the gingerbread houses. FOKAL’s planned restoration of the 
gingerbread houses was intended to relay a strong message of “community urban renewal” 
(M. Pierre-Louis, “Restoration and Social Value of the Historic Gingerbread Houses” 97). 
There were hopes that the work would lead to the redevelopment of urban areas to 
include parks, gathering spaces, and overall neighborhood improvements. In addition to 
preserving these pieces of Haitian heritage, ISPAN hoped that the restoration of the 
gingerbread houses would bring tourists to these historic locations (Elie 24).  
Although several organizations committed to the restoration of the gingerbread 
houses, the community impact is unclear. FOKAL hoped the gingerbread house project 
would showcase Haitian creativity and allow culture to serve as a “uniting 
force…situating us in terms of our history, our collective memory and the present time” 
(M. Pierre-Louis, “Restoration and Social Value of the Historic Gingerbread Houses” 97). 
The restoration of the historic, unique homes was also intended to provide practical 
benefits—including the preservation of anti-seismic building techniques and 
revitalization of urban areas—but it is unclear if such projects benefited the community. 
There is little information cited as to the cultural significance Haitians assigned to the 
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gingerbread houses, or if the various programs and efforts achieved any of their intended 
outcomes. 
In addition to the smaller organizations, UNESCO was active in Haiti after the 
earthquake. UNESCO targeted projects to address the damage in the cultural sector and 
in education and infrastructure. The Action Plan for National Recovery and Development 
of Haiti—a publication of the Haitian government—stressed the importance of culture to 
economic recovery and growth in the following passage: 
Thus, if a country is to be restructured, it is essential that culture be a 
driving force that contributes as significantly to economic growth as do 
other key sectors of national life. Given the globalized environment, it is 
necessary to create conditions that allow the effective development of a 
market for cultural goods and services… (Government of the Republic of 
Haiti, “Action Plan for National Recovery” 34) 
Marie-Laurence Jocelyn Lassegue, introduced earlier in this chapter as the former Haitian 
Minister of Culture and Communication, also supported the idea of culture as a 
significant contributor to economic development. She called for the development of 
services and infrastructure around cultural heritage sites to drive cultural tourism 
activities. Lassegue envisioned a “creativity fund” for artists and craftspeople in Haiti to 
encourage cultural entrepreneurship and allow for professional training opportunities 
(Lassègue 14). With the extensive infrastructural challenges facing Haiti, and urgent 
needs in the healthcare and education sectors, it is unclear where the funding for such 
culture-based economic projects would come from.  
Cultural tourism is a frequently mentioned as a possible way to address some of 
Haiti’s economic issues. Jacmel—a center for Haitian art and craft production—was 
nominated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2004, before the earthquake damaged 
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the area. There are already designated UNESCO World Heritage Monuments in Haiti—
namely the Henry Citadel and the Parc des Ramiers—but there are numerous other sites 
that may be eligible for the same consideration. Jacmel’s inclusion as a World Heritage 
Site could mean opportunities for heritage tourism revenue because of the interest and 
value that such designation confers on a site. Haiti’s rich collection of legends and folk 
tales may also be seen as “assets” used to enrich a heritage tourism experience (Bertrand 
37). This raises important questions for organizations, like UNESCO, that identify and 
designate such sites. What are the criteria for a site or heritage practice considered worth 
preserving? In some ways, the feasibility of Haiti’s cultural tourism sector depends on 
foreign organizations like UNESCO and the locations that they believe are significant.  
This is not to disparage UNESCO for all of their work in Haiti after the 
earthquake. The organization was an important partner for several Haitian agencies and 
organizations. ISPAN, Haiti’s cultural heritage bureau led by Daniel Elie, made an effort 
to assess the state of Haitian cultural heritage sites after the earthquake. A small amount 
of funding from UNESCO provided urgent protection for three damaged buildings in 
Port-au-Prince (Elie 25). Elie published his cultural heritage documentation online so that 
the international community stayed up-to-date with the status of Haiti’s heritage post-
earthquake. UNESCO assisted by placing an emergency, temporary ban on the trade of 
what were identified as “Haitian cultural goods”, including artworks (“Emergency 
Actions in Haiti”). UNESCO supported cultural work in Haiti after the earthquake, 
especially in tandem with local organizations. The organization’s reach allowed it to 
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provide support to local organizations as well as monitor the heritage situation on a 
global scale.  
One UNESCO-sponsored project helped the Haitian street theatre troupe Zhovie 
stage a production of the play “Zonbi Lage” in an earthquake IDP camp. One of the 
actors, Jean Joseph, described the play as a “therapeutic experience” for the earthquake 
survivors, allowing for a moment of laughter and a buoyed sense of hope (Bokova, 
“Editorial” 7). Joseph supports the idea that to help survivors, “it’s not enough to give 
them food. Mental health counts as much as physical health” (Bokova, “Editorial” 7). 
UNESCO increased its sponsorship in accordance with high demand for the group and 
supported performances in other temporary camps.  
The use of theatre as a way to reach disaster survivors serves as a reminder to not 
overlook Haitian intangible heritage like folk tales, language, music, rituals, and dance 
when addressing cultural heritage needs. The performance of heritage can serve as a 
“living transmission of cultural knowledge and values” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 
Destination Heritage 166). After the earthquake, Carnival and rara (Holy Week 
processions) were suspended and Vodou ceremonies were derided because some Haitians 
saw the practice as the root cause of the disaster (Bertrand 35). It has been suggested that 
the performance of such heritage practices can aid psychological healing after a disaster 
because they can affirm cultural identity and build community connectedness and 
solidarity. 
A recurring theme of cultural heritage work in post-disaster Haiti is that culture 
has always been a “keystone of [Haitian] society” (Kurin 27). Heritage sites and cultural 
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practices were supported by numerous local and international organizations because they 
viewed their work as a way to offer support to Haitian survivors. Wole Soyinka wrote, 
“as the healers of the world rush to the aid of the wounded and the traumatized…writers, 
artists and intellectuals must join hands for the restoration of the mind. Libraries must be 
re-stocked, galleries replenished, and schools resuscitated” (10). Cultural heritage 
preservation was positioned as a noble endeavor, and numerous organizations mobilized 
to address heritage deemed to be at risk.  
Questions remain around who is leading the efforts to protect cultural heritage in 
Haiti. Do international organizations, Haitian cultural elites, or members of the broader 
community identify the priorities and direct the work? International and local 
organizations established protection and preservation programs for an array of heritage 
sites—Vodou sanctuaries, private art museums, and gingerbread houses to name a few. It 
is unclear if certain projects provide greater benefit to a recovering population than others. 
For projects at private institutions or other locations that are largely inaccessible to 
Haitians, do they provide any benefit at all? In some circumstances, it may be that artists 
and those employed in an arts or cultural field benefit more from the work of these 
cultural organizations than the community.   
 
Cultural Heritage in Aceh  
In comparison to the extensive cultural heritage programs launched in Haiti, there 
were fewer reports on the state of Acehnese cultural heritage after the tsunami. Aceh was 
not the only location affected by the tsunami, but it was the first area to be hit by the 
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waves (Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 164). After the tsunami, 
status reports were produced on a number of heritage sites in Aceh and other Indian 
Ocean nations. UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Sri Lanka were of initial concern, but 
little was initially reported around Indonesia (Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' 
Framework” 163). As Ginger da Silva and Iwana Chronis of the Prince Claus Fund note 
that Indonesia has “a high awareness of its cultural past and an impressive network of 
heritage organizations,” but little was communicated to the international community 
about the state of Acehnese heritage shortly after the tsunami (20). This section explores 
the work done primarily by Acehnese cultural heritage organizations to address the 
changes in the heritage landscape and how Acehnese were impacted by such a 
transformation. 
The tsunami impacted Acehnese cultural sites to varying degrees. The waves 
damaged structures and erased historic landscapes in Banda Aceh, the capital city of 
Aceh province. Archaeological sites in coastal areas were destroyed, and water carried 
away the batu Aceh, Islamic tombstones valued for their historical and artistic importance 
(Nurdin 94). Many mosques—due to the fact that they were built with high-quality 
concrete and reinforced with steel frames—withstood the waves and could be spotted in 
fields of tsunami debris (Cluff 14). As discussed in a previous chapter, some survivors 
believed the mosques were spared through divine intervention.  
The Aceh State Museum is of particular interest because it was built in the 
traditional wooden, raised Achenese architectural style. The museum is best known for its 
extensive collection of Islamic manuscripts, which—along with its extensive 
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ethnographical, historical, and geological collections—remained untouched by the 
tsunami. Therefore, the institution assumed a role as the “centre of efforts to protect and 
conserve Aceh’s manuscript heritage” after the disaster (Nurdin 96).  
In 2006, the BRR allocated funds to purchase 315 manuscripts to be kept in the 
collections of the Aceh State Museum. The purchase of the manuscripts ensured that they 
stayed in Aceh—and were not sold abroad—and was also intended to “[raise] public 
awareness of the importance of preserving cultural property as a source of national pride” 
(Nurdin 96). The connection of cultural heritage to a feeling of national identity and pride 
also suggests a sense of obligation or responsibility for its care.  
The Aceh State Museum partnered with the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies 
to develop a program to educate manuscript owners about the cultural and historic value 
of the texts (Nurdin 96). The museum offered to purchase manuscripts from individual 
owners and properly conserve them, but some owners donated their manuscripts to the 
museum and expressed they wanted to protect a piece of Acehnese cultural heritage 
(Nurdin 97). The Aceh State Museum used the tsunami as an opportunity to raise 
awareness of heritage that may have otherwise gone unnoticed. 
Although the Aceh State Museum’s collection of manuscripts was not impacted, 
private collections of manuscripts were lost. Furthermore, the Pusat Dokumentasi dan 
Informasi Aceh (Aceh Documentation and Information Center) building was completely 
destroyed (Nurdin 95). The Aceh Heritage Community Foundation (AHCF) also assisted 
with the recovery and replacement of the cultural documents kept at the Pusat 
Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh. The Librarians’ Association of Malaysia called on 
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libraries with Indonesian and Acehnese manuscripts and rare books to trace the materials 
to aid in the “rebuilding of [Aceh’s] cultural memory” (Baba 3).  
The Prince Claus Fund’s Cultural Emergency Response (CER) program funded 
and was involved in the reconstruction of a new library to house Islamic manuscripts in 
Arabic, Acehnese, and Malay (da Silva and Chronis 20). The initial earthquake—rather 
than the tsunami—damaged the library building and threatened the safety of the 
manuscripts. Although the Prince Claus Fund contributed to the recovery, the efforts to 
protect and replace the manuscripts appear to have largely been done on a local and 
regional scale through the work of Acehnese heritage groups and other organizations in 
Asia.  
The Aceh Heritage Community Foundation (AHCF) also conducted an initial 
assessment of Aceh’s heritage after the tsunami. It advanced a number of initiatives to 
document heritage sites and raise support for their safeguarding. The AHCF was driven 
by the belief that Acehnese cultural heritage “contributes to the psychological well-being, 
social pride and identity” of the province (Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' 
Framework” 164). Several years following the tsunami, the AHCF also conducted a 
survey of intangible heritage in Aceh with an eye on “reviving traditional practices” and 
livelihoods (Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 165). The AHCF 
created a public heritage trail program that highlighted surviving Acehnese cultural 
heritage sites. One heritage trail stopped at a graveyard used by the Dutch, Japanese, and 
the former Sultan to “demonstrate the rainbow of communities” represented in Acehnese 
history (Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 166). 
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The heritage trails also featured the “tsunami boats”. The tsunami boats—
watercraft of various sizes that were washed kilometers inland by the force of the water—
became “some of the most iconic and recognizable monuments to post-tsunami Aceh” 
(Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 167). Some of the tsunami boats 
were relocated to the sea during the cleanup process but others remained as memorials to 
the tsunami and “sites of memory” (Rico, “The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 
166). The boats became icons because they speak to “a strong theme of resilience and 
adaptation in Acehnese identity” and a local, shared experience of the tsunami (Rico, 
“The Limits of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 171). As the tsunami boats are tied to a 
recent event, they challenge a view of heritage as a present-day use of the more distant 
past (Hoelscher 202). Without an agreement on whether or not they should be considered 
heritage, it was difficult to secure preservation funding and resources to care for the 
tsunami boats.  
The tsunami boats illustrate how cultural heritage can communicate and validate a 
traumatic experience. In contrast, the Aceh Tsunami Museum created a great deal of 
controversy when it was opened in 2009. It was criticized for the cost of its construction 
at a time when tsunami survivors still needed resources. The museum was charged with 
poorly representing Acehnese identity, undermining the value of the Aceh State Museum, 
and furthering a “narrative of destruction” to draw tourist interest (Rico, Constructing 
Deconstruction 52-53).  
The Aceh Tsunami Museum was also accused of being a “culturally inappropriate 
form of dealing with psychological trauma and memorialization in contrast to the role of 
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prayer and mosques” (Rico, Constructing Deconstruction 53). The mosque and the 
meunasah—a space for prayer and social gatherings—were identified as the “most 
important elements of ‘cultural heritage’” in a community regardless of whether they 
were old structures or newly built (Daly and Rahmayati 65). The mosques had a 
comforting or healing quality for survivors and were valued for their role in religious 
practice and as social spaces. A survey of Acehnese villagers impacted by the tsunami 
found that many could not “conceptualize an Acehnese community in the absence” of a 
mosque or meunasah (Daly and Rahmayati 65). Both features were essential to “the 
fabric of everyday social life” and part of Acehnese cultural heritage because they were 
an expression of a community’s Islamic roots (Daly and Rahmayati 68).  
Preservation work in Aceh focused on cultural heritage that spoke to survivors’ 
Islamic identity. The preservation of Islamic manuscripts was a primary consideration for 
cultural organizations and institutions like the Aceh State Museum. Religious structures 
like the mosque and meunasah were viewed as essential to the restoration of community 
and revival of social practices. Post-disaster cultural heritage in Aceh can also be tied to a 
broader discussion of what can be considered heritage after a traumatic event. As 
Trinidad Rico explains, when a landscape is restored to its pre-disaster state, it erases the 
knowledge of how the changes came to pass. Allowing for new forms of cultural heritage 
to emerge can support “an effective transmission of this knowledge” (Rico, “The Limits 
of a 'heritage at risk' Framework” 172). The tsunami boats are an example of a new form 
of heritage that was embraced by many Acehnese as a reminder of their shared 
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experience and reinforced their resilience. This new form of heritage may be as impactful 
and important to survivors—if not more—than the manuscripts and other sites. 
 
Arts of Survival 
 The previous section briefly introduced the concern that cultural heritage 
preservation can halt the natural changes that occur in culture over time. Artistic 
production is one way that change—prompted by disaster—can be represented. The 
Museum of International Folk Art in Santa Fe, New Mexico hosted an exhibition in the 
summer of 2011 entitled The Arts of Survival. The purpose of the exhibition was to 
highlight the use of folk art to assist in the recovery of populations affected by natural 
disaster. As written in Saving Haiti’s Heritage, “cultural expression always accompanies 
disaster…it is the way we humans process the unfathomable” (Kurin 20). This section 
delves into an example of how folk art may be used as a means to heal communities and 
communicate a post-disaster reality. Folk art, as suggested by the works on display in 
Arts of Survival, can memorialize the dead, console the living, and help the community to 
recover from the effects of natural disaster, both economically and psychologically.  
The exhibition is centered on folk art objects and production, so it is essential to 
define “folk art”. Folk art, as defined in this thesis, expresses cultural identity though 
shared community values and aesthetics. Folk art first and foremost conveys a 
community’s cultural identity, rather than individual artistic identity. In other words, the 
artist draws from established cultural and community design principles in order to 
reference a shared community identity. While the folk art in Arts of Survival is not 
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necessarily produced with national identity in mind, folk art and folk culture have often 
been tied to ideas of nationalism and national roots. 
Folk art can also be seen as a form of living cultural heritage, an expression of 
cultural identity, and the mechanism through which a group of people are connected to a 
place. As Arts of Survival curator Suzanne Seriff states, survivors of a disaster are “faced 
with tasks that require the most basic humanity and the most humble creativity—to 
comfort, to rebuild, to petition, to record, and to create” (Seriff 62).  As explored in Arts 
of Survival, folk artists approached these tasks in order to strengthen their communities 
because they believed in their ability to “reflect our deepest emotions through their 
creative expressions” (Our Inspiration/Our Mission).  
Folk art, as cultural heritage, can communicate “identity in terms of family, 
religion, folklore, geographic location, and the time in which [the artist] lived” (Carlano 
2).  This connection to a place and time is evident in many of the works on display in Arts 
of Survival. New Orleans folk artist Joe Minter used salvaged pieces of wood and metal 
to tell the story of Hurricane Katrina. With paint and phrases—often religious—added to 
the pieces, Minter's folk art communicates ideas about the African American experience 
in America as well as his personal experience of life in the South.  The creation of a folk 
art piece in the shape of Louisiana is a literal representation of place, as are the names of 
the wards and areas affected by Hurricane Katrina.  
In another example, Indonesian artisan and master puppeteer Ki Enthus Susmono 
brought “hope and inspiration” to Javanese affected by the eruption of Mt. Merapi using 
familiar and beloved shadow puppet figures (Seriff 62). Mt. Merapi has an important 
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place in the “physical and spiritual landscape” of Indonesia, and its depiction as a puppet 
builds upon its long ties to Javanese life. Susmono created and incorporated imagery of 
the eruption of Mt. Merapi into his work in order to encourage Javanese to move on with 
their lives. The puppets also communicated important information about current events 
and recovery efforts. The shadow puppet depictions and retelling of the disaster story 
unites survivors in the present and confirms their shared Javanese identity.  
Lucy Lippard, in Between Art and Anthropology, identifies “diaspora, post-
colonial discourse, emigration, immigration, and vulnerable national boundaries” as raw 
material and lived experience from which artists work (33). Natural disaster becomes a 
new sort of “raw material” from which folk artists in the Arts of Survival may draw. In 
the context of disaster and recovery, folk art production takes on additional meaning and 
significance. Well-known Haitian painter Prefete Duffaut died in October 2012, less than 
a year after the earthquake. Duffaut was well known for his idyllic and imagined rural 
scenes, but he stated that his “future paintings will be inspired by this tragedy” (Brubaker 
39).  
The resilience and imagination of the Haitian people, especially in times of great 
stress, may be evident in the works created to record and to cope with the earthquake. 
Vodou is a defining force in Haitian life and culture. Haitian artists draw a great deal of 
inspiration from Vodou. The gede are the spirits that embody death and have frequently 
appeared in Haitian art. The gede also are associated with regeneration and hope. As the 
gede are closely tied to death, they are also linked to the domain of the cemetery, imagery 
that frequently crops up in Haitian art. Evelyne Alcide is a folk artist who produces 
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Vodou ceremonial flags in her own workshop.  Traditionally, the flag portrays symbols 
of lwa or spirits.  After the earthquake, Alcide used the disaster as “raw material” and 
produced “a series of sequined portraits depicting the dismembered bodies in the National 
Cemetery, crushed by concrete blocks and collapsed power lines” (“Evelyn Alcide”). She 
also illustrated spirits bringing comfort to the earthquake victims. 
The Arts of Survival exhibition is one example of how identity may be 
communicated through art forms rooted in culture and place. The folk artists in the 
exhibition drew upon familiar forms—like puppetry and Vodou flags—to attempt to tell 
the story of a contemporary, traumatic event, memorialize the victims, and bring comfort 
to the survivors. The exhibition promotes the idea that their creative responses called 
attention to shared values and cultural identity and laid a path to community recovery 
(Seriff 62).  
 
Discussion 
This chapter explored the impact on a community if heritage sites are destroyed or 
heritage practices suspended after a disaster. Similarly, I sought to understand if heritage 
protection or preservation work resulted in positive outcomes for a community. The 
accounts of local and international organizations prompted a number of additional 
questions about how cultural heritage is approached in a post-disaster situation. The 
involvement of international organizations—like UNESCO, the Prince Claus Fund, and 
the Smithsonian Institution—raises questions around how value is ascribed to cultural 
heritage, and who identifies heritage “at risk” and directs preservation efforts. These 
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organizations provided needed resources, support, and staff expertise. However, it is 
important to consider “who defines cultural heritage and who should control stewardship 
and the benefits of cultural heritage” (Silverman and Ruggles 3).  
Responding international organizations may disagree with locals on what 
constitutes heritage and what is worth saving, which leads me to ask, how were heritage 
priorities defined in Haiti and Aceh? Western heritage values, for example, may prioritize 
the restoration of a built site over the ritual that takes place there (Silverman and Ruggles 
4). When these resource-rich cultural organizations arrive in a post-disaster situation, the 
question remains as to if they set their own priorities or if is it in their practice to work 
with local stakeholders. It may also be important for responding organizations to consider 
how professional training is commensurate with the resources available and respectful of 
local methods of care for cultural heritage sites and objects (Kreps, “Appropriate 
Museology in Theory and Practice” 25). 
There are a number of other issues raised by working with cultural heritage, 
especially when considering the potential to leverage heritage sites for tourism revenue or 
urban renewal. When UNESCO adds a site or heritage practice to one of its “world 
heritage” lists, there is a symbolic value that comes with the designation. Recognition for 
the sites is driven by the belief that “you cannot protect what you don’t value” 
(Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production” 57). Not only 
does this raise questions about whether locals ascribe the same value to these sites as 
UNESCO, but is there a suggestion that the only heritage sites or practices worth 
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supporting are the ones that can be leveraged for tourist dollars or generate revitalization 
projects?   
Furthermore, there are few concrete examples of how cultural heritage can 
contribute to community recovery after a disaster. The question still remains—does 
cultural heritage reinforce a shared identity, generate solidarity, and provide symbolic 
strength when there are urgent, basic needs that may go unaddressed in a post-disaster 
situation? Is funding for the Tsunami Museum, gingerbread house revitalization, and 
private art collections appropriate when disaster survivors lack access to adequate food, 
water, or shelter? Locals and foreigners working in the cultural realm produced the 
accounts of cultural heritage efforts cited in this chapter. Many of the projects tended to 
by international organizations—such as the attention given to private Haitian art 
collections—would seem to benefit a limited segment of the population, primarily 
cultural producers and consumers. Despite research into the work done by cultural 
organizations, I am unsure as to whether the benefits of cultural heritage are measurable, 
especially when looking at the situation broadly.  
In spite of these criticisms, efforts to restore frequently used places of worship 
and restart cultural heritage practices—like festivals—may benefit a wider segment of the 
population. The role of religion in post-disaster recovery was discussed in a previous 
chapter, but rebuilding places of worship—such as churches, mosques, and temples—
may be vital in a post-disaster environment. These sites communicate beliefs, values, and 
ideologies and are often essential to a community’s social life. Acehnese tsunami 
survivors could not imagine their communities rebuilt without a mosque and meunasah at 
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the core. Places of worship can support religious practice, aid a return to normalcy and 
stability, and may benefit a broader segment of the community.  
Natural disaster also presented an opportunity for new forms of cultural heritage 
to emerge. The tsunami boats are a display of heritage and are “active vehicles in 
producing, sharing, and giving meaning to popular understandings of the past” 
(Hoelscher 203). The displaced boats can reinforce Acehnese cultural values of resiliency 
and adaptation and carry the collective memory of the tsunami. Heritage may be actively 
produced and “embodied in people and not just societies in the past” (Silverman and 
Ruggles 7). Disaster has the potential to spur creative production as people search for 
ways to understand and process their trauma. Intangible cultural heritage—legends, 
beliefs, music and dance—is the “greatest inspiration” for artists, writers, and performers 
(Bertrand 37). As evidenced in “Arts of Survival,” Vodou beliefs were fused with folk art 
traditions to produce artworks that speak to a collective identity and shared past.  
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CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Sphere International Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards was 
drafted in the 1990s and was accepted by many international humanitarian agencies. A 
key passage in the charter explains, “we acknowledge that it is firstly through their own 
efforts, and through the support of community and local institutions, that the basic needs 
of people affected by disaster or conflict are met” (“The Humanitarian Charter”). The 
idea that people affected by a disaster have the cultural systems and social support 
mechanisms in place to inform their recovery, and set their own priorities, was an 
important topic in this thesis. Aid organizations may able to provide more efficient, 
directed assistance if they are conscious of the cultural practices around decision-making, 
resource allocation, and addressing loss, and look to align their involvement with these 
systems. 
Haiti and Aceh were linked in the media through the repetition of the “build back 
better” mantra, but there are several other parallels that helped to ground this comparative 
study. For example, Haiti and Aceh experienced periods of destabilization in their 
respective histories. The effects of foreign occupation, misguided aid programs, and 
armed conflict were explored in greater detail in Chapter Three. Both Aceh and Haiti 
have strong religious foundations, which influenced community priorities and affected 
how some aid organizations interacted with disaster survivors. As noted in Chapter Seven, 
certain organizations viewed sharia law and Vodou as progress-resistant practices that 
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complicated humanitarian aid and development programs. Within these broad similarities, 
there were also nuanced differences. For instance, both Haitians and Acehnese had a 
complicated relationship with the national government. Despite the tensions between 
Acehnese and the Government of Indonesia, the province benefited from the strength of 
the government-created BRR. The centralized and relatively powerless Haitian 
government possibly hindered Haiti’s recovery. It was with these similarities—and 
differences—in mind that I examined aspects of the disaster response through case 
studies and a comparative analysis. 
In Chapter One, I outlined the primary, general interests of my research. I sought 
to understand how disasters affect shelter in the short- and long-term as well as how it 
influences living arrangements. Also of interest was how the experience and expertise of 
responding aid workers interacts with local knowledge and community decision-makers. 
I was interested in how local economies function post-disaster as well as if religious 
belief and practice have some bearing on community recovery. Cultural heritage 
intersected with the other areas of inquiry because of its potential to propel both social 
and economic recovery. 
The central research questions were established in Chapter Two and are 
reintroduced below. While these questions are not an exhaustive list of post-disaster 
considerations, they were formulated to explore a related set of human concerns and the 
influence of local cultural forces, traditions, and beliefs in the recovery process.  
• How are habitation patterns and social relationships impacted by disaster? 
• What is the role of shelter in the recovery process?  
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• Did aid organizations approach rebuilding homes in ways that support local 
cultural needs and environmental constraints?  
• To what extent do cultural differences present a challenge to disaster recovery? 
• How do aid organizations and disaster survivors negotiate cultural differences?  
• How do aid organizations work with community groups and social institutions to 
address needs?  
• In what ways does natural disaster impact livelihoods and the economic system? 
• Can aid organizations support economic recovery through employment 
opportunities without creating new dependencies? 
•  How did aid organizations support or ignore religious practices, beliefs, and 
institutions and integrate them into their efforts? 
• What is the impact on a community when heritage sites are destroyed, heritage is 
threatened, or heritage practices suspended after a disaster? 
These questions provided a lens with which to analyze post-disaster accounts, aid 
organization program surveys, and cultural organization studies, among other documents 
and resources. Although Haiti and Aceh are geographically and culturally distinct, a 
comparative study of the two disaster response efforts elicited a number of similar 
challenges, misguided actions, and positive directions. Therefore, I perceived there to be 
a set of general recommendations or considerations for future humanitarian relief 
scenarios.   
The conversation around appropriate housing—both transitional and permanent—
can be expected in a post-disaster situation. A few recommendations may be elicited from 
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the successes and failures of the response in Aceh and Haiti. Tents, shared barracks, and 
more established T-shelters are perhaps best conceived of as transitional structures. The 
temporary camps in Haiti described in Chapter Four were described as overcrowded, 
chaotic, and unsafe. The examples described in this thesis suggest that insufficient 
housing can perpetuate a feeling of instability and can delay the return to social and 
economic normalcy. The centralization of resources in temporary camps can also separate 
survivors from their home communities and disrupt social networks. In Aceh, poor 
planning divided members of the same gampong—and even the same family—between 
multiple government barracks. The separation created conflict within the community and 
complicated the allocation of resources.  
Thinking broadly, a temporary housing model that keeps families and villages in 
as close proximity to their homes as possible during rebuilding may provide a better base 
for other aid organization programs. Rather than centralizing resources in overcrowded, 
inadequate temporary camps, supplies could either be handed out through satellite supply 
distribution points or through the networks of community and religious leaders. These 
approaches may allow for socio-cultural systems of support to remain intact and 
functioning despite outsider influence.  
Based on survey results from Aceh, survivors preferred that aid organizations led 
housing reconstruction but with local input. They disliked assuming responsibility for the 
physical construction of their homes because—as non-experts—construction took longer. 
Construction delays prolonged their reliance on temporary housing and postponed a 
return to their pre-disaster livelihoods. In general, resident input was critical in 
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determining how their home fit their cultural and social needs. Standard housing models 
are preferred by aid agencies for efficiency and cost, but modifications may help the 
housing fit the cultural needs of a particular place. One solution may be providing 
residents with a small fund to modify the standard model to support cultural practices and 
fit family requirements over time. There may also be an opportunity for international 
organizations to innovate new models of post-disaster housing that address cultural 
preferences, protect against environmental hazards, and respond to ecological concerns. 
There are also opportunities to learn from housing models rooted in culture, as traditional 
architecture may be more environmentally responsive. In Haiti and on the Indonesian 
island of Nias, vernacular structures were more earthquake resistant than concrete 
construction.  
Other factors influenced habitation patterns in a post-disaster situation. At the 
time of the earthquake, Haiti had a high number of renters who could not lay claim to 
replacement houses offered by aid organizations. Many survivors were left with the 
choice of leaving Port-au-Prince to stay with family in the rural interior—where there 
were few job opportunities and little aid support—or staying in an overcrowded, poorly 
equipped temporary camp. Acehnese tsunami survivors faced challenges of their own, 
but community-mapping programs helped to allocate land in the absence of paper records. 
In a number of locations, the gampong structure was leveraged as a temporary camp 
alternative.  
Cultural differences between aid workers and disasters survivors can also be a 
challenge in a post-disaster situation. Chapter Five detailed various tensions that emerged 
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because many foreign aid workers lacked a fundamental understanding of cultural 
practices and beliefs and had limited interaction with local people. Disaster survivors 
were also wary of the policies and practices of aid organizations. For example, the 
implementation of sharia law was a point of contention between aid workers and 
Acehnese. Aid workers were uncomfortable with the uneven application of sharia 
punishments. Similarly, Acehnese religious leaders were fearful the arrival of non-
Islamic foreigners would threaten the moral foundations of the province.  
It is difficult to say how such fundamentally different principles can be overcome. 
However, aid organizations may want to provide advance training and equip aid workers 
with strategies to navigate such situations. It benefits aid organizations and disaster 
survivors alike to avoid a difference of belief devolving into a more confrontational 
situation. For example, the presence of UN and American soldiers at supply distribution 
points reinforced a pervasive stereotype of violent and dangerous Haitians while 
simultaneously amplifying a sense of fear among the earthquake survivors.  
The physical distance between aid workers and disaster survivors may have also 
contributed to a lack of engagement with the affected population. It is improbable that aid 
workers and organizations can deliver culturally responsive aid when they have little 
understanding of survivors’ day-to-day life. Many aid workers lived apart—offshore, in 
the case of UN workers in Haiti—from the people they were directed to support. In order 
to facilitate better working relationships, the parent organization may choose to establish 
an expectation that aid workers live and work alongside the project stakeholders before 
any long-term development project can be implemented. In this situation, an 
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anthropologist can serve as a cultural mediator and make recommendations for how aid 
workers and locals can partner. As discussed in previous chapters, collaboration between 
aid organizations and communities—through cultural structures like the gampong—led to 
greater program success. 
There is also variability between aid organizations describing their projects as 
participatory and the degree to which their process is collaborative. Many Haitians were 
kept from active involvement because critical meetings were held on the UN Logistical 
Base instead of out in the community. Discussions were in English or French, not Haitian 
Creole. The Haitian government was largely excluded from decision-making processes, 
which made it appear to be unable to care for its citizens. These forms of exclusion 
reinforced the belief that white foreigners decided Haiti’s future, and Haitians had little or 
no say in development projects that they did not want. Some aid organizations in Aceh 
touted their projects as participatory, but community members claimed they were 
consulted only at the beginning of a project. There is an opportunity for increased 
awareness among NGOs in terms of the ways in which stakeholders are routinely 
excluded from involvement and how local knowledge and participation has been utilized 
in a token or patronizing way. Community member involvement throughout the recovery 
process—not just at the outset—may help to ensure a program’s cultural relevance and 
applicability.  
The natural disasters in Haiti and Aceh were economically disruptive. Cash-for-
Work (CFW) programs were one tactic implemented to provide short-term monetary 
support while other income sources were unavailable. The short-term CFW programs in 
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Aceh were vital because the tsunami greatly impacted the fishing economy and the 
income generated from the coastal ecosystem. However, critiques of the post-disaster 
CFW program—especially those implemented in Haiti—cited concerns around 
dependence on NGOs for employment opportunities. Post-earthquake employment 
opportunities in Haiti were generally limited to exploitative, low wage jobs in foreign-
owned garment factories. Therefore, the employment opportunities proffered by NGOs 
were preferred. Given the likely economic challenges in a post-disaster situation, there 
may be an opportunity for aid organizations to further explore how to support alternative 
employment opportunities in the informal sector, entrepreneurial endeavors through small 
business loans, and training for careers typically given to foreign workers.  
In Haiti and Aceh, economic support for the rural hinterland was generally not 
considered in plans to decentralize overpopulated urban areas and address issues of 
poverty. Rural workers, farmers, peasants, and GAM soldiers did not receive the same 
economic support as the costal, urban communities. These examples of urban-rural 
divisions demonstrate how rural populations in particular may be economically 
marginalized. Monsanto’s donation of hybrid seeds—an example mentioned previously 
in Chapter Six—underscores how concerns around dependency also apply to aid offered 
to rural communities.  
Chapter Seven explored how aid organizations were challenged by communities’ 
religious beliefs and practices. Religion can be a stabilizing force in a traumatic post-
disaster situation, and aid organizations may be better able to support communities by 
addressing faith-based needs early in the humanitarian response. Religious beliefs and 
  191!
practices are a central aspect of culture, and aid workers—and their approaches—can 
benefit from understanding the ideology and worldview of the people they assist. The 
question remains as to how—or whether—to provide oversight and ensure that NGOs do 
not discriminate on the basis of religion, give preferential treatment to people of their 
own faith, or mandate conversion before support is offered.  
The preservation of cultural heritage post-disaster was a formative concept for 
this thesis and was further scrutinized in Chapter Eight. A number of international 
organizations—UNESCO among them—espouse the idea that cultural heritage sites and 
practices communicate cultural values and identity. Heritage protection and preservation 
projects are driven in large part by the belief that cultural heritage sites can connect 
communities with the past and ground their lives in meaning. However, there are a 
number of concerns around diverting resources to such projects. Some heritage 
projects—for example, the restoration of “gingerbread houses” in Port-au-Prince—may 
have a narrow public reach and relevance. This may mean that the projects’ benefits are 
also limited. It may be difficult to justify expenditures on seemingly extraneous cultural 
heritage projects if there are urgent physical needs that are unmet. Furthermore, it is 
unclear if locals or international organizations are more likely to identify heritage 
priorities and guide preservation efforts. It may be useful for aid organizations to respond 
to what communities identify as important in a post-disaster situation rather than 
prioritizing sites identified as globally valuable.  
Despite these challenges, cultural heritage can be a valuable resource in the 
recovery process. Heritage can support the cultural beliefs, values, and social practices of 
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disaster-affected communities and aid a return to normalcy. Additionally, heritage and 
cultural practices can help fulfill basic needs following a disaster. There is practical value 
in vernacular housing models that better resist environmental threats or traditional 
leadership structures that can distribute emergency supplies more efficiently.  
Disasters will continue to occur, and based on the information gathered in this 
thesis, there is additional work to be done in terms of humanitarian response efforts. 
While many of the issues and recommendations are specific to a particular place and 
context, aid organizations may choose to take a more proactive approach and invest in 
advance preparation. Improved training and planning for humanitarian emergencies may 
help to ensure both basic, physical needs as well as cultural needs are met.  
Aid organizations may also decide to institute policies in support of more 
substantive engagement between workers and disaster survivors. For example, they may 
establish guidelines that require key staff members to live and work in the communities 
in which projects and programs are planned. This may provide greater insight into how 
communities are equipped to meet their own needs. Better understanding of cultural 
beliefs and practices may also help to communicate information about disaster 
preparedness and causation. More work is likely needed to streamline the disaster 
response process and address the issue of abandoned aid projects.  
 Humanitarian emergencies are complicated situations. The two particular 
disasters explored in this thesis are no exception. Reflecting on misguided aid efforts in 
Haiti, Jonathan Katz suggested, “the urge to help seemed to have overpowered the desire 
to do so thoughtfully” (Katz 79). There are numerous aid organizations and individuals 
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with a desire to help. Despite their good intentions, communities are more likely to 
benefit if they are guiding their own recovery and their cultural beliefs, practices, and 
values are at the heart of humanitarian response. 
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